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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents an explorative study of the place of caring in bioethics. 
Through the examination of various sources of literature from the disciplines of 
nursing, feminist theory and ethics, and bioethics, a case is developed that 
argues for a valid respected place for caring, as an ethic of care in bioethical 
decision-making. Evidence is presented and examined from all three disciplines 
including critiques of caring, an ethic of care, and bioethics from all disciplinary 
perspectives.  
The case is built by providing evidence to support the fundamental importance 
of caring to human life, health, relationships, and survival at the broad societal 
level. This is supported by more detailed and specific evidence regarding the 
value and the ‘good’ of caring and the ethical aspects of caring. This is 
presented from the feminist and nursing perspectives, along with a critique of 
the negative aspects of caring practices. The next stage of the case presents a 
layout of the discipline of bioethics, using an historical perspective to illuminate 
the influences of bioethics’ deep past, as it still affects the discipline in the 
present. The development of contemporary bioethics’ current status is 
presented along with critiques from bioethicists themselves, and nursing and 
feminist theory and ethics.  
In the case at this point, from a bioethical perspective, two major predicaments 
appear to prevent an ethic of care obtaining a valid place in ethical decision-
making in bioethics. These are the justice/care duality, and the conflict between 
different conceptions of care and autonomy. The bioethical objections and 
arguments put forward regarding these predicaments are picked up, 
meticulously and comprehensively examined and refuted, establishing a sound 
case for the inclusion of an ethic of care in bioethical decision-making. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
CHOOSING THE LENSES AND TAKING A BEARING: AN ORIENTATION 
TO THE THESIS 
 
”On the road to find out” (Cat Stevens, 1979). 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the topic of the thesis 
and explain how the topic came into being, and how the investigation was 
organised. 
 
Focus of thesis 
This thesis is an exploration of the place of caring in bioethics. The starting 
point, or impetus for this thesis, stems from my assumption of the fundamental 
importance and ethicality of caring, in human, (and nonhuman) health, 
development, quality of life, and survival. This assumption I have developed in 
reflection and over time from a combination of knowledge, learning, and 
experience as a nurse and as a student. In particular, from tertiary nursing and 
women’s studies; as a patient with a chronic disability; and as a human being 
who is also a woman. It has led me to hold the perspective that the profound 
importance of caring, and its ethical aspects, to human and nonhuman life, 
requires that it be included in ethical decision making particularly in the 
healthcare arena which is the realm of bioethics. To be even more direct I would 
say that I do not believe ethical decision making is actually “ethical” without 
including a caring perspective, that is, an ethic-of-care, into the decision making 
process. This thesis then proceeds with an attempt to articulate and support this 
perspective and the assumption it is based on by exploring and drawing from 
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 selected sources of literature on caring and bioethics from the feminist, nursing, 
and bioethical perspectives. 
 
Personal statement/reflection  
The creation of this thesis has come about through the coalescing of several 
factors and circumstances. It begins with the combination of fourteen years’ 
experience of nursing education and practice and twelve years’ experience, 
education, and survival as a patient with chronic pain and disability. From this 
combined experience I have had the opportunity to experience and come to 
know deeply and profoundly, both as a nurse and patient, the fundamental 
importance of caring to health, human development, and quality of life, as well 
as the powerful and sometimes transformative healing it can produce.  
 
My understanding of health is that an absence of disease and or disability, even 
the presence of a terminal condition, is not a requirement for health. Health, 
from my experience and understanding, consists above all of good quality 
relationships that involve loving and caring. They also involve a sense of 
belonging, a sense of self worth, a connection with the natural world and the 
other creatures that share it, having a vision for the future and being able to 
make plans that can give a reasonable chance for achieving the vision. In my 
view health, and caring, is often largely about helping to remove obstacles, and 
providing the right needs at the right time. From both sides of my 
nurse/patient experiences a genuine caring relationship can provide the 
knowledge, understanding and sensitivity necessary to know what really 
counts as an obstacle to a particular person in their particular context and to 
judge along with them the right need and the right time to move into action, or 
not to act, as the situation may require. From my perspective when this is 
achieved and caring is done well it is an extremely valuable complex skill and 
one that requires considerable amounts of intellect, self-knowledge and 
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 awareness, courage, general knowledge, and experience. This level of skill also 
requires time, effort, commitment, ongoing learning, and reflection. 
 
This form of caring within the profession of nursing and directed purposefully 
towards the health of another human being is not just a simple, easy, natural, 
instinctive, instantaneous occurrence, although those descriptors can all be 
applied in some caring situations. It has always seemed to me in nursing that 
the greater the caring skills, experience, and development the less obvious they 
are, and thus appearing simple, natural and unsophisticated, are easily 
overlooked by an untrained eye, and frequently go unrecognised for the artful 
scientific skills they really are.  
Main argument 
The primordial source underpinning the development of this thesis is a belief in 
the good of caring and a deep concern for the erosion in the valuing of caring 
both within nursing and on a more general societal level. The devalued status 
of caring is not new. It has an historical basis in long-standing philosophical 
and social issues and inequities. However, over the last decade there have been 
radical changes in the healthcare system with the implementation of neo-liberal 
policies of economic rationalism and the exposure of healthcare services to 
market forces. This has markedly heightened my concern for the exacerbation 
of the erosion of caring particularly in the healthcare system. This exacerbation 
has been clearly articulated by Jane Kelsey in her book The New Zealand 
Experiment: A world model for structural adjustment? published in a new edition in 
1997. While acknowledging that caring has negative aspects, flaws, and traps 
for the unwary, I still believe despite this, that caring is fundamentally 
necessary for the quality of relationships, development, health, peace, well 
being, safety, and ultimately the survival of human beings. These beliefs and 
assumptions are both personal, deeply professional, and indubitably rooted in 
the social, and cultural and contextual circumstances and influences in which 
the personal, professional, political, gender, race, and class aspects of myself are 
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 entwined and embedded. However, I am neither alone nor unique in my 
position. 
 
I share with Bowden (1997) her “intuition that caring is ethically important”. 
And that “caring expresses ethically significant ways in which we matter to 
each other, transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond 
ontological necessity or brute survival” (p. 1). I concur with Benner and Wrubel 
(1989) who also believe that caring sets up what matters to a person thus 
providing a differentiated world in which there are meaningful distinctions that 
provide motivation and direction, and provides the positive freedom to choose 
and act (pp. 1-2). Of course the freedom to choose and act does not come alone, 
it is paired with the requirement to take responsibility for those choices and 
actions. In order to stop further erosion of the valuing of caring, I agree with 
Watson (1990b), that “approaches to knowledge that preserve human caring as 
the interface between technologic and bio-behavioural sciences, and ecosystems 
need urgent research” (p. 21). Most importantly, I believe that caring as “the act 
of reaching out to someone who is ‘other’, with the intention of meeting that 
other’s need for their own sake, and in full recognition of their uniqueness and 
intrinsic value as a human being, is one of the highest forms of humanity. It is a 
truly healing and a deeply ethical act” (Cleary, 1999, P.166).  
 
It is what occurs in the true partnership relation, that experienced, expert 
nursing practice continually strives for, despite increasing time and institutional 
pressures. Given the ethical nature of caring practices (Fry, 1989, 1990; Watson, 
1990a, 1990b; Benner, 1991, 1994; Gastmans, 1998, 1999), it makes sense that 
caring should be involved in our ethical deliberations and decision making. As 
Watson (1990b) states, “We need windows and doors that embrace the 
humanity and the relational life processes of patients, nurses and ecology…” 
(p.23). In order to take a more authoritative position and establish a basis for 
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 future work, a comprehensive exploration of the literature concerning caring, 
bioethics and the state of relations between the two was undertaken. 
 
Background 
With this understanding and a measure of frustration and puzzlement at the 
lack of valuing and understanding of this that I encountered within the 
healthcare system, vertically as a nurse and horizontally as a patient, I 
embarked on the MA Applied (Nursing) to extend my knowledge and give me 
the opportunity to teach nursing as a way of remaining sane and in nursing 
despite some level of disability.  
 
Within the MA (Applied) program in the Graduate School of Nursing and 
Midwifery at Victoria University of Wellington, I took two papers NURS 521 
Health Policy and an Ethic of Care, and NURS 531 Nursing, Midwifery, and 
Health Services in Aotearoa/New Zealand that had a watershed effect on my 
thinking regarding caring and ethics within nursing. These papers underpinned 
and developed not only my understanding of the challenges to caring in 
healthcare but the importance of the legal and most particularly the ethical 
aspects of caring. In the first paper NURS 521, I developed a connection with 
the ethic of care and a broad understanding of the critique and discussion 
surrounding its establishment and acceptance within feminist theory, nursing 
theory and bioethics. Importantly, the political aspects of the position of caring 
and an ethic of care were brilliantly brought out into the light by the paper 
coordinator Joy Bickley with the relevant astute information and observations 
she shared with us, not to mention the well chosen speakers from the wider 
community invited to present to us on this subject and related issues.  
 
In this paper I found theories, ideas and information that joined with my own 
thinking and began to give me some ideas and tools to express my deeply held 
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 concern for what I perceived as a increasing lack of valuing and erosion of 
caring within the healthcare system. The latter paper required the preparation 
of a paper for presentation at a relevant conference entitled “ Care, politics, and 
an ethic of care”(now published in the Journal of Law and Medicine) and 
submitting it for presentation at the conference. I was astonished but elated 
when my paper was accepted. I went to Melbourne and presented it at The 
Australian Institute of Health, Law, and Ethics conference on “The Costs of 
Health”. This paper expressed my concerns about the effects of the increasing 
undervaluing and erosion of care on people’s health in the context of the radical 
economic changes in the healthcare system. The paper also outlined the 
importance of caring, its ethical aspects, and some possible reasons for their 
increasingly low value status and position, in particular the political and moral 
boundaries.  
 
It was not my presentation so much but the actual attending of this 
multidisciplinary conference that was a significant galvanising step in the 
development of ideas leading towards this thesis. As the conference proceeded, 
it became evident that amongst the other disciplines of bioethics, medicine, and 
law, there was a glaring, although not quite total, lack of consideration of caring 
as an ethical or valuable factor in health. This seemed especially so when 
reducing costs was an issue. In further discussions with conference attendees I 
was struck by the other disciplines’ representatives apparent lack of knowledge 
of the wealth of theory, research and scholarly writing that has been developed 
within the discipline of nursing and feminist theory (and even other bioethicists 
and philosophers and noted scientists) regarding caring, its importance, ethical 
aspects, in relation to health. To me it seemed they were all thinking and 
writing (and making decisions, policies, and laws) with only “part of the story” 
completely either ignorant or dismissive of an entire relevant body of 
experience, research and theory. I was informed by a bioethicist that as the only 
nurse, my presentation had been novel, interesting, enjoyable even, but I had 
ruined my credibility by citing work by Carol Gilligan. He said hadn’t I known 
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 “that Gilligan was marginalized in mainstream bioethics and no longer 
considered of any significance (personal communication, Dr Daniel Sullivan, 
October, 1998). A discussion ensued from which Dr Sullivan eventually 
departed, but not before admitting that different approaches to ethical 
situations could be helpful and an ethic of care could be reconsidered (Personal 
communication, Dr Daniel Sullivan, October, 1998). 
 
My thinking turned to what the possibilities might be if there was more 
dialogue and information sharing across disciplines particularly in regard to the 
ethical nature of caring and its relationship to people’s health. This remains my 
long-term goal, to work and write in the interdisciplinary area concerning 
ethics and caring. However, more immediately important was a need to learn 
more, a desire to know and understand to increase my knowledge about 
bioethics and what place caring could or should have within it.  
 
Methodology 
This was a personal journey of exploration and immersion in literature, taken to 
expand my understanding and knowledge of the nature of caring and its place 
in bioethics. Selected sources of literature from the disciplines of, nursing, 
feminist theory, bioethics and other relevant related areas were utilized in this 
journey taken by the author in the form of an extensive literature review. The 
online databases CINHAL and Bioethics Line were accessed through OCLC 
First Search and OVID and used to search for relevant peer reviewed articles 
between 1975 and 2001. Articles and books unobtainable from the Victoria 
University of Wellington library were sourced through their interloan service or 
from the medical library of the University of Otago School of Medicine 
(Wellington), and the Law Library of Victoria University of Wellington. Books 
and articles were also sourced from the Massey University, Wellington, library, 
and the New Zealand Nurses Organisation library. The Publication Manual of 
the American Psychological Association was used for referencing and citations 
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 and grammar, and every care has been taken with the referencing and citations 
to eliminate any mistakes and potential plagiarism. It is to be understood that 
the choices of literature, decisions and overall perspective brought to bear in the 
development and resulting finished thesis are overall, from and influenced by, 
my social and cultural background, my life experiences both personal and 
professional. The worth and validity of this work rests on its level of coherence, 
and its making sense and fitting or resonating with the reader’s perspective. 
 
Organisation of the thesis 
To present the thesis in a consistent coherent manner that best displays the 
process and aim of the study to explore the place of caring in bioethics it has 
been organised into seven chapters. The first two chapters are concerned with 
introducing the subject of caring, and providing evidence of its place and 
position in society from a broad then a narrower focus. 
 
Chapter Two: Relation, health and reality: A wide-angle view of the 
fundamental importance of caring to human being. 
This chapter presents a discussion of the issues and implications surrounding 
the difficulties of defining caring. Evidence in support of the importance of 
caring to human life is presented from a broad societal perspective, and the 
chapter concludes with an indication of the predicament of the paradoxical 
position occupied in society by caring.  
 
Chapter Three: Caring: Positives and negatives through the feminist and 
nursing lenses. 
This chapter presents a narrower focus on the positive and negative aspects of 
caring from the feminist perspective and the nursing perspective. Both 
disciplines have considerable bodies of research and scholarship regarding 
what is seen as positive and negative about caring from each perspective. This 
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 is drawn from in order to present a greater depth and detail regarding not only 
caring, but also the ethical aspects of caring and its development as an ethic of 
care. Finally the similarities and differences of the two perspectives are 
discussed with possible implications for interdisciplinary dialogue. 
 
The next two chapters introduce bioethics as a subject and identify the main 
characteristics, important terminology and an historical perspective of the 
influences pertaining to its evolution. This perspective is aimed at presenting a 
clear picture of bioethics in its current form. To provide finer detail and depth, 
positives and negatives are discussed through a critique of contemporary 
bioethics from the bioethical, nursing and feminist perspectives. 
 
Chapter Four: Bioethics: An orientation to the present, from a telescopic view 
of the past. 
This chapter deals with the issues of clarifying confusing terminology and fluid 
boundaries in bioethics as a fast growing and developing discipline. As 
bioethics was formed in part from philosophical ethics, the past and continuing 
influences of this genealogy are presented in order to indicate that connections 
between past and present have been, and still are, significant in shaping 
bioethics. 
 
Chapter Five: Contemporary bioethics: A critical portrait from the bioethical, 
nursing and feminist perspectives. 
This chapter presents an outline of the significant features of contemporary 
bioethics, the closer connection to law, the increasing multidisciplinarity and 
the effects of plurality and the postmodern perspective. In order to provide 
more depth and detail of both positive and negative aspects, as with caring, 
critique of ethical decision making, focusing largely on clinical practice, is 
presented from the bioethical, nursing, and feminist perspectives. 
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The next chapter diverges from the previous pattern and takes from the 
previous four, what stand out as the most significant predicaments, or 
difficulties involved in caring having a place in bioethics, and explores some 
possibilities for their solution or management. 
 
Chapter six: Possibilities for a place for caring in bioethics: Adding some new 
lenses. 
This chapter examines two significant predicaments in finding a place for 
caring as an ethic of care in bioethics, the care/justice duality, and the problem 
of the conceptualisation of autonomy. Evidence is presented supporting 
different ways of approaching these two predicaments, that possibly may 
contribute towards their resolution. 
 
Chapter Seven: Discussion and reflection. 
This chapter concludes the thesis with a final discussion of the conclusions and 
limitations of the study, followed by an outline of the implications of the study 
and its relevance to nursing. Finally, a reflection on the process of the study, 
and directions for the future are presented. 
 
Terminology 
In this study I make no distinction between the terms ethical and moral. The 
term ethics is often seen as representing formal universalisable theory and the 
term morality as representing more informal private personal ideas and values. 
In fact, according to (Ladd, as cited in Johnstone, 1994) there is no 
philosophically significant difference between these terms and they can be used 
interchangeably and according to personal preference.  
10 
 In this study I use the term patient rather than client. While I don’t feel satisfied 
with either term I have, on balance, decided on the former.  
 
Summary 
The purpose of this initial chapter is to introduce the reader to the topic of the 
thesis of an exploration, the place of caring in bioethics, and provide an 
orientation to this study. It outlines the focus of the study, how it came about, 
how it was carried out and how it has been organised for presentation to the 
reader 
11 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
RELATION, HEALTH AND REALITY: A WIDE ANGLE VIEW OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF CARING TO HUMAN BEING. 
 
“ The essence of what it means to be human is not to be found in the individual human 
being but in the personal relationship which exists between two human beings.” 
(Feuerbach, as cited in Buber, 1970) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of two exploring the nature and importance of caring. 
Both this chapter and the following chapter are concerned with providing the 
reader with background evidence on caring with which to proceed to the later 
chapters that explore more directly the issues regarding caring and its 
relationship with bioethics. The purpose of this first chapter is to present from a 
broad societal perspective, the complex and critically important nature of caring 
within the reality of everyday human existence. This includes examining the 
difficulties and desirability of defining caring, exploring and elaborating the 
fundamental importance of caring to human health and relationships, and 
ultimately human survival. It also attempts to illuminate the paradoxical 
position that caring occupies in society, and the mechanisms that maintain this 
paradox where the importance and ethicality of caring is obscured and 
devalued. 
 
The complexity of defining caring 
Before attending to the nature of caring in relation and in health, it is necessary 
to look at the problems of defining caring. This needs to be dealt with first 
because how ideas about caring are formed is a fundamental issue that affects 
the reality of not only how caring is seen, but indeed whether caring is seen. 
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 The issue of defining caring has significance throughout this thesis, not least in 
the specifics of the relationship between caring and bioethics.  
 
The multiple manifestations of caring 
Caring is a broad, complex, multifaceted, ubiquitous and essential phenomenon 
that is deeply embedded in virtually every aspect of human daily life. Every 
culture has its own word(s) or action(s) that represent caring. However despite 
this, caring can still be recognised throughout the world, if not by verbal 
expression, then at least by its non-verbal and sometimes even more eloquently 
expressive body language (Ekman as cited in Darwall, 1998, p.265). Leininger 
(1981), a nurse theorist, has concluded from her studies in the area she describes 
as transcultural caring, that caring is “an essential human need for the full 
development, health maintenance, and survival of human beings in all world 
cultures” (p.3). Tronto (1993), a feminist political theorist, also agrees that caring 
is multifaceted, global, and both culturally and biologically essential. She states 
that  
 
…despite the fact that the meaning of care varies from one society to another, 
and from one group to another, care is nonetheless a universal aspect of human 
life. All humans need to be cared for, though the degree of care that others must 
provide depends not only on culturally constructed differences, but also on the 
biological differences that human infants are not capable of looking after 
themselves, and that sick, infirm and dead humans need to be taken care of (p. 
110). 
  
In this sense, from its everyday necessity and occurrence across cultures, caring 
can be seen as a concept that has to some extent a universal aspect. However, 
Tronto (1993) further explains that despite all human beings’ need to be cared 
for “…care is not universal with regard to any specific (my emphasis) needs” 
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 (p.110). In agreement with this, Bowden (1997) states, “What goes as caring and 
what is understood as its ethical significance are by no means indisputable in 
any particular case” (my emphasis) (p. 1). Therefore, although there may be 
universally recognised aspects to caring, in any particular instance, caring is 
expressed in a unique manner that is directly related to the situational context 
in which it is occurring. Thus, caring can be seen to have both particular and 
universal aspects. As a result caring can and does take on a rich diversity of 
forms, in a vast range consisting of both concrete and intangible, verbal and 
non-verbal features, that can in turn be arranged in a multitude of combinations 
(Bowden, 1997; Carse, 1998; Darwall, 1998; Little, 1998; Tronto, 1993). 
 
Although one of the most common approaches that people take to begin to 
understand something is to look for a succinct definition that applies always 
and everywhere, given the nature of caring as outlined above, such a definition 
seems unlikely. The multifaceted contextual diversity of caring, including both 
universal and particular aspects, despite the logical presence of some 
commonalities and near commonalities, bestows upon caring a fundamental 
unpredictability that defies capture in one concrete definition.  
 
The unpredictability and uncertainty concerning caring, and its resistance to 
definition, do not fit well with proponents of the scientific and positivistic 
perspectives, and others who insist on precise measurement and categorising 
for material, economic, or knowledge development purposes. These 
perspectives are not without value but they are based on the long-standing, and 
pervasive notions of certainty and predictability where there is the existence of 
one ultimate truth that will explain all (Capra, 1985). It must be pointed out that 
this is one way of seeing but not the only way. Capra points out that other 
perspectives or paradigms exist that are also of value and can contribute much 
to human life. However he also points out, that although the scientific positivist 
perspective is no longer quite as dominant as it has been in the past, in many 
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 areas and on many levels it still provides the criteria for what is accepted as 
knowledge and therefore what is deemed valuable.  
 
Caring is not by any means the only such phenomenon to be unpredictable and 
resist definition so strongly. Of particular interest, given the nature of the 
traditional scientific perspective, the predicament of attempting to define caring 
concretely, has a most striking parallel found deep in the heart of science itself. 
Similarly unsuccessful attempts have been made within the discipline of 
physics to concretely define subatomic particles. In the esoteric realm of particle 
physics, scientific experiments set up to measure and define subatomic particles 
have demonstrated repeatedly that the subatomic particles, that is the electrons, 
protons, and neutrons in the nuclei of atoms (literally the basic matter of the 
universe) do not exist as single concrete objects as expected. According to Capra 
(1985) “Depending on how we look at them, the electrons, protons and 
neutrons appear sometimes as particles sometimes as waves” and further, that 
this variable nature “…is also exhibited by light, which can take the form of 
electromagnetic waves or particles (photons)” (p.67). 
 
In much the same way as with caring, the moment you choose to focus on a 
subatomic particle to measure and define it, it becomes something else and the 
particle changes form. Thus it is impossible to absolutely define the particle as 
you only ever see one part or aspect of the whole of what the particle (or caring) 
can be at any one time (Capra, 1985; Prigogine & Stengers, 1987). What has been 
demonstrated in these experiments is that the specific properties a subatomic 
particle displays at any particular time, has been repeatedly shown to be 
dependent on its environment. Also, the perspective and approach that is 
brought to the particular observation by the person attempting the 
measurement has been established as directly influential on the outcome 
(Capra, 1985; Khun, 1999; Prigogine & Stengers, 1987). In short it introduces 
15 
 uncertainty and choice into a science based previously on certainty and 
unequivocation. According to Prigogine and Stengers (1987)  
 
All description thus implies a choice of the measurement device and a choice of 
the question asked. In this sense, the answer, the result of the measurement does 
not give us access to a given reality. We have to decide which measurement we 
are going to perform and which question our experiments will ask the system. 
(p.224)  
 
Ultimately, the implication for physics is that this undoes the classical notion of 
objectivity and, at the same time, removes certainty, as has been formally 
substantiated by the “Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations”, a formula that 
mathematically describes the phenomenon of uncertainty as discovered in 
Quantum theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1987, p.225). Rephrased with regards to 
caring, the above quotation would read as – All description of caring thus 
implies a choice of the definition employed and perspective applied. In this 
sense, the answer, the result of the chosen definition does not give us access to a 
given reality. We have to decide which definition we are going to use, and 
which perspective that in our attempts to define caring, will be brought to bear 
on the caring situation. It can be seen that attempting to define caring closely 
fits with attempts to define this quantum phenomenon. According to Prigogine 
& Stengers (1987)  
 
…there are various possible individual points of view on subatomic particles (or 
caring) from a viewer’s perspective, but they all deal with the same basic 
universal reality - subatomic particles the matter of the entire universe - (the 
universal aspects of caring), but it is impossible to reduce them to one single 
definition. (p.224).  
 
16 
 In summary, to borrow further from Prigogine and Stengers (1987), caring 
exists as “an irreducible multiplicity of representations” (p.225), and should not 
and indeed cannot, be truthfully represented in a single concrete definition. 
This has important implications for how we approach the development of an 
understanding of caring, in that ultimately we are responsible in terms of our 
choices, and ethics for our perspective of caring. This will be pursued further on 
in this chapter. 
 
If it is accepted that a concrete definition of caring is not possible, except 
presumably under the constraints of individual, specific and non-transferable 
parameters, how does one go about formulating a deeper understanding and 
knowledge of such a complex phenomenon as caring? It is precisely because 
caring can be so many things to so many people, that the question ‘what is 
caring?’ according to Kitson (1993)  
 
…is a question of concept, in that to understand the word ‘care’ the individual 
must engage in looking critically at what care means to him, to people around 
him, how it is described in literature, the media, defined by scholars, and so on. 
A definition of caring is not what is needed, but rather a divergent exploration of 
how ordinary people use the word (p. 28). 
 
Thus, rather than pursue a single concrete definition, each person needs to 
embark on their own journey and formulate their own conceptual 
understanding of caring. As Kitson further explains 
 
Concepts have both a logical and psychological dimension to them. They parallel 
the meaning or definition of certain words, but derive their special use from 
being able to map out and explain what meaning individuals attach to certain 
things (1993, P.29). 
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However, this does not necessarily mean the creation of multiple 
incommensurate individual understandings of caring. The process of an 
individual forming a concept of caring is unique to the individual, but within 
that process we draw from a pool of common experiences by virtue of being 
human and also by belonging to groups and cultures. Thus the individual 
concepts will have a range of greater and lesser degrees of commonalities 
among them. The common human, biological, and cultural aspects of lives in 
some cases, provides similar but not identical experiences and contexts that 
imbue individual conceptions with commonalities. These in turn provide links 
that according to Kitson (1993), we can then use to create a shared or common 
understanding of the issue in question.  
 
Caring is not the only term better understood using a conceptual approach as 
opposed to concrete definition. My point in emphasising this here is that, as 
opposed to simply accepting a definition formulated by someone in a 
dictionary or elsewhere, in the process of concept formulation the individual’s 
attention is harnessed and focused intently and critically on the object or 
phenomenon in order to reach an understanding and form a concept of it. This 
is significant because caring is so deeply embedded in people’s lives that much 
of it passes by us unnoticed and that which is unnoticed is taken for granted 
(Greenleaf, 1991, p.74). Therefore this engagement and attention focused on 
caring is much needed and most welcome, and there is the hope that it may 
take the person beyond their everyday superficial assumptions and ideas 
regarding caring. This is explained well by Kitson (1993) where she says that, 
“Using and talking about concepts has the effect of making us self conscious 
about words that we have hitherto used without thinking (my emphasis)” (p.27). 
She further elaborates that, “we become more conscious and look critically at 
our actions, reflecting on both the action and the significance of that action.”(my 
emphasis). Finally, Kitson (1993) emphasises that in sharing our concepts once 
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 formulated they can contribute to an even deeper and broader understanding of 
the phenomenon. This approach appears to be particularly fitting in the case of 
developing any depth of understanding of caring, or other phenomena that 
exist as irreducible multiple representations. 
 
At this point for the sake of clarity, as a beginning understanding, and in order 
to have something to hang our developing conceptual ideas on, it is necessary 
to provide a very basic, broad, but workable description of caring. According to 
Tronto (1993), “On the most general level care connotes some kind of 
engagement” and she further explains that it carries with it two additional 
aspects “first, care implies a reaching out to something “other” than self 
…Second, care implicitly suggests that it will lead to some type of action” (p. 
102). I would add to that description by including that the action implicit in care 
would be intended to be beneficial, and that it can be extended to the “self” as 
well as someone or some thing “other”. Human beings have the ability to be 
self aware as Fromm (1975) points out, “Man… has awareness of himself, of his 
fellow man, of his past, and of his possibilities for the future.” (p.14). Staying at 
the very broad descriptive level, caring can also be viewed as a “species activity 
that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so 
that we can live in it as well as possible” (Fisher &Tronto as cited in Tronto, 
1993, p.103). Tronto herself adds “that world includes our bodies, our selves, 
and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life 
sustaining web” (1993). 
 
No single description can be held as representative of all that caring can be, at 
best, we capture only one facet of the whole, or at worst a distorted perspective 
of its nature and form. According to Dunlop (1994), if caring “could be captured 
by rules, it would not be caring.” (p. 38), and she uses the example of language 
to elaborate on her statement by saying that 
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 If, for example, we consider language, we can see that our culture provides us 
with a vocabulary of words and patterns for their use, but to simply use set 
words and follow set patterns is, in an important sense, not to really speak the 
language. Similarly, our society can be seen as providing us with examples of 
caring, but to simply copy these is to lay oneself open to the charge that one does 
not really care. (Dunlop, 1994, p. 38). 
 
It still remains that a means of forming a useful and workable understanding of 
caring in its complexity needs to be found. Bowden (1997) has developed a way 
of apprehending the complexities of caring, involving the examples of caring 
provided by society, not by copying them but by using them in a very specific 
manner. Bowden has based studies of ethical caring practices in her book 
Caring: Gender sensitive ethics on the examination of multiple examples of caring 
practices. Her aim was to show that the complex “plurality of possibilities 
expressed by different forms of caring in different persons’ lives” (p.11) could 
be captured, made visible and understood without resorting to reductionist 
methods. Bowden employs the idea that her investigation is not directed 
towards phenomena but “towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena” 
(Wittgenstein as cited in Bowden, 1997, P.2). This idea comes from aspects of 
the second major work of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) titled 
“Philosophical Investigations” published in 1953 two years after his death. This 
second work of Wittgenstein was notorious for being the complete and utter 
antithesis of his first ardently positivistic and most influential work the 
“Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus published earlier in 1921. Bowden works with 
the Wittgensteinian notion from the second work, Philosophical Investigations, 
that understanding a concept is a practical capacity involving “knowing how to 
go on using it - of knowing the salience of the uses given in the explanatory 
examples - when other examples are encountered.”(Wittgenstein as discussed 
in Bowden, 1997, p. 13). That is, as Bowden explains, a concept is best 
understood by giving examples of particular ways the concept is used, not by 
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 defining its boundaries or by giving a complete reductive analysis of its 
function. 
 
According to Bowden (1997) when faced with the interpretation of multiple 
possibilities (as in the case of caring) it is possible to see that conceptual 
explanation is a matter of assembling particular exemplars that direct interest in 
a particular way (p.13). From Wittgenstein’s perspective, clarity of 
understanding or ‘perspecuity’ as he describes it, “is produced by a discerning 
juxtaposition of different ‘objects of comparison’ that enables appropriate 
connections to be made among them.” (Wittgenstein as cited in Bowden, 1997, 
p. 13). Bowden interprets this as meaning that “a survey of different examples 
can guide understanding by pointing to patterns of similarities and 
dissimilarities among them that bring a certain dimension into focus”(pp.13-14). 
Further surveys can then be done that draw attention to other dimensions, and 
therefore understanding. In this case of her investigation of caring practices, 
understanding comes from multiple surveys of examples of the caring practices. 
According to Wittgenstein, as cited in Bowden (1997), developing this form of 
understanding does not entail “limitless manipulations of examples”, the 
assembling of examples is not infinite but is constrained by the range of 
particular purposes the assembler shares with those persons she/he is engaged 
in communicating with (p.15). 
 
This provides something of a caveat, however, as a survey of ‘objects of 
comparison’ according to Wittgenstein as cited in Bowden (1997), “can only 
produce understanding when it brings to light patterns or connections that 
reveal dimensions of meaning hitherto hidden or dormant in the practices of 
those who would understand ”(p.15). Thus Bowden interprets in relation to her 
work that “ a survey of different relations of care can only produce 
understanding of caring if it illuminates aspects of caring that already lie 
implicit within the range of those seeking understanding” (p.15). This 
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 interpretation is very important and has deeper significance for the relationship 
between caring and bioethics to be discussed further in chapter three. With 
these parameters understood, Bowden carried out her enquiry “by surveying 
the possibilities and limitations of four examples of caring relations: mothering, 
friendship, nursing and citizenship” (p.15). Each chapter takes one of the caring 
practices, drawing attention to the particularity of its contextual setting and the 
specific kinds of relational concerns that the setting brings to bear on the form 
of caring expressed. Within each chapter Bowden (1997) juxtaposes different 
writers’ perspectives on the practices under consideration, thereby following a 
process that repeats the survey method and connects the separate chapters This 
allows the development of a comprehensive understanding of caring under the 
guidance of learning what is salient in each context. 
 
In summary, Bowden’s method of apprehending the complexity of caring is 
through investigating the caring practices of mothering, friendship, nursing, 
and citizenship. The investigation is based on an idea from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein of developing an understanding of complex phenomena by, in this 
case, examining multiple examples of caring practices. This is done by 
collecting and presenting a range of examples of each practice set in its own 
particular context that are then juxtaposed and compared from different 
perspectives (writers). The process involves moving back and forth among the 
examples noting similarities and dissimilarities. In this way, understanding of 
the complex phenomena of caring is gained without using reductive processes 
that destroy the integrity of the wholeness of caring.  
 
The invisibility of caring practices 
Bowden’s use of comparing examples of caring provides a possible pathway to 
understanding the multiple manifestations of caring in a manner that is more 
able to reflect and preserve its complexities and wholeness. However, there is 
another barrier besides the difficulty of defining or understanding and 
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 developing knowledge about caring. It is that caring and care work is largely 
invisible (Tronto, 1993). This barrier has the ability to undermine the usefulness 
of Bowden’s approach and any others developed. The reason is that, at the most 
fundamental level caring must first be seen, it must gain people’s attention, be 
recognised as valuable and worthy of attention in order for efforts towards 
understanding and investigation to be stimulated. Unfortunately in much the 
same way as people are largely unaware of breathing as they go about daily 
living, (unless it is somehow impaired), so too the myriad daily caring acts pass 
largely unnoticed by our conscious awareness. Bowden (1997) points out that 
we often miss as Wittgenstein has observed, “the aspects of things that are most 
important for us… because of their simplicity and familiarity”(P.5). She further 
explains this feature of caring in the following manner 
 
The very common and everyday nature of our involvement in caring relations- 
from the deep intimacies of family relations to the innumerable, publicly 
exchanged gestures and words of personal significance that craft institutions 
and communities- produces an aura of invisibility. (Bowden, 1997, p.5-6). 
 
This “aura of invisibility ”serves to obscure caring from the focus of our 
attention. This invisibility of caring, together with the inability to adequately 
define caring (for those who insist on definition or measurement in order to be 
acceptable), and the considerable effort and resources required to develop other 
ways of understanding caring, constitutes a formidable double barrier. This 
barrier effectively prevents the recognising and acknowledging of the real 
importance and value of caring within the many aspects of human life. Quite 
simply you cannot come to know or value what you do not see or recognise. 
Greenleaf (1991) provides a clear example of this in her discussion of how 
caring is influenced by its social context, firstly by the expectation that caring 
acts will occur within that context, and secondly by the resources brought to 
support such caring acts. She gives the following example  
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If, for instance, we establish an AIDS hospice to provide a humane place for 
people with AIDS who are dying, the intention is for caring acts to occur there. 
In fact, the expectation is so strong, so unequivocal, that it seems to be stating 
the obvious to even mention it. The notion of caring acts is so deeply embedded 
in the meaning, the intent of hospice, that it usually remains unstated. The 
taking for granted of such caring acts, this notion that they are inherent in 
certain social contexts renders the acts themselves, and the people who perform 
them invisible (Greenleaf, 1991, P. 72). 
 
A flow on effect from this is that unseen invisible caring acts cannot be 
recognised as important or valuable and therefore do not register as requiring 
any resources to support them. The results of this are as Greenleaf continues to 
explain 
 
If the social context establishes an intent for caring acts to occur but fails to 
provide the necessary resources to sustain them, caring will fail in spite of the 
most heroic efforts of individuals to sustain it alone. It is easy to imagine how 
individuals may then be held responsible for the failure of caring even when the 
breakdown is in the supportive system or context. The potential for, and some 
would say actual, scapegoating of women – who perform most of the caring acts 
– for system failure is great. (1991, P.72-73). 
 
This demonstrates not only consequences of the invisibility of caring, but also 
the critical integral nature of the relationship between caring and the context in 
which it occurs which is a fundamental characteristic feature of caring, as 
Greenleaf (1991) also explains 
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 Failure to recognise the relation between caring acts and their social context 
keeps hidden from view the civilising contributions of caring. It keeps hidden the 
power that caring has for altering not just the reality for individuals within the 
caring act itself… but also to alter the meaning of the context, and the world 
beyond it by making them more humane (p.73) 
 
Another very important area of human life where the contributions of caring 
and caring work are invisible, and their power and potential for influencing 
change is also hidden is in economics. Tronto (1993) points out that “care 
consumes a large part of our daily lives although we do not pay systematic 
attention to this dimension of life” (p. 111). If caring consumes a large part of 
our daily life it would seem logical and appropriate that it would be significant 
in economic terms. Although the perceived increase in financial costs of caring 
for health problems in healthcare systems has been a significant focus (Kelsey, 
1997) most of the everyday caring and caring relations, according to Waring 
(1988), that work to produce sustain and maintain individuals’ and 
communities growth, development, health and quality of life are not significant 
in economic terms. More insidious than this, there is evidence that caring is 
actually excluded from local, national and international accounting systems that 
are used to inform economic and social policy development, and resource 
allocation (Waring, 1988). In her book Counting for Nothing,  
 
Waring demystifies economic accounting systems, clearly explains and exposes 
unequivocally how the particular selectivity of the United Nations System of 
National Accounts (UNSNA), excludes and makes economically invisible 
women’s unpaid caring and labour. She also exposes that this system of 
economic accounting lacks any imputed value for the environment. According 
to Waring (1988), the UNSNA is a system of economic measurement used 
globally by the World Bank, the International Monetary fund, and the United 
Nations (UN) agencies, and has been adopted and used by many national 
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 governments (including New Zealand). She further explains that the selectively 
gathered information from this system is used to determine aid, funding and 
resource needs, to project markets, plan investments and develop policy, 
globally, nationally (including social policy) and ultimately filtering down to 
local communities. The UNSNA is only interested in cash generating activities, 
and not productive capacities. Thus at all levels an enormous amount of unpaid 
productive and reproductive caring, and caring work is rendered invisible and 
valueless by this system. As Waring states 
 
The current state of the world is the result of a system that attributes little or no 
“value” to peace. It pays no heed to the preservation of natural resources, or to 
the labour of the majority of its inhabitants or the unpaid work of the 
reproduction of human life itself – as well as its maintenance and care. The 
system cannot respond to values it refuses to recognise. (1988, p. 3). 
 
She provides the following examples. Firstly people who stay at home and rear 
children are considered unemployed and therefore unproductive and they and 
their work are excluded from the system of economic accounting. Yet few 
would deny, and certainly anyone who is a parent knows well, the very real 
work, long hours, financial costs, and physical intellectual and emotional effort 
required to rear children. Waring (1988) quotes an American Senator Daniel 
Moynihan as saying “ ‘If American society recognised home-making and child 
rearing as productive work to be included in the national economic accounts, 
the receipt of welfare might not imply dependency. But we don’t’ “ (p.6). 
Secondly Waring states that, 
 
Many of the environmental resources we value are excluded from measure in the 
economy. They cannot be sold in private markets, so it is said to be difficult to 
determine what they are worth. Yet their destruction, and the costs of cleaning 
up after the destruction, are labelled “growth” and “production (1988, p.26). 
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Thus, as Waring elaborates, the costs of cleaning up pollution appear in the 
national accounts, the benefits of a clean environment do not appear. Chopping 
down trees and rainforest are included, but a living tree or forest providing 
oxygen and habitats for living creatures does not. They are deemed 
unproductive and have no value according to the UNSNA. When presented so 
clearly, as Waring does, it seems improbable that the perversity of the situation 
is not immediately clear to everyone and that something is not being done to 
change the situation. Waring (1988) points out that this situation persists, as 
does the use of the UNSNA that leads to the situation. It does indeed seem as 
the philosopher Wittgenstein has stated, we tend to be blind to “the aspects of 
things that are most important for us” (Wittgenstein as cited in Bowden, 1997, 
p.5). 
 
The caring and caring work that is rendered so invisible and economically 
valueless is carried out within a network of relations, that are in turn frequently 
rendered invisible and of little value. However, the perspective informing the 
UNSNA is one perspective, albeit a very powerful and pervasive one. There are 
others. The feminist and nursing perspectives on caring and relation are two 
important views that will be explored in some depth in the following chapter 
three. More immediately, and continuing at the broader level the significance of 
the intimate involvement and interaction of caring, relation, and health in the 
reality of daily human life, will be explored. The relationship between them is 
poorly understood, although few people if directly asked, would deny their 
importance. 
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 Caring in relation and health 
Biological, and anthropological, aspects  
Roach (1987) holds that caring relations are essential to human growth, 
development, and health. However, caring goes a step beyond that. It is 
fundamental not just to our health and relationships, but indeed to our very 
survival as a species (Watson, 1990b). “Quite simply, people die when it is 
absent or inadequate” (Cleary, 1999, p. 386). A very stark reminder of this is 
provided by Ashley Montagu in his book Touch: The human significance of the 
skin published in 1978. He cites statistics from studies carried out in some 
orphanages in the USA in the early 1900s to discover the cause of marasmus, a 
mysterious “disease” of infants who waste away and die. Montagu explains 
that as late as the second decade of the twentieth century the death rate for 
infants under one year of age in various foundling institutions throughout the 
United States was nearly one hundred percent (p. 77). Montague also reports 
 
…that it was in 1915 that Dr Henry Dwight Chapin, the distinguished New 
York paediatrician, in a report on children’s institutions in ten different cities 
made the staggering disclosure that in all but one institution every infant under 
two years of age died (P.77). 
 
Resident babies, although having their basic needs mechanically met for food 
shelter and cleanliness, simply failed to thrive and died. Montague (1978) 
further explains that Dr Chapin recognized the “emotional aridity” of children’s 
institutions and organised a system of boarding out babies with families. In 
these cases the infant survival rate showed some increase. However, it was a Dr 
Talbot who spent time in a children’s clinic in Dusseldorf, Germany before 
World War One that brought back with him the practice of “tender loving 
care”. At that clinic he discovered they had an older servant woman who would 
carry the sick babies around with her, talking to them and caressing them. The 
Director of the clinic told Dr Talbot that “when we have done everything we 
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 can medically for a baby and it is still not doing well, we turn it over to old 
Anna and she is always successful” (p.78). Simply it seems, because she gave 
the babies tender loving care. In context it must be remembered that at that time 
doctors and parents alike were under the thrall of the Dr Spock equivalent of 
the time, a booklet titled The care and feeding of children first published in 1894 
and latest edition in 1935. The author, Luther Holt, Professor of Paediatrics at 
New York Polyclinic and Columbia University, “recommended the abolition of 
the cradle, not picking the baby up when it cried, feeding it by the clock, and 
not spoiling it with too much handling.” (p.78). Tender loving care was at the 
time considered “unscientific”(p.78) and its practice was discouraged, most 
successfully among the middle and upper classes. 
 
This stark but powerful example demonstrates all too clearly that without 
caring human babies simply die. It was initially thought at the time that 
marasmus was due to inadequate nutrition, but even with adequate nutrition 
mechanical performance of the necessities and cleanliness are not enough. For 
survival we need caring or more precisely the establishment of caring 
relationships. For something so fundamentally important how is it then, that 
care, care work and those who largely perform this work in our society are so 
devalued and compartmentalised? Even more significantly in considering this 
example the questions are raised; what status and value do our relationships 
have in human life? What status and value does caring really have within those 
relations? What status should it have? And if caring is so fundamentally 
important to survival let alone merely “ living the good life” should it not be 
considered of ethical importance, and have a role in ethical decision making? 
The disciplines of anthropology and archaeology have clearly established that 
relation and particularly caring relationships are primary. Historically human 
beings have always been, as they remain today, a gregarious social species. 
They are rarely found as isolated individuals living completely without any 
contact with others (true hermits). They prefer, even if actually living alone as a 
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 single person, to be in connection and have a sense of belonging through 
relation with others rather than to be in isolation (Feuerbach as cited in Inwood, 
1995; Ridley, 1996; Salzberg, 1997). According to Fromm (1975),  
 
Being separate means being cut off, without any capacity to use my human 
powers. Hence to be separate means to be helpless, unable to grasp the world- 
things and people- actively; it means that the world can invade me without my 
ability to react (and further that) the deepest need of Man, then, is to overcome 
his separateness…Man– of all ages and cultures- is confronted with one and the 
same question; the question of how to overcome separateness, how to achieve 
union, how to transcend one’s own individual life and find at-onement (p.15-
16). 
 
Consequently human beings gather in groups developing and maintaining a 
range of cultures that display the many different interpretations of how life can 
be lived (Geertz, 1986). All of these individuals and groups of people- as 
cultures, and as different groups within the many cultures- are born, brought 
together, maintained, constrained, transformed, dissolved and reconstituted by 
the infinite permutations of the relations, that exist between them. According to 
Ridley (1996), “We are far more dependent on other members of our species 
than any other ape or monkey” (p.6). We cannot live with out each other the ‘I’ 
needs a ‘you’ ” (Feuerbach as cited in Inwood, 1995, p. 277), and not least for the 
reproduction and survival of the human species. 
 
Psychological, and philosophical aspects 
Caring and relation are not only instrumentally essential for protection and 
survival of the species there are deeper, complex qualitative aspects to human 
relations. The development of mutual, caring relationships are the basic threads 
from which qualitatively unique human lives and histories are woven. This idea 
30 
 is expressed by the philosopher Martin Buber in this manner, “Man’s creativity 
is the energy which is given to him to form and direct, and the real product of 
this creativity is not a novel or a work of art but a life lived in relation” (Buber 
as cited in Friedman, 1976, P. 65-66). 
 
There is an enormous range of different kinds of relation that are necessary to 
accommodate the adequate and effective communication and functioning 
within the equally large and deep complexities of human life. It is not merely 
necessary that relation exist in and of itself, but also that the quality or nature of 
the relation allows for virtually infinite, flexible, adaptable levels of subtlety 
and nuance required for the healthy development and flourishing of human 
beings. This is of course also necessary for the relatively smooth functioning of 
complex cultures and society in general. This in turn supports the more 
qualitative aspects of life such as the achievement of life goals, pleasure and 
satisfaction of complex aesthetic needs in the connections and communications 
between humans and between humans and other living creatures and the 
environment. To a certain extent, quality of life is related to quality of relations, 
which has great significance psychologically for human beings. 
 
Relation between human beings is a dynamic, open social process that does not 
occur in a vacuum. It is always set within a context from which it is continually 
susceptible to multiple influences from many directions and levels, some of 
which are within our control and some which are not (Geertz, 1986; Miller, 
1976). Amongst other things, the dynamic nature and susceptibility of relation 
to contextual influences (as is caring) means that a relationship can take many 
forms ranging from the ultimate altruistic expression of acceptance, love, and 
nurturing support, to distrust, exploitation, and the destruction of self and/or 
other(s) (Tronto, 1993; Carse, 1996; Miller, 1977). Given a favourable context 
that provides adequate resources and support for skilful, life enhancing caring, 
as previously discussed by Greenleaf (1991), the presence of caring can provide 
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 the communication, cohesion, and relative stability that determines a high 
quality of relation. When caring is either inadequate or absent in relation, then 
relation is stripped to its bare instrumental bones, and as Montagu (1978) has 
previously pointed out survival is unlikely. Even survival of older children and 
adults is questionable as Fromm (1975) explained previously, people who are 
separate, not in relation, and who do not have a sense of belonging experience 
psychologically intolerable levels of fear and anxiety. The biological aspects of 
caring are only one part, human beings have an enormous psychological 
capacity and need for caring. Bowden (1997) captures these aspects of caring as 
she states “caring expresses ethically significant ways in which we matter to 
each other, transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond 
ontological necessity or brute survival” (p. 1). 
 
When caring is present in its supported skilful and life enhancing forms, caring 
can be thought of as the interstitial fluid of relation. When working well, 
caring’s achievements are truly supererogatory, with an adaptive flexibility it 
gives definition in the sense of shape and form, supports, makes room for 
growth and development, provides some cushioning effect between the relation 
and the external world, and provides some means of repair. It creates stability 
for smooth functioning, while allowing for a carefully filtered flow of new 
material to nurture the relation at the same time as allowing for some removal 
of unnecessary or harmful material. In summary it could be stated that human 
beings flourish in relation sustained by caring described as reaching out to an 
“other” in recognition of a need, with the intention of meeting that need in a 
manner that is consistent with the wishes of the one cared for and recognises 
the unique wholeness, dignity, individuality, and historic situatedness of that 
person (Cleary, 1999, P. 385). 
 
Historically, caring and relation have not received a lot of attention in 
philosophy. There are several reasons for this that will be studied in the 
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 following chapter. However there are several noted philosophers and thinkers 
from the traditional era of philosophy who have found caring a worthy subject 
for study, and managed to make an impact with their thinking. Of these, two of 
the most influential have been Martin Heidegger, and Martin Buber. Buber was 
a Jewish religious thinker born in Vienna in 1878. His works have become 
accessible to the English-speaking world through translations and 
interpretations of the translations. According to Geering (1983) for Buber  
 
…everything that is, exists in relation. It is out of relation, in the fullness of 
time, that life emerged. Life reaches its most complex and highest level in human 
relationships, and, whenever those relationships are threatened, all that we most 
value, including life itself, is under the threat of extinction. (pp.13-14). 
 
Before anything else in human life there is relation, from the moment of 
conception before sentience there is relation, through the connection with the 
mother, and even before that, the act that brings about conception is, in its ideal 
form, indeed one of deep intimate relation (Geering, 1983, p.17). “…without it a 
human being cannot live” (Buber as cited in Berry, 1985, p.x), and further, for 
Buber the most fundamental characteristic of our life as human beings is the 
“innateness of the longing for relation”(Buber as cited in Berry, 1985, p.42). As 
Berry explains from Buber’s perspective  
 
In the sphere of the human… there is no person, no situation, contact, or 
involvement with another human being that is excluded from the possibility of 
being a partner in dialogue – from the most fleeting and occasional, to the most 
stable and enduring (1985, p.42). 
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 Buber’s relation or “being a partner in dialogue” is not all encompassing. He 
insists that on entering into relation there is the necessity to let the other be 
without being reduced or subsumed or absorbed. Rather one life opens up to 
another life, without incorporating the other (Berry, 1985). In the detailed 
explanations that Buber gives regarding the forms of relation, caring, which 
seems more implicit in much of his writing, is made explicit particularly in his 
book “I-Thou” where he explains according to Geering (1983) that “the ‘I thou’ 
relationship is reciprocal… there is a mutual response. There is an encounter, 
the one with the other and the other with the one, a genuine meeting.”(p.16). 
This leads to an important point that is characteristic of a life enhancing caring 
relationship and imparts in some degree an indication of its ethicality. From 
Buber as cited by Berry (1985) 
 
Every true existential relationship between two persons begins with acceptance. 
By acceptance I mean being able to tell or rather not to tell, but only to make it 
felt to the other person, that I accept him as he is. ‘I take you as you are’ (p.* ) 
 
In a different existential approach Martin Heidegger (1962) is a philosopher 
who addresses caring explicitly from an ontological perspective in his 
existential phenomenological philosophy outlined in his seminal work “Being 
and time”. According to Heidegger as cited in Roach, “man’s essential relation 
to the world is one of care. ‘To be is to care,’ and the various ways of ‘being-in-
the-world’ are different ways of caring” (P.4). Roach (1987) further explains, for 
Heidegger 
Care is the basic constitutive phenomenon of human existence. It is thus 
ontological in that it constitutes man as man. All existentials used to describe 
Dasein’s self have their central locus in care. When we do not care, we lose our 
being and care is the way back to being. Care is primordial, the source of action 
and is not reducible to specific actions (p. 4). 
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 From his book “Being and Time” “Heidegger developed hermeneutical 
phenomenology as a Philosophical methodology to uncover the meaning of 
being of human beings, the significance of which he claimed had been covered 
over by past philosophical approaches that were reductionistic and 
objectifying” (Plager, 1994). As a research methodology Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical phenomenology provides “a theoretical basis for conducting 
research projects that does not reduce issues of human beings’ concerns to mere 
characteristics, absolute properties, or brute data” (Taylor as cited in Plager, 
1994). There is an interesting connection to note between Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger in the matter of embedded familiarity leading to blindness. 
Heidegger claimed “that we are so culturally and socially embedded in 
familiarity with our practices and skills that we lose sight of our being from 
existing within this familiarity” (Heidegger as cited in Plager, 1994, p.66). While 
Wittgenstein claimed that we often miss “the aspects of things that are most 
important to us… because of their simplicity and familiarity” (Wittgenstein as 
cited in Bowden, 1997, p.12). Both of these philosophers appear to have a deep 
understanding of both the difficulties and the importance of capturing the 
elusive, contextually embedded meanings of human life. The methodologies 
developed from their philosophies, have been successfully used by Plager 
(1994), Bowden (1997), and others see for example Benner (1984, 1994,) to 
capture and make caring more visible. 
 
It seems that there is some strong support philosophically and psychologically 
for the fundamental place and importance of caring in human life. However it 
also seems that despite some support, those who largely perform the caring and 
the caring work in the present society, continue to be devalued and 
compartmentalised (Tronto, 1993; Bowden, 1997). 
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 The paradoxical position of caring in society 
Given the evidence presented so far in this chapter indicating the fundamental 
importance of caring and caring relationships to quality of life, sustaining 
health, and providing the means of our very survival, it seems that caring 
should be much higher in our values. This poses the question of what status 
and value should caring hold in human life and society? Why is caring not 
more visible, and being recognised for its complexity and useful abilities in 
areas beyond the presently accepted private realm. Why is there not better 
funding and resources for research and development into caring practices, 
along with instrumental support? Should caring not have considerable political 
presence and status? But above all given its centrality to the quality of human 
life if not its very survival should it not have a place in bioethical and ethical 
deliberations and decision making? The reasons why caring is in the position it 
is at present and the possibilities of its ethical aspects will be the subject of the 
next chapter.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has been concerned with presenting information and evidence at a 
broad level regarding the nature of caring and the importance of caring in 
human life. It has considered the nature of caring and the difficulties and 
inadvisability of attempting to pin it to one concrete definition as the way of 
understanding a complex phenomenon such as caring. It has also looked at 
some of the consequences for caring in not being reducible to concrete 
definition and how that can influence how and indeed whether caring is seen 
and made visible. It has pointed out that in trying to define complex 
phenomena there are surprising connections between caring and hard science, 
and that the new developments of a science of complexity may bring more 
connections and better understanding of both human science including caring, 
and the natural sciences. It has looked at ways of developing an understanding 
of caring in its complexity without resorting to reductive processes through the 
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 presentation of the investigation of caring practices carried out by Peta Bowden 
using a Wittgensteinian approach of a comparative analysis of examples of the 
practices embedded in their particular contexts, comparing and juxtaposing 
them to see their similarities and dissimilarities, repeating the surveys to build a 
comprehensive understanding. 
 
Finally it has looked at the biological, anthropological, psychological and 
philosophical connections of caring and relation and their connection to health, 
quality of life and most importantly human survival. It concludes by posing the 
question, given the fundamental importance of caring why is it so devalued, 
and given that it is necessary beyond merely living the good life why does it not 
feature more prominently in our ethical deliberations and decision making 
processes. The next chapter will explore these questions at a more specifically 
focused level from the feminist and nursing perspectives, as these two groups 
have a significant concern and considerable experience in the investigation and 
research of caring and its relevance in human life. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
CARING: POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES THROUGH THE FEMINIST AND 
NURSING LENSES 
 
To gain a depth of understanding about a subject it is necessary to view it from different 
perspectives  
 
Introduction 
This chapter follows on from chapter two in maintaining caring as the subject, 
but alters the focus from a broad societal perspective to viewing caring from the 
feminist and nursing perspectives. Both the disciplines of nursing and feminist 
theory have significant interests and concerns regarding the phenomenon of 
caring. This is due in part to their close association with the nature and impact 
of caring practices in their life experiences as women and as nurses, who are 
still predominantly female (Condon, 1992; Bowden, 1997). As a result of these 
interests and concerns, nursing and feminist theory have developed 
considerable bodies of work, rich in depth and detail, of past, present, and 
ongoing investigations into caring. Part of these investigations has been a 
strong focus directed toward the ethical aspects of caring including the 
subsequent development of an ethic of care and its possibilities. Drawing from 
the work of both feminist theory and nursing, this chapter will attempt to 
address the questions posed in Chapter Two and support that chapter’s broad 
focus with a more specific depth of focus on the importance of caring and its 
ethical aspects. The two perspectives, although having points of connection, are 
quite different, and this chapter will also explore some of the similarities and 
differences. 
38 
 The feminist perspective of caring and an ethic of care 
The feminist perspective 
The feminist perspective of caring, or indeed of any topic, is not one unified 
perspective. It is a plurality of views that involve different schools of feminist 
thought; for example, liberal, radical, psychoanalytical, socialist, and 
ecofeminist, as well as different individual views. Tong (1993) makes a further 
distinction within the feminist perspective between feminine and feminist 
views. She holds that the feminine view regards the gender traits traditionally 
associated with women, in particular nurturance, compassion, and caring as 
positive human traits. This view perceives that these traits are undervalued in 
society and seeks to have them valued and celebrated. On the other hand 
according to Tong the feminist view is specifically political and sees women as 
suppressed, repressed and oppressed. It seeks to eliminate this subordination 
by arguing against patriarchal domination for equal rights, and fair distribution 
of scarce resources. Feminists in general also acknowledge the 
interconnectedness of the issues of race class sexuality, disability, and age with 
those of gender ascription (Tronto, 1993; Bowden, 1997). They also 
acknowledge the tension between individual and community needs, and seek 
to include all voices and not to deny the unique experience of the individual, 
while at the same time understanding that there are community and cultural 
voices as well with commonalities and differences. 
 
Given such a broad range of views the feminist perspective is not without its 
critics from both within feminist theory itself and from outside it. Some have 
criticised the plurality of views in the feminist perspective as indicating an 
inability to reach some form of consensus or finalise a position, particularly in 
the case of caring (Veatch, 1998). However, Browning-Cole and Coultrap-
McQuin (1992) have the more positive view that it can be seen as healthy 
discussion and debate allowing a greater range of perspectives and possibilities 
to be brought out for consideration in a field of rapidly evolving theories and 
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 approaches. In part, I believe, the varied range of approaches and debates may 
also be seen as indicative of an openness to exploration and change in feminist 
theory, a willingness to look within as well as without, a state not encountered 
so vigorously in all disciplines. Kheel (1993) an ecofeminist writer emphasises 
that if we are sincere in the desire to live in a world of peace and non-violence 
for all living beings, “we must help each other through the painstaking process 
of piecing together the fragmented world view that we have inherited” (1993, p. 
261). 
 
Despite the diversity in the feminist perspective, however, there is also unity, as 
according to Little (1996), all feminist theorists, scholars, and thinkers share 
several fundamental characteristics. Their work always displays  
 
…an attempt to uncover the ways in which conceptions of gender distort 
people’s view of the world and to articulate the ways in which these distortions, 
which are hurtful to all, are particularly constraining to women. (p. 2) 
 
These works are not merely “benign protestations of women’s value or 
equality”, Little explains, because the assumptions about gender have shaped 
not only the ways in which we think about men and women, but also “the 
contours of certain fundamental concepts-from motherhood to rationality-that 
constitute the working tools of theoretical analyses” (p. 2). Even though, or 
perhaps because of, the assumptions at issue are often so subtle or so familiar as 
to be invisible, the “distorted and harmful conceptions of gender have come to 
affect the very ways in which we frame our vision of the world, affecting what 
we notice, what we value, and how we conceptualise what does come to 
attention” (Little, 1996, p.2). The focus of feminist perspectives and their 
reflections on such things as gender distortions in society, have contributed 
many new insights that can create possibilities for change by “altering what 
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 questions people think to ask, what topics they regard as important, what 
strikes them as a puzzle in need of resolution.” (Little, 1996, P.2). 
 
Another of the fundamental characteristics common to feminist theory is the 
view that human society, “to put it broadly, tends to be androcentric, or male-
centered.” (Little, 1996, p.3). Although there are changes afoot in this area it still 
largely remains that “man is treated as the tacit standard for human… the 
unstated point of reference, for what is paradigmatic of or normal for humans” 
(Little, 1996, p. 3). What this means, as Little further explains, is that certain 
features of men-their experiences, their bodies, their values-have 
subconsciously come to be regarded as constituting the human norm, and she 
provides an example from psychology of how this androcentric view has 
tended to define the human mind. 
 
In a famous study (Broverman et al. 1970), when psychologists were canvassed 
and asked to describe the “healthy” man, the “healthy” woman, and the 
“healthy” human, the list for men and humans turned out to be virtually 
identical, the list for women divergent (Little, 1996, p.4).  
 
The conflation of male with the general terms human and normal is made quite 
clear here. Certainly there have been changes between then and now, but as 
Tronto (1993), and Little (1996), point out, the changes are neither 
comprehensive, nor uniform in depth. For example, the use of only male 
participants in drug trials for drugs that are also prescribed for women, when it 
is highly possible there could be significant differences in uptake and tolerance 
levels (McCarrick, 1995). This possibility has already been scientifically 
established in the case of alcohol tolerance. 
Given the feminist perspectives focus on uncovering gender distortions in 
society that negatively affect everyone, a considerable amount of attention has 
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 been focused on caring, due to the nature and significance of its impact in the 
lives and experiences of women. The relationship between women and caring 
and how they are both valued and positioned in society is complex. To some 
extent based on the thinking “that one cannot change what one does not 
understand” (Kheel, 1993, p. 244), feminists from all walks of life and 
professional backgrounds have made a concerted effort to investigate caring 
thoroughly. They ask questions about both the positive and the negative impact 
of caring practices on the lives of women, children, men, the environment and 
the structures and social organisation that do, or do not, support the caring 
practices. 
 
The feminist perspective of caring. 
One of these feminist investigations, gives an answer to the question from the 
end of chapter two regarding the paradox of how caring can be at the same time 
so vital to human life and yet be so undervalued and compartmentalised. This 
investigation provides an insight into how the position of care in society is 
maintained by a matrix of both subtle and complex, value and social structures. 
Studies by Tronto, (1993) present an analysis of care as work, that reveals a 
perspective on how these structures and values help to set a higher value on the 
kinds of caring done by the more powerful, while those who are less powerful 
are left with the less important caring.  
 
It is essential here to emphasise the point that both research and statistics 
support the fact that gender, is not the only significant factor in determining 
who does caring work. According to James and Saville-Smith (1994) the issues 
of gender race and class are so entwined in our cultures that they are virtually 
inseparable, and to consider one in any depth is to eventually encounter the 
other two. Tronto (1993) confirms this as she agrees that “in fact not just gender, 
but race and class, distinguish who cares and in what ways in our culture.” 
(p.148). Further to this she explains that 
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 If we look at questions of race, class, and, gender, we notice that those who are 
least well off in society are disproportionately those who do the work of caring, 
and that the best off members of society often use their positions of superiority to 
pass caring work off to others (Tronto, 1993, p. 149). 
 
To illustrate this Tronto sees that caring occurs as a four-phase process: 
 
1. Caring about - recognising that there is a need 
2. Taking care of - recognising that something can be done to meet that need 
3. Care giving - the direct meeting of needs hands on 
4. Care receiving - the acceptance and response to the care delivered. 
 
According to Tronto (1993), ‘Caring about’ and ‘Taking-care-of’ are related to 
broader public issues, associated more with public roles, and are seen as duties 
of the more powerful. ‘Care giving’ and ‘Care receiving’ are related to more 
private issues and private roles and are seen as duties of the less powerful. 
 
Tronto continues by elaborating that traditionally the least well off in society 
are women, servants and slaves that have always included people (men and 
women) of colour. The caring for children, the elderly people, and the sick or 
disabled people, especially when concerned with direct bodily contact, has 
largely been done by women. Cleaning and low skilled maintenance has largely 
fallen to people of colour, and the poor. According to Tronto (1993) this is 
clearly demonstrated in the USA where mostly Black and Hispanic men and 
women take on a relatively greater percentage of this work, along with less well 
off white men and women. The division of caring labour is, however, not as 
simple as this. Tronto argues that there are more subtleties in the division of 
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 caring labour that blur the unfairness, and decrease the likelihood of reaction 
and action, that would occur if it was more blatantly obvious. 
 
In regard to such subtleties there are several powerful myths that stem from 
these value and social structures that Tronto has identified. Firstly, prevalent in 
many Western liberal societies is a pervasive myth regarding an individual’s 
state of autonomy based on the idea that “…we exist as independent, 
autonomous individuals when closer examination, as in the discussion of 
relation in chapter two, shows that in reality, we exist in complex webs of 
relation sustained by care” (Cleary, 1999, p.166). The reality is the majority of 
our daily decisions are not made in true autonomous fashion without any 
accounting for the presence, wishes, or needs of others, and cultural and 
societal rules. As discussed in Chapter Two humans live in relation, which 
necessitates certain levels of communication and compromise between 
individuals for the smooth functioning and survival of those relations, which 
are in turn necessary for our survival as a species. 
 
Secondly, there is a myth that our society is based on true equality when it is 
actually based on the assumptions bound to the idea of equality of opportunity. 
According to Tronto (1993) under this assumption glaring inequalities can be 
tolerated in society because it is understood that the responsibility for success 
and flourishing (and health) lies with the individual, and other influential 
factors are ignored. For example, a successful individual is seen as successful 
because she/he has taken up an opportunity available, whereas the 
unsuccessful individual is seen as unsuccessful because she/he has not taken 
up the available opportunity. Under this myth the construction and 
organisation of social structures, our values, environmental factors and the 
state, are seen to have no responsibility or part to play in influencing the ability 
of the individual to access the opportunity. The success or lack of success of the 
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 individual is entirely attributed to her/him. This is especially so in liberal 
democratic societies. The third myth is  
 
that our society is suffused with the idea that individuals are seen in a 
dichotomous way, as either autonomous and independent, or dependent and 
needy. Again the reality is that we all without exception, continually move 
through varying states of need and of dependence and interdependence from 
birth to death simply by virtue of the process of human development if not by 
some incident with illness or injury as well (Cleary, 1999, p.166).  
 
The opposition set up by this dichotomous view is not helpful in illuminating 
the real needs of people and serves to hide the importance of relationships and 
especially caring relationships. Both the feminine and feminist perspectives 
agree that we need each other to care and be cared for, but the ramifications of 
the potential extent of this need are so threatening to some, that it necessitates 
separating the need out, denigrating its importance, and compartmentalising it 
(Tronto, 1993; Miller, 1976).  
 
The work of Jean Baker Miller, a psychologist noted for her work with women 
in the 1970’s, (see her book “Toward a New Psychology of Women”, published 
in 1976) provides some explanation for the fear and threat perceived in caring 
by many men and also provides an alternative to the negative view of the 
weakness and vulnerability assumed to be inherent in women’s natures. 
Although Miller’s work may seem dated, it is worthy of discussing here 
because she deals with some very basic issues that underpin caring, still not 
often dealt with openly and thus remaining pertinent.  
 
According to Miller (1976) society is built on an exceedingly restricted 
conception of the total human potential, holding up narrow and ultimately 
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 destructive goals for the dominant group (largely males) and it attempts to 
deny vast areas of life (p. 47). Some of the denied areas she discusses are sexual 
and intimate caring relations, dependence, vulnerability, and emotion. She 
further explains that some of these aspects are such necessary parts of human 
experience that “they cannot be ‘projected’ very far away. One must have them 
nearby, even if one can still deny owning them.” (Miller, 1976, p.47). To ‘deny 
owning them’ means not admitting to having the need for them. Miller then 
concludes that, “the falsity and full impact of this limited conception has been 
obscured”(p. 47).  
Probing more deeply into the integral psychological and emotional aspects of 
caring particularly concerning feelings of vulnerability and weakness Miller 
(1976) explains that “…the issues of how a person is made to feel vulnerable or 
helpless and what she/he then tries to do about it is probably the basic issue 
underlying most modern concerns in psychiatry” (p.37). To care about 
something or someone immediately makes us vulnerable, it is often admitting 
to a need a wish or desire, and more importantly there is the fact that in many 
cases we simply cannot guarantee or control that the response required will be 
forth coming. The key point Miller makes is that, vulnerability and weakness, 
long associated with being female and generally abhorred and denied by males, 
is a natural part of human life. According to Miller (1976),  
 
In no society does the person -- male or female -- emerge fully grown. A 
necessary part of all experience is a recognition of one's weaknesses and 
limitations. That most valuable of human qualities -- the ability to grow 
psychologically -- is necessarily an ongoing process, involving repeated feelings 
of vulnerability all through life (p. 31). 
 
Miller explains that men have been conditioned to fear and hate weakness, and 
to try to get rid of it immediately which she believes represents an effort to 
distort human experience, when in fact, 
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It is necessary to “learn” in an emotional sense that these feelings are not 
shameful or abhorrent but ones from which the individual can move on -- if the 
feelings are experienced for what they are. Only then can a person hope to find 
appropriate paths to new strengths (p. 31). 
 
In Miller’s view women are better able than men to consciously admit to 
feelings of weakness or vulnerability and we have not recognised the 
importance of this ability. She goes on to say that life in general, and 
particularly in our society, generates these feelings in everybody, but women 
are truly much more able to tolerate these feelings because both superficially 
and deeply, they are more closely and touch with basic life experiences and in 
touch with reality. Miller states that “by being in this closer connection with this 
central human condition, by having to defend less and deny less, women are in 
a position to understand weakness more readily and to work productively with 
it” (p. 32), and therefore use it as a positive strength. Ultimately her point is that 
women can become the developers of a different understanding of weakness 
and vulnerability and of the appropriate paths out of it rather than be carriers of 
it (Miller, 1976, p.32). 
 
However, she adds that “... if the members of the dominant group-that is, 
men-claim that they do not have feelings of insecurity, subordinates (women) 
cannot challenge the claim”(p.33-34). Furthermore, it is women’s responsibility 
to then supply the needs of the dominant group so that its members can 
continue to deny these feelings. Unfortunately the fact that such emotions are 
present in everyone, and are intensified by the problems that our society creates 
for all people, makes this difficult situation most difficult to resolve (Miller, 
1976). 
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 There is another significant human life task to which caring is fundamental that 
is also undervalued and compartmentalised namely participating in the 
development of others. The benefits of the caring integral to this process, 
however, are often overshadowed by the unfair distribution of this task within 
society overwhelmingly to women (Miller, 1976; Held, 1995; Carse & Nelson 
1996; Bowden, 1997). According to Miller (1976) and Tronto (1993) there is no 
question that the dominant society has decided that men will do the important 
work, and women will tend to the lesser caring work of helping other human 
beings to develop. As Miller states “…this dichotomy means that our major 
societal institutions are not founded on the tenet of helping others to develop. 
All people need help in development at all stages, but it is made to appear as if 
only children do” (1976, p.40). This provides yet another distortion and Miller 
explains that this causes difficulty for both women and children, particularly 
with psychological consequences for children of both sexes.  
 
However, on the positive side, women generally have a much greater 
understanding of the pleasures of close connection with physical, emotional 
and mental growth than men (Miller, 1976). This is undeniably changing in the 
world with the advent of paid parental leave for both men and women 
becoming standard in many Western developed countries, (although not New 
Zealand as yet). This is making it easier for both parents to spend time with 
infants and many men are simply choosing to take more active parenting roles 
even choosing to be the main caregiver while the woman continues with 
employment. What has not changed is that “women have had to do this major 
work without the supports that a culture would give to a task it valued” (Miller, 
1976, p. 40). Finally, Miller makes the point that such close involvement with 
growth and development results in developing intimate knowledge of 
participating in change. Thus in a positive way women can become more at 
ease and adaptable to change, and as she notes the adaptability to change also 
unleashes the accompanying skills of creativity and cooperation (Miller, 1976).  
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 Some negative aspects of caring 
There is no doubt that as essential to life as caring is, it has significant negative 
aspects and forms. From the feminist perspective, many of the negative aspects 
of caring have deep historical roots and associations. These begin with the 
position and valuing of women in general in society, where from ancient Greek 
times and throughout history even to the present day, woman has been 
regarded as a deficient human. In Aristotle’s view, woman’s place in his 
hierarchy was only just above slaves both male and female, and she played no 
part in the world outside the home (Groenhout, 1998, p. 172). Many influential 
male thinkers such as Kant, Rousseau, and Thomas Aquinas, quite apart from 
Aristotle and continuing through the centuries of time not only held, but also 
taught their intractable views “that women were rationally and morally inferior 
to men, and therefore incapable of theoretical reasoning, or shaping a system of 
morality” (Kant as cited in Johnstone, 1994). The powerful positions and 
influence these men had in the thinking and philosophy of their times has been 
overwhelming and far reaching lingering right through into the attitudes of the 
present. 
 
As a result of this history, the feminist perspective holds that “ social 
institutions and practices have encouraged discrimination against women” 
(Browning-Cole & Coultrap-McQuin, 1992, p 1). Further to this they see “that 
which is tightly and consistently associated with women tends to become 
devalued” (Little, 1996, p. 10) As caring has been and is so associated with 
women, caring has been and is devalued, while at the same time, in a vicious 
circle, women’s association with caring and care work that is devalued, in turn 
devalues the women (Tronto, 1993). Thus in some feminist perspectives, caring 
is seen negatively as a way that women are kept oppressed by the dominant 
patriarchy in order to serve their needs. As Ruddick (1995), points out many 
caring relationships in a patriarchal society are often not a result of women’s 
free choice but are heavily socially sanctioned expectations. According to 
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 Bowden (1997), in the view of some feminist theorists, ”women’s caring is seen 
as a coerced practice on which their survival depends” (p.8), and she further 
points out that  
 
These critics note the typical lack of reciprocity in women’s practices of care, the 
limited set of relations in which caring is normally expected, and the ways in 
which practices of care may undermine integrity and ethical agency. …and, in 
fact, perpetuates the reign of the dominant by encouraging self sacrifice and 
servility in the guise of care (Bowden, 1997, P.8). 
 
Other negative aspects of caring from the feminist perspective concern how 
“caring comes to be perceived as an innate characteristic of women and 
therefore a natural determinant of women’s social possibilities and roles” 
(Bowden, 1997, p.8). Held (1990) explains that this connection is plainly seen 
when associations traditionally built up are examined 
 
…the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man 
transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as 
the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species… Dominant 
patterns of thought have seen women primarily as mothers, and mothering as 
the performance of a primarily biological function… Women accordingly have 
been thought to be closer to nature than men, to be enmeshed in a biological 
function involving processes more like those in which other animals are 
involved, than like the rational discussion of the citizen of the polis…” (p.334-
335). 
 
Where the association of caring with women has been seen as natural, that is, as 
an essential, inherent part of being a woman, Bowden (1997) points out that, 
“correlatively, the absence of caring attributes is used to castigate and denigrate 
50 
 women” (p.9). Ultimately the essentialist association of women and caring in 
the manner described above results in the enormous diversity of women’s 
caring practices “tending to become ossified in abstracted and prejudiced 
models of femininity and care” (Bowden, 1997, p.9). 
The consequent compartmentalisation of stereotypical women and caring 
relationships to within the boundaries of the private realm of domestic personal 
and intimate relations is a further negative aspect, according to Baier (1995) 
Bowden (1997), Groenhout (1998a), and Held (1995). This limits the range of 
practices of caring, reinforces the traditional splitting of public and private 
realms and between men’s and women’s caring possibilities. The outcome of 
this segregation is, as Miller explained previously, a necessarily narrow and 
distorted construction of humanity brought about because in this 
public/private segregation each half of humanity is deprived of the benefits of 
a total broader experience, and a more balanced view of what is possible for 
humanity (Carse, 1991; Little, 1996; Miller, 1976). 
 
The feminist literature containing discussions and debates on the negative 
aspects of caring is considerable, and this is wholly to their credit as they boldly 
tackle aspects of human life and society where others have either feared or been 
too uninterested to go. As Bowden (1997) points out 
…the tendency to see the perspectives and concerns arising from maternal and 
other practices of caring simply in a positive light glosses over the dark side of 
these practices: the frustrating demeaning and isolating dimensions of their 
routines. ‘Care’ has a lengthy history in the (English-speaking) West as a 
burden. A bed of trouble, anxiety, suffering and pain (p.9). 
 
Thus within the feminist perspectives on caring there is a tension between the 
feminist approach who see the need for radical political changes for women 
position to improve and the feminine approach who tend to concentrate more 
on raising awareness and support for valuing traits commonly associated with 
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 women. From a feminist perspective it is vitally important to understand and 
face up to the negative aspects and forms of caring in our society but that does 
not mean that caring should be dishonoured or abandoned (Carse, 1991; Carse 
& Nelson, 1996). The value placed in care by those supporting the feminine 
approach is not misguided especially given the evidence of the fundamental 
importance of caring to the survival and quality of human life as discussed in 
Chapter Two. However, there is a definite need to find ways to reduce and 
avoid the traps and negative formulations of caring, or in some cases it is the 
removal of barriers and boundaries distorting caring practices that is required 
(Tronto, 1993; Bowden 1997). Means to support and facilitate good caring, 
caring that is done well, need to be found and developed.  
 
Noddings (1984), and Gilligan (1982) building on the work of Miller (1976) and 
Chodorow (1974) have taken up this challenge by exploring the ethical 
possibilities of caring as a potential source for positive examples caring “done 
well”. As Noddings explains, to do caring well the natural inclinations present 
in human beings need to be built on. Both Noddings, and Gilligan along with 
Held (1990), and other feminist theorists eschew any essential or natural basis to 
women’s traditional association with the tasks of caring. They believe this 
association to be socially constructed rather than something that is innate. They 
further maintain that understanding and development of good practices of 
caring can, and in their view preferably should be, learned by all human beings 
(Chodorow, 1974; Held, 1990, 1993). It is these authors’ investigations through 
both feminine and feminist perspectives of caring that have brought about the 
understanding that caring has ethical importance as an integral part of human 
life, and particularly to ethical development, as well as supporting the ability to 
actually be ethical. This in turn brought about the development of feminist 
ethics and the development of an ethic of care. 
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 Feminist perspective of an ethic of care 
It is the work of Carol Gilligan, most well known for her book In a Different 
Voice first published in 1982, and the work of Nel Noddings, most well known 
for her book Caring: A feminine approach to ethics published in 1984, that have 
been credited with establishing grounds for the importance of the ethical 
aspects of caring. This has subsequently grown into a field of inquiry into the 
ethical nature and possibilities of caring. 
 
Carol Gilligan established that there was a different moral voice to be heard, 
when she challenged the validity of Kohlberg’s six-stage moral development 
theory that was based on a traditional ethical theory of justice. She condemned 
it as inherently biased because Kohlberg, an internationally renowned moral 
development theorist, had used all male samples as the empirical basis for his 
theory construction. Gilligan pointed out that in using only male samples the 
theory could hardly be taken as representative of human experience. Gilligan 
also challenged Kohlberg on the basis of her own research into the apparent 
differences between male and female moral reasoning. She found that many 
women had a different approach to ethical situations. Rather than use an 
objective abstract principled view, they tended to want more information about 
the concrete aspects of the situation, and they focused on the care and 
responsibility of relationships between people in the situation. 
 
Gilligan (1982) sees that many women come from a world of relationships and 
psychological truths, where an awareness of the connections between people 
gives rise to the recognition of responsibility for one another. She also sees that 
while many women have taken care of men, men have, in their theories of 
psychological development, as in their economic arrangement, tended to 
assume or devalue that care. Of the latter, I believe Marilyn Waring’s book 
Counting for Nothing provides an excellent account. They see concern with 
relationships as a dependency and as a weakness of women, rather than as a 
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 healthy interdependency and a human strength, as discussed previously by 
Miller (1976).  
 
According to Gilligan the different voice she discovered in her research 
appeared predominantly to come from women. However, she was roundly 
criticised for placing too much emphasis on the attribution of this different 
voice to women only. Many of her critics seem to have overlooked that in her 
book she clearly made the point that  
 
…it is primarily through women’s voices that I trace its development. But this 
association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are 
presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and to 
focus a problem of interpretation rather than to present a generalisation about 
either sex…no claims are made about the origins of the differences described or 
their distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time. 
Clearly, these differences arise in a social context where factors of social status 
and power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males 
and females and the relations between the sexes (Gilligan, 1982, p.2). 
 
Further research cited in Tronto's book “Moral Boundaries: A political 
argument for an ethic of care” published in 1993, substantiates that the different 
moral voice is found also among people of colour, amongst some tribal 
societies, and people who are poor. Therefore, like the issue of the relationship 
between gender, race, class, caring, caring work, the different moral voice is not 
just about gender. However this does not render Carol Gilligan’s work invalid 
as some critics have maintained. Marilyn Friedman points out 
 
… the different voice hypothesis has a significance for ethical theory and ethics 
which would survive the demise of the gender difference hypothesis. At least part 
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 of its significance lies in revealing some of the obsessions that have distorted 
theories of morality… until recently (1993, p.121). 
 
Noddings (1984) provides another approach for an ethic of care. She claims that 
it is not only different from, but is ultimately better than, an ethic of justice that 
has favoured theoretical reasoning over practical modes of reasoning. In doing 
so, Noddings claims that the ethic of justice has neglected the kinds of personal 
intimate relationships that sustain the lives of all human beings. She holds that 
most of us have memories of caring and tenderness from our very first 
relationship with our mothers, and this leads us to a vision of what is good—a 
state that is good in itself—and to a commitment to enhance that good. 
Noddings (1984) believes that ethics begins at the emotional level with the 
desire to be a good person, rather than at the intellectual level with the analysis 
of the concept of goodness. This notion is supported by Blum (as cited in Tong, 
1993) who states that “altruistic emotions such as sympathy, compassion, 
human concern, and friendship are necessary components of morality” (p.74), 
and further to this “that the motive of the action can not be separated from the 
action” (P.75). Noddings insists that ethics is about particular relations and uses 
the model of a two person relationship made up of ‘the one caring’, and ‘the 
one cared for’ to explain her ideas. 
 
Feminist scholars and philosophers have established a feminist ethics within 
which many have contributed to the development of an ethic of care in 
response to the perception that traditional ethics did not adequately reflect the 
moral experience of many women or answer their moral questions (Fieldman, 
1987). In general the main disagreements of those who espouse either a 
feminine or feminist ethics, with those who espouse traditional ethics according 
to Johnstone (1994), are that 
 
1. Traditional ethics is too abstract to be useful in practical everyday affairs. 
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 2. It focuses too intensely on abstract rules and principles, rather than 
promoting quality relationships between people. 
3. It has tended to privilege the interests of white middle class, able bodied, 
heterosexual males, at the expense of those deemed other and hence 
inferior; for example, women, people of non-English-speaking and 
culturally diverse backgrounds, disabled people and so on (p.103). 
 
Johnstone (1994) also questions the value neutral account of rationality, and 
why reason should be regarded as having more authority in moral thinking 
than the moral sentiments of empathy compassion, sympathy, kindness, and 
caring.  
 
Regardless of the form an ethic of care takes the predominant feminist 
perspective is that it is not held up as a replacement for all of traditional ethics. 
Rather it is to address the lack of inclusivity of different views, and a need for a 
greater ability to be responsive. An ethic of care does not present itself as a 
universal theory, this would collapse it back into the form of traditional ethics, 
and deny the aspects crucial to the new perspective, namely the richness in the 
difference of individual ways of caring, and the different cultural meanings, 
ways, and values of caring. It is a plurality of approaches that according to 
Johnstone (1994) is more congruent with the view of transcultural ethics and the 
ethics developing from an ecofeminist view, both of which can enhance our 
ability to actually be moral, in a world of diverse and competing valid world-
views. An ethic of care is still a ‘work in progress’, however, its main themes 
can be summarised into a useful description as an approach to ethics that- 
 
Recognises the main moral concern is with needs and corresponding 
responsibilities, and a caring commitment to respond 
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 Recognises the inseparability of persons and their environments and that choice 
is contextually bound and dependent on the particularities of the situation 
Values and supports the connections and relations between the people involved 
Values and supports the natural interdependent relatedness of human beings 
(Cleary, 1999). 
 
Given the focus on caring, responsibility, and relation it would seem self-
evident that these ethical aspects of caring would logically also have relevance 
for nursing as a discipline much concerned with these elements. Therefore, in 
the interests of providing comprehensive coverage, the remaining half of this 
chapter is devoted to presenting a nursing perspective of the positives and 
negatives of caring and an ethic of care, and finishes with a discussion of the 
similarities and differences between the feminist, and nursing perspectives. 
A nursing perspective of caring and an ethic of care 
The nursing perspective 
Like the feminist perspective, the nursing perspective is a plurality of views 
that are wide ranging and also sometimes conflicting. However, the nursing 
perspective has its own unique and specific origins arising from the fact that 
nursing is a practice based professional discipline. Nursing as a profession was 
developed in response to social requirements for the provision of a proscribed 
and particular form of health care practice. As such, it rests on a social contract, 
as do other professions, based initially on the notion set out by Donabedian 
which according to the New Zealand Nurses Organisation, Social Policy 
Statement (1993) claims that “there is a social contract between society and its 
professions in which trust by the public, and self-responsibility on the part of 
the professions play a large part.”(p.9). The nature of the contract and of the 
proscription of the form of health care practice provided by nurses, has been 
influenced by factors both internal and external to the profession of nursing 
throughout its developmental history, and continues to be shaped by these 
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 forces. A comprehensive understanding of the nursing perspective does require 
knowledge and understanding of its history. However, as it is a matter of 
centuries, full coverage of this history is beyond the bounds of this study, and 
thus only a brief sketch as an orientation is provided here. 
 
From early in human history, according to Reverby (1987), nursing evolved 
from woman's historical role in caring for the community’s vulnerable 
individuals and was firstly imposed as a duty on women, then as the needs of 
society increased in times of warring and epidemics, it was then imposed as a 
duty on a paid nursing work force. According to Rafferty (1993) nursing work 
was seen as one of the few employment options, along with teaching, deemed 
appropriate for women in those early times and many women willingly took up 
this option for the relative amount of independence it gave them. This 
independence was certainly relative as Reverby (1987) points out that Florence 
Nightingale, considered as the originator of modern nursing, proved without 
doubt that nursing in and of itself made a difference to mortality in the 
battlefields of the Crimea, but then saw to it that nursing came under the 
“guidance” of medical doctors.  
 
Nursing also adopted a hierarchical ranking as an organisational system that 
was closely aligned with the military model, along with associated behaviours 
and attitudes such as stern control of emotional involvement with patients. At 
this time, Rafferty (1993) explains, the emotional aspects of caring were kept 
well damped down as they were seen as detrimental to the nurse’s ability to 
perform her duties. She further elaborates that caring in nursing, at this time, 
was seen more as a physical task oriented endeavour concerned mainly with 
the physical and bodily aspect of caring for the person and their immediate 
environment. These nursing tasks were carried out under the explicit direction 
of the physician and with total obedience (Rafferty, 1993). It is these historical 
roots and the subjugation of nursing under medical doctors that give feminists 
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 pause. It makes them suspicious of nursing as a whole and of accepting ideas, 
theories, and caring practices upheld by nurses’. The feminist perspective sees 
that these caring practices and theories concerning caring have arisen directly 
from the profession of nursing that was developed as another version of 
patriarchal exploitation of women’s caring practices (Bowden, 1997). This 
theme will be discussed further at the end of this chapter. 
 
However, much has changed since that time. Nursing has grown, it began the 
journey of development into a discipline, and to find its own place to stand as 
distinct from being seen as an appendage to the medical discipline. Nursing 
theories emerged, along with the beginning of an abundance of research 
projects, the establishment of a domain of inquiry, the beginnings of forming a 
philosophy of nursing, and the establishment of its own nursing ethics. The 
changes to nursing have been considerable, particularly in deciding what the 
focus of nursing is, how to explain the nature and significance of what nurses 
do. What counted and what was involved in nursing knowledge was 
articulated in Barbara Carper’s (1978) landmark article “Fundamental Patterns 
of Knowing in Nursing”. She identified the scientific, aesthetic, personal and 
ethical ways of knowing in nursing. More recently White (1995) added the 
social way of knowing. Vigorous discussion and debate began concerning what 
methods, methodologies, epistemologies and ontologies are appropriate or 
inappropriate for the developing of that knowledge.  
 
Nursing has moved from being task centred, with apprentice style learning on 
the job, to a theory based practice with an ethical basis taught in an academic 
setting at the tertiary education level. This involved the combination of a very 
broad academic programme involving physical and natural sciences, biology, 
microbiology, psychology, sociology, self-awareness, values clarification, 
cultural awareness and ethics, along with practical experience in a wide variety 
of workplaces. These changes have had enormous effects on nurses’ 
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 perspectives of themselves, the significance of their profession, their caring 
practices and the direction of their evolving discipline. The establishment of the 
importance of nursing research, and its consequent growth have played a large 
part in the changes. 
 
In the development of nursing research, there was an initial concentration on 
positivistic scientific methods and methodologies, in the hope that it would 
bring acceptance, status and credibility with the medical profession and in the 
wider social world beyond. However, it was found that a single approach based 
on the scientific approach ultimately failed as Parker (1991) explains, it became 
clear that the scientific method based on reduction, abstraction, control, and 
prediction was not very successful in illuminating the kinds of projects of most 
interest and relevant concern to nursing. Even so the scientific approach has not 
been dispensed with entirely as according to Cox-Dzurec (1989) it is still very 
useful as long as its limitations are clearly understood, and it is considered as 
one among the many other approaches now included in developing nursing 
practice and knowledge. The debate in nursing research over whether there 
should be one or many approaches used to develop nursing knowledge, has 
been resolved with the acceptance of multiple approaches to fit with the 
plurality of perspectives (Cox-Dzurec, 1989). 
 
The use of multiple approaches to practice and knowledge development means 
that different paradigmatic view points are present in nursing which in turn 
means that knowledge generated under the different paradigms will take 
different forms contributing to the plurality of the nursing perspective 
(Newman, Sime & Corcoran-Perry, 1991). As was pointed out by Guba (1990) in 
Chapter Two, the paradigms underpinning the approaches used, can be 
distinguished in studies and research by applying three questions regarding the 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology of the study. The ability to recognise 
and decipher the presence of different paradigmatic assumptions is almost an 
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 essential skill to develop for assessing research and theoretical studies both 
within a discipline and in interdisciplinary situations. Further to this, with all 
the talk of plurality it is important that the nursing perspective is not 
misconstrued as meaning that its methods, research and enquiries are random 
or chaotic. The diversity of views and approaches within the nursing 
perspective, like the feminist perspective, has a unifying focus.  
 
This unifying focus is “derived from a belief and value system about the 
profession’s social commitment, nature of its service, and area of responsibility 
for knowledge development” (Newman, Sime & Corcoran-Perry, 1991, p.1). 
The concepts of person, environment, health, and nursing were identified by 
Fawcett (1984) as being fundamental to nursing. However, it is not just the 
concepts themselves that are important it is also the relationship between these 
concepts that is fundamental to nursing. Newman et al. (1991) developed 
Fawcett’s concepts further by linking caring and health in nursing, quoting 
studies by Leininger (1984); Watson (1985); Newman (1986); Benner & Wrubel 
(1989); Benner (1984, 1994), that specifically link caring with health, healing, and 
well being (p.2). They also show that links are made between nursing, person 
and health, as Newman has stated that nursing “has something to do with how 
nurses facilitate the health of human beings”(p.3), and further that nurses are 
present with people as they are experiencing various states of health. Thus 
Newman, Sime & Corcoran-Perry (1991) concluded that a focus statement for 
nursing that relates these concepts to each other in a meaningful way, and 
identifies the domain of inquiry for nursing is that “nursing is the study of 
caring in the human health experience”. 
 
A further broad unifying focus comes from the fact that nursing practice is 
carried out within a relationship established between the person seeking help 
and the nurse. Bishop and Scudder (1990) point out this is not based simply on 
the nurse’s desire “to be with that particular person but to help that particular 
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 person become well… this relationship has an end beyond itself” (1990, p.152). 
This end, or purpose, as explained by Newman (1986), is to “facilitate the health 
of human beings” is the common end or purpose to all nursing relationships. 
Caring in the human health experience is always practised within a purposeful 
relationship, oriented towards the good of that person. However, the specifics 
of the caring relationship, its process, and outcomes, are unique to the 
particular characteristics and needs of the nurse and person involved, and their 
particular context. This is where the individual skilled caring practices of the 
nurses play their fundamental role. Ultimately no matter what the situation the 
nursing perspective is filtered through a flexible highly discerning caring lens 
that develops in expertise as experience increases. 
 
A nursing perspective of caring 
Within the discipline of nursing caring is held by most nurses as fundamental. 
Amongst nursing theorists it has been seen as the essence of nursing (Leininger, 
1981), and as ontological, or a way of being in the world (Benner & Wrubel, 
1989; Roach 1987; Watson 1985). Ontology is about how we perceive reality and 
it is absolutely fundamental (Guba, 1990). As a form of existence or way of 
being it is inherently holistic and informs all of who a person is and how they 
live their lives (Benner 1994; Benner & Wrubel 1989; Fry 1990; Heidegger 1962). 
In the reality of everyday nursing practice it is understandable that not all 
nurses reach the same depth of engagement with caring. As with other 
professions, there are a range of levels of expertise and competency, and nurses 
caring practices are no exception. Nurses’ caring skills can vary for a number of 
different reasons that generally fall into two categories, those to do with the 
nurse personally, such as the amount of each nurse’s experience, to individual 
personal, and professional reasons, and those to do with the broader context of 
nursing and health care, such as the political and institutional influences, 
particularly in regard to the degree to which they materially, and financially 
support and value caring and caring practices.  
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The professional discipline of nursing has in place standards for nursing 
practice, codes of ethics, continuing education programmes, post graduate 
educational opportunities, peer reviews, collegial support and ethical 
discussion groups, national associations and nursing regulatory bodies, 
professional performance assessments, crisis intervention teams, and individual 
and group supervision sessions. All of these work towards supporting the 
growth and development of nurses, and assisting those nurses who are 
experiencing difficulties, and/or who are seen to fall below accepted standards. 
It is the political and social climate, and employers’ organisational ethos, that is 
more difficult to contend with. In that, they hold much power and they form 
the larger contexts in which nurses’ caring practices are situated (Benner & 
Wrubel, 1989; Condon, 1992; Johnstone, 1999; Watson, 1990b). The political and 
institutional contexts have proven much harder for nurses to gain access to, and 
particularly at the levels where they can influence policy and decision making. 
Nurses in practice and nurses working in the academic, educational, and 
theoretical areas have been focusing their efforts on finding ways to support 
and value their caring practices, and to support and value the growth and 
development of their discipline. 
 
Within the nursing perspective of caring there is a deep awareness of the 
undervaluing of nurses and their caring practices, and like the feminist 
perspective, they seek to find ways to make the value of what nurses actually 
do, and the caring skills involved in nursing practice more visible (Benner, 1984; 
Benner & Wrubel, 1989; Chinn, 1991; Watson, 1988, 1990). Part of the difficulty 
in accomplishing this satisfactorily is due to the difficulties explored in Chapter 
Two regarding the definition and articulation of caring without resorting to 
reduction and losing its complexity and holistic nature. However, part also 
stems from the fact that, caring in society in general, and caring within the 
healthcare system exist in a macrocosm—microcosm relationship (Bowden, 
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 1997; Tronto, 1993). The undervalued status of caring and its 
compartmentalisation by the constraining social and value structures in the 
wider society, is mirrored in the undervaluing and compartmentalisation of 
caring within the healthcare system (Bowden 1997; Johnstone, 1999; Tronto, 
1993). Benner and Wrubel (1989) wrote their book “The Primacy of Caring” in 
order to address “the cultural and ideological background that lies at the root of 
the… devaluation of nursing care and other caring practices”. (p.xv). The book’s 
aim was also to provide an alternative basis for legitimising and valuing the 
caring practices and making visible the expert knowledge embedded in nursing 
practice (Benner & Wrubel, 1989). 
 
Rather than being completely concerned with prediction and control of 
variables, nurses seek approaches that are supported by philosophies whose 
epistemological and ontological perspectives are more compatible with, and 
more able to capture a nursing perspective of caring practices. These caring 
practices that are deeply involved with the understandings and meanings in the 
complexities of human lives and health experiences (Benner, 1984, 1994; Benner 
& Wrubel, 1989; Chinn, 1991). Theories of caring have been articulated 
(Swanson, 1991), and concepts of caring compared and analysed (Boykin & 
Schoenhofer, 1990; Morse, Bottorf, Neander & Solberg, 1991). However, in 
terms of making the actual, concrete caring practices in nursing visible, Benner 
in her book “From Novice to Expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing 
practice” (1984) has been the most successful, though that success is still largely 
confined to within the discipline of nursing. 
 
Benner (1984) employed a hermeneutic or interpretive phenomenological 
approach developed from the philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, 
and Merleau Ponty. Heidegger (1962) in particular holds that caring is the most 
basic way of being in the world, as noted in Chapter Two, and his interpretive 
approach requires that  
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…to understand specific meaning of any behaviour (or nursing care measure), 
one must know the specific context , and knowing the context inherently limits 
the possible meanings of behaviour into manageable wholes. Therefore, the 
interpretive approach always relies on the particular context of the 
situation-that is, the timing, meanings, intentions of the particular situation 
(Benner, 1984, p.40) 
 
Benner (1984) has used narrative accounts of what she terms “paradigm cases”, 
that are exemplars from expert nurses’ practice, to capture the ‘timings, 
meanings and intentions of the particular situations’. Benner (1984) presented 
and then analysed these narratives using a model of skill acquisition developed 
by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) based on the study of skill acquisition of airline 
pilots. In doing so, she has been able to demonstrate many of the subtle, usually 
hidden complexities in nurses skilled practices of caring. These skills are 
integral to establishing, maintaining, and bringing to closure the skilfully and 
artfully developed nursing relationships critical to facilitating patients healing 
health and wellbeing. This process was followed through the developmental 
stages of nurse practitioners from novice, through advanced beginner, and 
competent, to proficient and expert.  
 
One of these vital skills Benner (1984) has illuminated, is the perceptual origin 
of excellence in nursing practice. She asserts that, “perceptual awareness is 
central to good nursing judgement and that this begins with vague hunches and 
global assessments that initially bypass “critical analysis” (p.xviii). She further 
notes that “expert nurses know that in all cases definitive evaluation of a 
patient’s condition requires more than vague hunches, but through experience 
they have learned to allow their perceptions to lead to confirming evidence” (p. 
xviii). Expert nurses “can get a gestalt of the situation”(Benner, 1984, p xviii). 
This is part of what is understood as intuition, and intuition has historically, as 
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 with caring, often been attributed as some “natural”, mysterious or even occult 
ability of women. Such suspicions in the past have lead to many women’s 
deaths by burning at the stake (Erinreich & English, 1973). Another example 
Benner highlights is the importance of discretionary judgement. By this she 
means that, sometimes, expert nurses will make a judgement that the best 
course of action is not one normally dictated by the rules of the situation, and 
act on it. Benner points out that this is not a careless abandonment of rules but a 
skilled advanced understanding of the situation that allows orderly behaviour 
without rigid rule following. 
 
Benner further explains that understanding the discretionary judgement 
exhibited by nurses at the expert level comes from examination of the 
differences between practical and theoretical knowledge, and their relationship 
to the importance of experience in the development of expertise. As described 
by Benner (1984), “knowing that” and “knowing how” have been identified as 
two different kinds of knowledge, there are many skills (know how) that we 
acquire without first “knowing that”, such as swimming or riding a bike. As 
she sums it up “some practical knowledge may elude scientific formulations of 
‘knowing that.’. And ‘know how’ that may challenge or extend current theory 
can be developed ahead of such scientific formulations”(p.2-3). According to 
Benner (1984) then 
 
Expertise develops when the clinician tests and refines propositions, hypotheses, 
and principle based expectations in actual practice situations. 
Experience…results when preconceived notions and expectations are challenged, 
refined, or disconfirmed by the actual situation. Experience is therefore a 
requisite for expertise (p.3). 
 
This indicates that it is largely practical clinical experience, and of course 
reflection on that practical experience, that provides for the development of 
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 discretionary judgement in expert nurses. Benner further notes, “theory offers 
what can be made explicit and formalised, but clinical practice is always more 
complex and presents many more realities than can be captured by theory 
alone.” (1984, p.36). She goes on to explain in more detail that 
 
A nurse who has dealt with many people acquires a rich basis on which to 
interpret new situations, but this multifaceted knowledge (like that of caring) 
with its concrete referents cannot really be put into abstract principles or even 
explicit guidelines. There is a leap, a discontinuity, between the competent level 
and the proficient and expert levels (Benner, 1984, p.37).  
 
This leap or discontinuity is where both the role of perception in skilled 
performance, and discretionary judgement comes in, as according to Benner, it 
is not that the rules simply become unconscious, it is that the rules are dropped 
completely. She further explains that in the Dreyfus and Dreyfus model, when 
the airline pilots reached this stage “their deviation from the rules allowed the 
instructors to perform faster and better. Thus indicating that with experience 
and mastery the skill is transformed” (Benner, 1984, p.38). This change 
according to Benner (1984) results in a whole new level of performance, and 
interestingly, according to the findings of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, if these expert 
pilots are made to pay attention to the rules that they may have used as 
beginners, their performance actually deteriorates (Benner, 1984, p.38). I have 
presented considerable detail in this section, which although it may be familiar 
ground to some readers, has been included to emphasise that nurses 
relationships with their patients, and the caring practices within them, 
constitute formidable, complex, intellectual, emotional, and practical skills that 
have taken considerable time and effort to achieve. At the proficient and 
especially the expert levels of caring practice in nursing, where the caring 
relationships seem to flow effortlessly from these nurses, can thus be easily 
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 overlooked and undervalued. As a final point in this regard, again from the 
work of Benner, (1984) she states that  
 
As long as the practices of experts in a field go unnoticed and undocumented, 
and as long as the development of clinical expertise is limited by short clinical 
careers, an essential link in theory development in nursing will be missing 
(p.37). 
 
A nursing perspective of caring and relation 
Caring requires relation whether it is with self or other (Buber, 1970), and in 
nursing, the nurse-patient relationship is both constituted by and contains the 
nurses caring practices. Thus nursing is indeed about being in relation, whether 
briefly or for a lengthy time, and given the diversity and scope of nursing 
practice the nurse-patient relationships encompass a wide range of relations As 
such a central part of nursing the nurse-patient relationship has been the focus 
of research and studies, for example Peplau (1969); Roach (1987); Watson (1988); 
Vezeau & Schroeder (1991); Pollack-Latham, (1991). A number of nurses have 
selected the work of Martin Buber to express for them the remarkable nature of 
this relationship. Buber’s (1970) ideas of the intense and intimate I-thou 
relationship as outlined in Chapter Two, may seem to imply too greater 
intensity and intimacy to be appropriate as a model for the nurse-patient 
relationship. Kuhse (1997), criticises nurses’ use of Buber’s work for exactly this 
reason. She states that “it would be quite unrealistic to suggest-as many nurse 
theorists do-that the nurse-patient relationship ought to be of the “I-Thou” 
kind.” (p.148). And further, that there is “a great danger in requiring that every 
nurse-patient encounter be a ‘total encounter’ and in thus setting the ideal of 
caring in nursing too high” (p.149). Kuhse makes a good point, in that it is 
important to have realistic standards, goals and ideals to provide guidance, 
direction, and motivation. As Greenleaf (1991) previously pointed out, it is also 
important to understand that setting unrealistic expectations or ideals for caring 
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 opens up very negative possibilities for the blaming and scapegoating by others 
of those unable to reach them. Other effects at the personal, individual level are 
self-condemnation and burnout. However, Kuhse is in fact missing a vital point 
regarding the real nature of caring as understood by nurses who have actively 
been in the nurse-patient relationship.  
 
As Benner (1984) has established the nurse-patient relationship “is not a 
uniform, professionalised blueprint but rather a kaleidoscope of intimacy and 
distance” (my emphasis) (1984, p.xxii). To put it another way, it is not necessary 
for every contact between nurse and patient to be a total encounter of Buber’s I-
Thou kind, but what is important is that there is the potential for that kind of 
encounter to occur. The consistent actuality of an I-Thou relationship in the 
nurse-patient relationship is not required, but the openness to the possibility for 
it is. I believe this openness and possibility is gradually developed refined and 
carried within the caring practices of the expert nurse. Martin Buber’s relational 
philosophy and ideas addresses exactly this potential and possibility inherent in 
relation. Berry (1985), in his book “Mutuality: The vision of Martin Buber”, 
explains that in Buber’s philosophy 
 
…in the sphere of the human…there is no person, no situation, contact, or 
involvement with another human being that is excluded from the possibility of 
being a partner in dialogue-from the most fleeting and occasional, to the most 
stable and enduring. All discussion of degrees and limitations on full mutuality 
must begin with this recognition of the universal human possibility of relation 
(P.42). 
 
Thus Berry explains that the fullness of mutuality is not inherent in our life 
together, but its possibility is. He quotes Buber saying that, “it is a grace, for 
which one must always be ready and which one never gains an assured 
possession”(Buber as cited in Berry, 1985, p.42).  
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There appears to be a parallel between Benner’s (1984) description of the 
nursing relationship being a kaleidoscope of intimacy and distance and Buber’s 
philosophy of relation where Buber explains that “two movements are required 
for mutuality: distancing and entering into relation. Modification of either 
movement will qualify the degree of fullness which is possible in a given 
relationship” (Buber as cited in Berry, 1985, pp.42-43). The closeness of these 
two ideas is clearer if you substitute ‘intimacy’ for ‘entering into relation’, and 
‘kaleidoscope’ for ‘modification of either movement’. Buber’s philosophy is also 
close to nursing practice in another aspect. Berry (1985) points out that Buber 
acknowledges the particular case of relation in “the helping role”. He says that 
for Buber 
 
Mutuality arises in the sphere of the interhuman on two levels. The first is that 
level on which we have to do with another person without any defining task or 
role to be played out or performed, where mutuality is most fully possible. The 
second is that level on which we have to do with another person, where 
mutuality is genuinely possible but where we are prevented from becoming fully 
mutual… which is occasioned by the presence of a task or a special defining role 
that is necessarily involve (p.41) 
 
The prevention of being fully mutual comes from a one-sidedness, an inequality 
stemming from the task or defining role. According to Buber “a person becomes 
a patient by virtue of seeking assistance in dealing with a need from someone 
who can be counted on to help” (p.48). Further to this the nurse or therapist 
does and must do something “that the patient cannot do” (Katz as cited in 
Berry 1985), and this something that the patient cannot do “is precisely that 
which imposes a normative limitation on the mutuality possible”(Berry, 1985). 
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 The nursing relationship does have a defining role and a task. As previously 
noted, it is established with the purpose of facilitating healing and health 
(Newman, 1986). Nurses intentionally attempt to create caring relationships 
that are not and cannot be standard blueprints but are uniquely co-determined 
with the other person involved, for each nurse-patient relationship (Vezeau, 
1992). Out of a partnership relationship with each patient (and often the family 
are involved as well) an environment is created with the hope that healing may 
occur (Benner, 1984). Indeed, there is not a guarantee that healing will happen 
but in my experience and the experience shared by colleagues, most of the time 
it does. Reading the practice exemplars presented by Benner (1984) gives at 
least some confirmation of this. Some of the time, that healing is transformative 
and transcendental in nature. This understanding of some transformative and 
transcendental healing occurrences, encountered in nursing caring practices, 
has been written and researched by many nurses and nursing theorists and 
scholars (Benner, 1994; Benner and Wrubel, 1989; Phillips and Benner, 1994; 
Vezeau, 1992; Watson, 1988; ). It is also found in countless anecdotal narratives 
shared by other nurses from their experiences of caring relationships in their 
practice. 
 
The practical reality of the nurse patient relationship is often, but not always, 
quite remarkable, intense, and despite the opinion of Khuse (1997), 
transformative and transcendental as Buber (1970) has described the I-Thou 
relation can be. It may not always be totally fully mutual and reciprocal, rather 
a matter of degrees, but even in fleeting encounters with the appropriate 
context, as well as the longer ones, it can and does happen. According to Benner 
and Wrubel, (1989), “Nurses provide care for people in the midst of health, 
pain, loss, fear, disfigurement, death, grieving, challenge, growth, birth, and 
transition on an intimate frontline basis. Expert nurses call this the privileged 
place of nursing” (p.xi). Bowden (1997) in support of this perspective sees that 
“nurses participate in the parts of peoples’ lives when they are most vulnerable, 
when there are fewer possibilities to hide behind appearances, and when 
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 everything that makes life most meaningful is at risk.” (p.119). As Griffin (as 
cited in Bowden 1997) states, “Nurses are party to human possibilities that 
many other persons never experience or observe.”(p.119). 
That some nurses have found a resonance between their work and the 
philosophy of Martin Buber appears, in this light, not so surprising nor would it 
seem inappropriate. Even though Buber has explained that relationships that 
are task or role defined are to some degree limited in their ability to be fully I-
Thou, or fully mutual, Berry explains that “There are also many gradations in 
the realm of I-Thou”(p.54), and finally he emphasises that  
 
The presence of a task to be performed does not seal the borders of mutuality, but 
creates a difference that is qualitative rather than quantitative relative to the 
nature of the encounter… that… is not a distinction to be measured, but a 
recognition that each relationship is open to mutuality in its own peculiar way 
(Berry, 1985, p.68).  
 
The relational connection in the caring nurse patient relationship is obviously 
an integral fundamental part of, as Benner (1984) would say, the power and 
excellence of nursing practice. Benner also found that skills of developing and 
managing the balance of involvement in the relationship, was a key factor in 
moving nurses through the growth process from novice to expert. However, it 
still remains that there is, as pointed out previously, a one-sidedness and 
inequality arising from the differences in knowledge, culture, and the relative 
differences between the vulnerability of the person seeking help and the power 
and professional authority of the nurse. These differences can be mishandled 
through ignorance, inexperience, or stress, and in some very unfortunate cases 
exploited deliberately causing real trauma and damage. Gorovitz (1994) points 
out that “ the time a person spends as a patient is a part of that person’s life; the 
quality of that time therefore is an ingredient in the quality of that life” (p.131). 
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 Gorovitz further emphasises that quite apart from major problems resulting in 
lasting damage caring is important because  
 
A patient who feels demeaned, ignored, depersonalised, diminished by 
unacknowledged delays, discomforted by rough handling, frustrated by failed 
attempts to communicate, or embarrassed by insensitive behaviour, is harmed- 
not necessarily in lasting ways, but in ways that are objectionable simply 
because they constitute avoidable diminutions in the quality of someone’s life 
(p.131). 
 
Nurses are acutely aware of the points Gorovitz makes, they care about that 
quality of life. Nurses are educated from the beginning of their basic education 
to be aware of the power difference in the nursing relationship, the physical, 
social, and cultural vulnerability of the patient. It is the individual levels of 
caring and the degree of commitment to nursing’s ideals of caring, that to a 
large extent determines how these power and knowledge and cultural 
differences are handled by the nurse (Benner, 1984; Benner & Wrubel, 1989) In 
her narrative exemplars of nurses’ actual practice presented in “From Novice to 
Expert”, Benner (1984) found the nurses in her study were indeed acutely 
aware of their patients’ vulnerabilities and did not take advantage of this power 
difference. Falk Rafael (1996) has also found that in the main, nurses use their 
power to enable and empower in order to assist in healing. She goes on to say 
that “enabling power is based on respect for the diversity among people” (p.14), 
and quotes Chinn’s description of this conception of power saying that “it is 
characterised by valuing the personal power of each individual, and is 
illustrated in decision making by consensus in which each person’s perspective 
is heard and considered” (Chinn as cited in Falk Rafael, 1996). Nurses work 
hard to protect the dignity, and integrity of their patients. They try to build 
trust through honesty and openness, by sharing themselves as human beings 
(Benner, 1984). In sharing their common humanity appropriately they thus 
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 create a bridge between the different worlds of the nurse and patient through 
which caring and assistance can be offered, made accessible and acceptable, and 
thus able to be received by the patient. Again it is aspects of Buber’s vision of 
mutuality that supports and explains this facet of nursing practice. As Berry 
(1985) explains that in interpreting Buber’s vision it is understood that 
 
In all the situations defined by the working out of a purpose, the helper also 
needs help, or at least should be understood as potentially needing help. Living 
out a purposive relationship in the light of that recognition can empower the 
implementation of the defining task without the rigid sense of hierarchy which is 
always the enemy of mutuality. While the helper accepts the asymmetricality of 
the relationship, he or she can thus open the self to be affected by all the impulses 
that proceed from the person of… the patient… That is possible because power 
over the other does not belong essentially to this archetypal situation. The 
central fact is for the healer to be able to affirm his or her own woundedness… 
This should give the patient and the therapist a way of regarding with equal 
authority and equal validity the way in which they see life. (p. 60) 
 
To see this understanding put back into the frame of nursing practice, where it 
is incorporated into the fundamental characteristics of the nursing perspective 
of caring, Parker (1991) eloquently sums up that 
 
The heart of nursing lies in the quality of the care which is delivered and which 
is premised on a recognition of the mutuality of the nurse- patient relationship, 
on the moral stance of the nurses and on empathy and understanding of the 
human vulnerabilities and frailties of people cast into patient and client roles... 
Nurses attempt to take into account the complexity of the life situation, life 
history, and life circumstances of people in their care and try to grasp in a 
holistic way the often complex, contradictory, and uncertain situations in which 
they find themselves in the planning and delivery of care. (p. 288) 
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However, what is vitally important to remember, is that nurses are not the only 
health care providers with responsibility for the patients’ quality of life 
experience within the health care system. Doctors, physiotherapists, even 
clerks, receptionists and many others all have a share, along with the 
institutional organisation and its general ethos. 
 
Given the issues of trust, honesty, and vulnerability involved in the caring 
practices within nurse patient relationships, the very ethical nature of nurses 
caring practices becomes clear. It also becomes clear that in reality the ethical 
aspects of caring cannot be separated out in the way that I have presented them 
in this chapter for purposes of clarity. It is not just caring practices that are basic 
to nursing but ethical caring practices, which will now be explored. 
 
A nursing perspective of the ethical aspects of caring and an ethic of care 
Caring is held to be the moral basis of nursing (Leininger, 1990; Fry, 1989, 1990, 
1991; Watson, 1985, 1990a, 1990b; Watson & Ray, 1988; Yarling & McElmurry, 
1986). The fundamental aspect of this ethical perspective is “the relational 
context in which nursing care must be situated… the nurse enters as a person 
into a relationship with the patient” (Gastmans, Dierckx de Casterle & 
Schotmans, 1998, p. 48). Caring relations are historically and contextually 
embedded, they involve trust and mutuality in varying degrees of intensity, as 
discussed previously, involving the whole person of both the nurse and the 
patient. This inevitably means responsibility, accountability, and risk. Here 
people’s lives can be at stake including the nurses lives. Parker (1991), 
eloquently expresses this  
 
Ethical decision-making for nurses is then based upon an ethic of responsibility 
towards oneself and others, and towards the natural and socio-cultural 
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 environment… It acknowledges that nurses are not detached neutral observers 
of the situations and circumstances in which they practise. The practice of 
nursing as a craft wherein nurses come into a caring, healing, nurturant 
relationships with troubled, vulnerable, sick, and hurting people requires nurses’ 
involvement, commitment, and insight, as well as their skills and knowledge (p. 
305). 
 
In the words of Gastmans (1999) “care can be considered as a foundational 
normative concept in the ethics of the nursing profession” (p.214). 
 
The basis for considering nursing as a moral practice, lies within the actual 
realities of its practice (Fry, 1989; Hinson Penticuff, 1991). Nursing, in being a 
practice discipline that has been given a social mandate to provide caring for 
people in their experiences of varying health circumstances, is directed towards 
the personal and social “good” (NZNO, 1993). In terms of Gadamer’s view of 
practice, nurse’s caring practices are “human action directed by communal 
ways of being, aimed at promoting human good” (Gadamer as cited in Bishop 
& Scudder, 1990, p.71) This is because according to Gadamer as cited in Bishop 
& Scudder, (1990) practices “are the bearers of intentionality that spring from 
participation in cultural groups with common meaning and values (p.71). 
Nursing is a cultural group that values caring as primary (Benner & Wrubel, 
1989), and that collectively, intentionally chooses to direct that caring to helping 
their patients (being individuals or groups) find meaning and healing in their 
health experiences ranging from birth to death. According to Benner, (1991) 
“the dominant ethic found in stories of everyday practice is one of care and 
responsibility” (p.2). A more recent study in New Zealand by Woods (1997) 
“Maintaining a Nursing Ethic: A grounded theory of the moral practice of 
experienced nurses”, also clearly outlines that an ethic of care, though not 
exclusively, underpins nurses’ moral practice. Tanner, Chesla and Gordon as 
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 cited in Benner (1991) give a definition of this caring related to the specific 
context of ethical nursing practice as 
 
the alleviation of vulnerability; the promotion of growth and health; the 
facilitation of comfort, dignity, or a good and peaceful death; mutual realisation; 
and the preservation and extension of human possibilities in a person, a 
community, a family, a tradition (p.2). 
 
Nurses develop the abilities and ethical comportment to do this by being able to 
draw from their accumulated store of experiences of skilful ethical caring 
practices developed within the previous partnerships of nurse-patient 
relationships. According to Benner (1991) ethical comportment refers to  
 
the embodied, skilled know-how of relating to others in ways that are respectful 
and support their concerns. Comportment refers to more than just words, 
intents, beliefs, or values; it encompasses nuances such as stance, touch, 
orientation-thoughts and feelings fused with physical presence and action (p.2). 
 
They employ what can be called practice wisdom to discern the greater, and 
also exquisitely small differences between previous situations and this 
particular one. As Benner describes it this practice wisdom or experience “is 
gained when one actively learns to recognise salient ethical distinctions in 
practice with particular patients and families” (p.2). Further to this Benner 
explains that “in practical ethical reasoning, clarity rests in a situated 
knowledge of the person, family or community” (p.3), and employing the ideas 
of Taylor as discussed in Benner (1991), Benner adds that “this particular 
knowledge reflects practice-based understanding of the good and its 
violation”(p.3). 
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 Nurses assess and choose from the plethora of practical experiences of what has 
and has not worked in the past, to come up with the plan most fitting and 
appropriate for action (or inaction) depending on the situation. As Benner 
describes it  
 
With experience, the concrete situation becomes coherent, and the practitioner 
creates a narrative of doing better or worse, of recognising similarities and 
differences, and of participating in common meanings, practice narratives, and 
practices that allow the practitioner to recognise common clinical entities and 
issues (1991, pp. 2-3). 
 
This narrative of doing better and doing worse assists the nurse in the 
responsibility of choosing and deciding involved in the contexts of their nurse-
patient relationships. Ultimately the nature and outcome of these relationships 
depend on the choices and decisions made within it: a simple, seemingly 
obvious point, but it has fundamental significance as it points directly to the 
ethical aspects or the aspects of “the good” of nurses’ caring practices.  
 
To explore this important point further, Gadamer (as cited in Bishop and 
Scudder, 1990), holds the view that choices constitute practice. He explains that, 
“human practice exists… when a free citizen makes a decision, and that 
decision takes its bearings by the order of preferences guiding ones conduct” 
(p.73). He further explains that  
 
practical knowledge involves knowing what to prefer among human values and 
how to choose that preference actively as an individual in community”, and that, 
“ ‘in deliberating and taking counsel’ in ‘guiding action,’ the preference or the 
deliberation has to be guided by its relationship to the good” (Gadamer as cited 
in Bishop and Scudder, 1990, p.73).  
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Applied to nursing, it can be seen that nurses caring practices involve 
deliberations and preferences (choices), that are guided, by a perspective of 
care, because from their previous personal experience, and developing practical 
knowledge (practice wisdom) they have learned to actively value, that is prefer, 
and so choose caring because for them it has demonstrated a primal 
relationship to “the good”. 
 
The nurse and patient reciprocally influence each other in growth and 
development through out the ongoing choosing and decision making processes 
of the caring relationship. Therefore it can be seen that even the small ordinary 
day-to-day decisions are ethical (my emphasis) decisions (Benner, 1991). The 
ethical nature of the everyday decisions in nurses caring practices implies then, 
that ethical caring practices are a way of being, and not something produced 
only in an ethical dilemma or problem situation. In the study by Woods (1997) 
mentioned previously, regarding the moral practice of experienced nurses, he 
found that morally competent nurses do not make ethical decisions in practice 
by trial and error, as may be the case with uncaring or inexperienced nurses, 
and they didn’t merely copy the approaches of the medical profession. 
According to Woods (1999) 
 
The modus operandi of professionally experienced and morally competent nurses 
is more likely represented in an ethic that is traceable to early days in nursing, 
but then adapted, modified, improved and developed into a truly professional 
nursing ethic. (p.6) 
 
Woods (1999) goes on to explain that this distinctly nursing ethic is what 
“serves as the central guide, or driving force behind every moral decision and 
action of morally competent nurses” (p.6) He concludes that this nursing ethic 
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 has its “origin, development and effect in practice” (p.6), and joins Benner 
(1991) in soundly establishing that expertise in skilled ethical comportment is 
gained in actual practice. This is not to say that theory has no part in nurses’ 
ethical development. It too is important, for guiding beginners while 
developing their nursing ethic, and also for dialogue with those health 
professionals whose main ethical approaches are theoretical. 
 
Woods (1997) points out, as does Benner (1991), that this has great significance 
for the teaching and the ethical development of nurses within the nursing 
education process. The nursing education process is where student nurses who 
come to nursing as unique individuals with their own histories (and own prior 
moral experience) are enculturated with the agreed upon and shared 
conceptualisations of caring and ethical caring, amongst other fundamentals, 
into nursing. (Woods, 1997, 1999) It is the sharing of these conceptualisations of 
caring and ethical caring practices, transmitted by theoretical and practical 
engagement, role models, mentoring, academic studies, practice narratives, 
standards for practice, and codes of ethics which also serves to develop nursing 
as a community. 
 
Benner (1991) pointed out ethical caring practices are defined as “…skilled 
actions that have a notion of good embedded in them because they are lodged 
concerns lived out in a community with a narrative and a tradition” (p.2). This 
living out in a community with a narrative and a tradition also serves to 
support, sustain, and reinforce the nurses’ commitment to caring ideas and 
ideals. This occurs, as Benner (1984, 1991, 1994) has pointed out, in several 
ways; it is achieved through the satisfying occurrence of those relational events 
in the degrees of mutuality between nurse and patient, when the mundane and 
the transformative and transcendental healing is witnessed. Also, from nurses’ 
exposure to role modelling, and observing the excellent ethical caring practices 
of experienced expert nurses (Benner, 1984) This is why experienced expert 
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 nurses are a near priceless nursing development resource. Much damage has 
been done to nursing by these nurses leaving the workforce, in the context of 
the Western phenomenon of importing into health care neo-liberal marketing 
ideology, values and strategies, that do not see, recognise or support their 
valuable skills. (Benner & Wrubel,1989; Carper, 1979a; Phillips & Benner, 1995). 
 
The internal nursing education, enculturation, and development of a distinct 
nursing ethic in morally competent experienced nurses (Woods, 1997) all 
support nurses’ ethical caring practices. This gives considerable strength to 
enable nurses to continue nursing, to the best of their ability in the “complex, 
contradictory, and uncertain situations” (Parker, 1991) that nurses frequently 
find themselves in. However, there are still formidable difficulties, and negative 
aspects to sustaining and maintaining ethical caring practices. There is already 
the difficult in-between position of different and divided loyalties, and different 
levels of authority to answer to. The nurse must balance and manage, nurse-
doctor relations, nurse-employer relations as well as the nurse-patient (and 
their family) relations. This further constrains nursing’s relative autonomy and 
ability to be moral in the organisational workplace as identified by (Yarling & 
McElmurry, 1986). Even the nurse-nurse relationship can be a source of distress. 
How to approach situations of observed bad nursing practice, and there is 
horizontal violence amongst nurses themselves classified by feminists as classic 
oppressed behaviour. Relationships between doctors and nurses to do with 
hierarchical power, gender, status, valuing and recognition make being a 
patient advocate very difficult at times. The often pointed to differences in 
perspectives of care verses cure between medicine and nursing is a simplistic 
and unhelpful dichotomy as both nurses and doctors actually do both, and 
value both (Gillon, 1992 Jecker & Self, 1991). However, the relative weights 
given to each and the power and enduring predominance of the curative and 
technologically oriented model of medical care are still a problem of major 
significance, especially in the field of palliative care (Fox, 1997). 
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Apart from power abuse issues there are other negative aspects in the nursing 
perspective of the ethical aspects of caring and an ethic of care. Many nurses 
find caring and an ethic of care unsuitable for adoption by the discipline as 
fundamental, (even though it is evident as a major part of what they do, 
because they do not fit with their emancipatory drive for scientific recognition 
(Benner & Wrubel, 1989). The emphasis on scientific evidence is still present in 
some areas of nursing, where there is a very narrow understanding of the kinds 
of evidence acceptable for evidence based practice (Watson et al, 2001), Those 
nurses significantly concerned with the drive for more autonomy and 
professional recognition, feel that emphasising caring and an ethic of care could 
undermine their quest because of the connection between women and caring 
and the undervaluing of both. Finally as previously mentioned, the complex, 
powerful influences of the social and political context in which both the 
healthcare system and nursing are embedded. 
 
However, it remains that there is a wealth of promise in the nursing perspective 
of caring and an ethic of care, as Benner (1984) has said, examining the practice 
of skilled experienced expert nurses holds much promise for nurses and 
nursing as a discipline. It also would seem that there would be much that 
would be of relevance in other areas besides nursing, for example, in 
contributing to knowledge and understanding of caring more generally in 
terms of the wider society. Perhaps the direction of the macrocosm to 
microcosm dynamics between society at large and the healthcare arena could be 
reversed so the value and influence of ethical caring practices flows from micro 
to macro? However, there are undeniable difficulties that nursing is continuing 
to wrestle with. In juxtaposing the feminist and perspectives on caring and an 
ethic of care, there is some evidence that a dialogue between the two could be 
fruitful in creating ways that the perspective of one could highlight new 
possibilities and solutions for the other and vice versa. This is again a whole 
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 field of inquiry too extensive for inclusion in this study. However, some 
insights can be found in a brief view of the similarities and differences of the 
two perspectives. 
 
Nursing and feminist perspectives: Discussion of similarities and differences 
A nursing perspective of caring and a feminist perspective of caring are two 
separate and distinctive perspectives, however they do have a number of 
common features. Nurses, in a female dominated profession, who make up by 
far the largest group of providers of caring work throughout the healthcare 
system (Johnstone, 1999; Tronto, 1993) share many points of connection with 
the oppressive experiences of other women existing in a patriarchal society. 
According to French (as cited in Falk Rafael 1996) “the denigration of women 
and that which is feminine has been entrenched in all of civilisations major 
institutions” (p. 6). The healthcare system is no exception. Johnstone (1999) 
explains that just as, historically, woman have been treated as the subordinates 
of men, and their moral concerns and viewpoints have tended to be 
marginalised, trivialised or invalidated, so too have nurses’ viewpoints tended 
to be marginalised, trivialised or invalidated and nurses have been treated as 
the subordinates of (medical) men. According to Falk Rafael (1996) many nurses 
remember being taught deference to physicians in nursing school, and she 
points out that loyalty to the physician remained an ethical requirement of the 
International Council of Nurses until as recently as 1973. Johnstone (1999) 
points out “although not always recognising it, nurses have had first-hand 
experience of the kind of negative and harmful consequences that can flow 
from a constraining gender-distorted (masculinist/malestream) view of the 
world.” (p. 133).  
 
In some respects the negative aspects for nursing are even more profound. The 
circular, devaluing “catch 22” association of women with caring, as outlined 
previously, serves a double measure for nurses. Nurses choose to care as a 
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 profession and extend their caring beyond the usual relationships of family and 
friends to complete strangers, in a societal position that spans both private and 
public realms but does not fully belong in either. Because of this nurses have 
been regarded with some suspicion by feminists as noted previously, who see 
this choice as supporting and perpetuating patriarchal oppression and as an 
exploitation of women’s caring (Tong, 1993; Bowden, 1997).  
 
At the same time nurses’ caring practices within the healthcare system are 
subordinated to medical practice, and the needs of the institution therefore they 
rarely get to influence policy or institutional practices from a position entailing 
some degree of autonomy (Scott, 1998; Johnstone, 1999). The fact that nurses 
provide comprehensive care is still largely accepted as, “a feminine virtue and 
duty deemed necessary but devalued” (Falk Rafael, 1996, p.9). A nursing 
perspective of caring, therefore, comes from a position of nurses maintaining 
and valuing care as an essential, if not the essential, feature of their profession 
within a context that accepts all that caring can provide for facilitating peoples 
health, and quality of life and death while compartmentalising and devaluing 
it. This necessarily can and does create in some nurses’ conflicts, frustration, 
depression, loss of morale leading to perpetuating the debilitating problems of 
burn out, horizontal violence, and loss of the commitment and the ability to 
care well for their patients, their colleagues, or themselves. The work done by 
Benner and Wrubel (1989) on stress and coping in health and illness, points to 
approaches to dealing with these problems. Benner and Wrubel explain that in 
their view 
 
The risks and vulnerabilities inherent in caring lead to the temptation to create 
safe places of “controlled caring” where the person dictates fully what matters 
and exercises the freedom to stop caring where the person or project is 
threatened. Many coping strategies are designed to increase distance and 
control. However, if such strategies are inappropriately used and understood to 
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 mean that detachment is always preferable and least stressful they effectively rob 
the person of the possibilities and meanings inherent in caring (Benner & 
Wrubel, p.2). 
 
This understanding is very helpful and provides an answer, but as other nurses 
such as Greenleaf (1991) have pointed out there is a problem with successful 
implementation of this approach if the contextual situational support and 
valuing of caring is not present. What the feminist perspective contributes to 
this situation is the study and understanding of the wider contextual influences 
society that do not always provide adequate support, no matter how hard a 
person or nurse tries to deal and cope with finding positive strategies. However 
following the feminist argument that revaluing and increasing the status of 
caring should not be done because it perpetuates patriarchal domination, is not 
an answer either.  
 
This position in the feminist perspective of caring and an ethic of care can be 
understood in part from their political point of view, but this is too simplistic an 
assessment. The nursing perspective of caring would argue that the importance 
and necessity to human survival of caring is such that it should be valued 
regardless (Benner, 1984, 1994; Leininger, 1990; Watson, 1990). The results of 
not valuing caring logically leads eventually to a lack of and in some cases 
complete absence of caring. The evidence of this lack stares people in the face 
everyday and is increasing, as is social fragmentation (Beaglehole & Bonita, 
1997). Nurses, in particular, ultimately have to deal with in their practice with 
child neglect and abuse, domestic abuse, poverty and all manner of 
psychological disorders. Despite this and despite the successful work and 
research in valuing caring and helping it to become more visible by many 
nursing scholars, much of it still does not effectively address the multiple 
constraints in the context in which the caring and ethical practices of nursing 
are carried out. 
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Bowden (1997), in her study of nursing as an example of a caring relationship 
makes some very valid observations. Her study demonstrates respect for the 
wonder of what nurses manage to do with their ethical caring practices as she 
observes how they are constantly balancing and negotiating “…the tensions 
between integrity and dependency, responsibility and control as well as 
mediating the interconnected aspects of patients’ subjectivity and objectivity, 
interposing the often conflicting aims of physiology and the spirit, science and 
humanism” (p.104). Bowden further points out that this complex caring, is 
carried out by nurses while situated in a difficult position. Her observations on 
this fact essentially echo and expand on the original work of Yarling and Mc 
Elmurry (1986) and also the in-between position originally identified by Bishop 
and Scudder (1990). However, unlike their positive interpretation of it, she sees 
this position as distinctly detrimental. She examines much of Benner’s work 
and values it highly for its clear exposition of what do nurses actually do, in the 
particular situations in which they care for their patients. However, she notes 
that the importance of care is demonstrated but not the means to lift it beyond 
its constraints and distortions and negative aspects. 
 
According to Bowden “most notably, nursing relations are usually 
characterised by exceptional functional interdependence and overlap with other 
relations in healthcare… they are infused with the tensions of sustaining 
interdependent but differently focused relations with different levels of 
authority” (p.104). She sees that relations with patients are closely tied into 
relations with other members of the institution and the gendered social order is 
a crucial constitutive factor in the practice of nursing. Further to this she sees 
that “in keeping with the dominant norms of this order, nursing care is 
incumbent with much of the social apparatus that operates to undermine both 
the value of woman's practices in general and the social possibilities of the 
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 practitioners. In particular this includes the largely invisible, ethical significance 
of nursing as a caring practice (Bowden, 1997).  
 
For change to occur, Bowden sees that valuing care and making it visible are 
vital but not sufficient. For the real possibilities of caring to be actualised the 
structures within which nurses ethical caring practices are carried out must 
change. It comes down to the fact as stated previously that all people need to be 
cared for regardless of gender, cultural differences, and politics (Benner & 
Wrubel 1989; Bowden, 1997; Tronto, 1993). It seems that caring itself may not 
the problem, but the lack of support and resources and the overwhelmingly 
unfair distribution in society of who does the caring. Addressing this should be 
the focus, and many feminists and nurses alike now focus on this. In fact many 
nurses adopt and combine a feminist perspective of caring along with their 
nursing perspective of caring for example Wheeler and Chinn (1989), and 
Watson (1990b). This combination along with closer interdisciplinary dialogue 
with the feminist perspective appears to hold possibilities worth pursuing.  
 
Summary 
It can be seen that a nursing perspective of caring existing as a plurality of 
views consists, like the feminist perspective of caring, of both positive and 
negative aspects. Both have degrees of difficulty with the demonstration and 
articulation of the importance of caring and the ethical aspects of caring, but no 
difficulty in knowing and understanding it to an advanced degree from a 
lifetime of association. It would seem that the more political approach of the 
feminist perspective of caring would have something of value to offer the 
nursing perspective, while the nursing perspective with its total immersion in 
the intricacies of ethical and purposeful caring relations and their indubitable 
impact on the health healing and survival of human beings would have 
something of value to offer a feminist perspective of caring. 
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There appears to be a need to come to terms with and accept that some of the 
most fundamental essentials for human health and quality of life are not 
entirely, rationally explicable or measurable or quantifiable. However, they are 
no less essential, valuable and vital. Caring is still recognised organically and 
utterly by humans none the less. They are known and understood 
unequivocally in the experiential realm and can be seen and measured more 
accurately by their sequelae, jobs, productivity, health, ability to cope, survive, 
adapt better and faster to change and challenges. 
 
It is time now to leave this part of the study focusing on caring, the ethical 
aspects of caring and an ethic of care to examine and explore the realm of 
bioethics. It is necessary to now focus on getting familiar with the nature of 
bioethics in order to progress with the aim of developing some understanding 
of what place, if any, caring may have within it. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
BIOETHICS: AN ORIENTATION TO THE PRESENT FROM A TELESCOPIC 
VIEW OF THE PAST 
 
To understand the present we must journey into the past (anon.) 
 
Introduction  
This chapter is concerned with beginning to lay out a view of the landscape of 
bioethics in order to see how caring might have a place within it. On entering 
into the bioethical literature for this study it soon became obvious that bioethics 
has developed into a complex and intricate field. There are broad descriptions 
of bioethics that may be acceptable at a surface level. For example, bioethics can 
be defined from its etymological roots as ‘ethics applied to the bio realm’, where 
bio comes from the Greek ‘bios’ meaning life (Reich, 1978; Johnstone, 1994; 
Gillon, 1998). However if one is looking in more depth at what constitutes the 
field of bioethics, or ‘doing bioethics’ a clear understanding is more difficult to 
obtain. It tends to depend on what period of its historical development is the 
focus, and which of the many different approaches or perspectives of bioethics 
is being used at the time. This is further complicated by a rather confusing 
usage of much of the terminology. Therefore, to provide a rich account of 
bioethics present day manifestation(s), this chapter, the first of two focused on 
bioethics, will provide the following: clarification of some of the important 
terminology, and of the general characteristics of bioethics; an outline of the 
influential history concerning bioethics genetic roots in early philosophical and 
ethical thinking, and finally the more recent history of the development and 
establishment of contemporary bioethics. 
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 Clarifying important terminology and identifying the general characteristics 
of bioethics. 
The term bioethics was first coined in 1970 by a biologist and cancer researcher 
Van Rensselaer Potter in his book Bioethics: Bridge to the Future. For Potter the 
term originally represented the combining of ethics, which he saw as belonging 
to the humanities, with biological knowledge from the sciences to create a new 
interdisciplinary ethics. It was Potter’s belief that the rapid advances in 
technology occurring circa 1970, required the guidance and wisdom that an 
interdisciplinary bioethics could provide in order to improve quality of life and 
ensure man‘s (sic)survival on earth. At almost the same time and apparently 
independently, according to Gillon (1998), the word bioethics was used in a 
somewhat different sense by a Dutch foetal physiologist and obstetrician Andre 
Hellegers. Hellegers, along with others, founded the Kennedy Institute of 
Human Reproduction and Bioethics at Georgetown University Washington DC 
in 1971. Hellegers used the term bioethics with a narrower focus to apply to the 
ethics of medicine and biomedical research. Thus from its establishment there 
were two quite disparate concepts of bioethics, one narrow in focus conceiving 
of bioethics as traditional ethics applied to increasingly complex ethical 
situations in medicine and biomedicine. The other, much broader in scope, 
conceiving of bioethics as the creation of a new interdisciplinary discipline to 
provide guidance in the face of burgeoning technological advances, and their 
potential impact on humanity and the environment. This disparity, according to 
Gillon (1998), highlights a fundamental disagreement over what constitutes 
bioethics that can be a source of confusion in working with bioethical literature 
if it is not understood. 
 
It was the narrower focus on medicine, and biological research that directly 
related to medicine, that was the first and major component of bioethics 
(Pellegrino, 1993; Gillon, 1998), and it appeared to stay this way for some 
considerable time. It is interesting however that in a literature search of 
contemporary bioethical texts in the Victoria University of Wellington Library, 
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 some foundational 1970’s bioethical texts that shared the same noted bioethical 
author were found separately, one in the medical section and the other in the 
biological science section. In the biology section “Contemporary Issues in 
Bioethics” published in 1978 and co-authored by Tom L. Beauchamp, was 
found together with Van Rensselaer Potter’s book “Bioethics Bridge to the 
Future”. In the medical section, also co-authored by Tom L. Beauchamp with 
James Childress and published in 1979 was “ Principles of Biomedical Ethics”, 
often referred to as “the bible” in medical and health care ethics. 
 
This provides some evidence that there has been awareness of the existence and 
validity of the other broader conception of bioethics, presumably developing 
parallel to but overshadowed by the narrower medically focused version. In the 
first Encyclopedia of bioethics published in 1978, the Editor in Chief, Warren T. 
Reich, defined bioethics at that time as  
 
… the systematic study of human conduct in the area of the life sciences and 
healthcare, insofar as this conduct is examined in the light of moral values and 
principles (Reich, 1978, p. iv).  
 
This reflects the narrower conception in ascendance at the time, as Reich (cited 
in Koczwara & Madigan, 1997) stated, “Many scholars and much of the public 
tend to identify the scope of bioethics in a somewhat narrow medical sense’ “. 
(p. 76). However, the balance between the two conceptions of bioethics is now 
changing. The main reason for the change is the pressure of the very rapid 
growth and expansion of bioethics since the 1970’s resulting in the inclusion of 
a much wider range of subject matter, and a greater number of different 
participants and disciplines (Gillon, 1998). In philosophical terms, these changes 
have taken place in a remarkably short time, as Koczwara and Madigan (1997) 
point out that The Encyclopedia of Philosophy has remained unchanged for 30 
years, whereas in fifteen years (approximately) the comprehensive changes in 
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 the field of bioethics created the need for a substantial revision of the 1978 
edition of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. In 1995 a new edition of the 
Encyclopedia of Bioethics was published in which Reich again as Editor in 
Chief, explains that it has become necessary to expand the definition of 
bioethics to 
…a broader scope that would embrace the social, environmental, and global 
issues of health and the life sciences. Thus we see the field of bioethics as going 
beyond biomedical ethics to embrace health related, and science related moral 
issues in the areas of public health, population ethics, and animal care.’Reich 
(cited in Koczwara & Madigan, 1997, p. 76) 
 
This revision represents a move of the perspective considerably towards Van 
Rensselaer Potter’s original broader conception of bioethics, thus indicating his 
original multidisciplinary conception to have been visionary at the time.  
 
Indeed Potter’s original conception consisting of two disciplines has been vastly 
surpassed. Bioethics now has a very multidisciplinary nature with the inclusion 
of disciplines such as moral theology, law, economics, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, and history, to name a few, along with medicine, nursing and 
biology. It is the increase of new areas seen as relevant to bioethical enquiry, 
and then added to the field that continually stretch and change the boundaries 
(Gillon, 1998). This basic instability of the boundaries of bioethics along with 
the increasing cultural diversity of other contributing parties as it expands 
world wide, and the effects of multiple media influences, virtually ensure the 
inability to make any conclusive definition of bioethics (Gillon, 1998; Koczwara 
& Madigan, 1997). 
 
The fluidity of the boundaries of bioethics is joined by a confusing 
interchangeable use of terminology as in the case of the terms applied ethics 
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 and bioethics. In its infancy bioethics was often known as applied ethics 
because at that stage it could simply be described as the application of 
traditional ethical principles, (from the parent discipline of ethics), to 
increasingly difficult situations beginning to occur in medicine and related 
biological research (Gorovitz, 1992; Pellegrino, 1993; Winkler, 1998). However 
as traditional ethics are now applied to areas beyond medical ethics, and 
beyond healthcare in general, the term ‘applied ethics’ no longer represents 
only this area. In the Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Winkler (1998) defines 
applied ethics as “a general field of study that includes all systematic efforts to 
understand and to resolve moral problems that arise in some domain of 
practical life.” (p. 192). The domain of practical life covered by applied ethics is, 
according to Winkler (1998), divided into the three major subgroups of 
bioethics, environmental ethics, and business ethics, each of which is divided 
into further subgroups of its own. In this view bioethics is now clearly 
recognised as only one part of applied ethics not the whole. However, in earlier 
definitions Weiss (1995) argues that environmental ethics is part of the field of 
modern bioethics, and Reich’s (1995) expanded definition of bioethics, also 
includes the area of environmental ethics, providing evidence of an overlap of 
subject areas that could be claimed by either applied ethics or bioethics. The 
earlier definitions of bioethics incorporate the developing area of environmental 
ethics within bioethics, while the latest definition puts it in the broader applied 
ethics as a category of its own illuminating a further boundary change due 
again to the rapid growth, of environmental ethics which is now a very large 
and specialized area in its own right, with many sub groups of its own, for 
example, deep ecology and eco-feminism. (Gillon, 1998;Kheel, 1993; Winkler, 
1998). 
 
Clinical ethics is another term that is sometimes used as an equivalent or 
interchangeable term for bioethics in its entirety, for example Pellegrino (1993) 
uses the term “clinical bioethics”. However clinical ethics is a sub branch of 
bioethics whose particular area of application is in the arena of clinical practice. 
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 (Koczwara & Madigan, 1997). Clinical ethics developed as a distinct area out of 
the main body of the early form of bioethics in the late 1970’s. According to 
Koczwara and Madigan, (1997), the term was first used in 1976 by Joseph 
Fletcher a philosopher and early pioneer of bioethics, in a lecture given at a 
medical school. He supported a form of situation ethics, which he felt was more 
appropriate to the practical aspects of medicine concerning a doctor and a 
patient as opposed to the application of general rules across the board. This 
focus on particular situations has become accepted as a distinct characteristic of 
clinical ethics. According to Gillon, (1998), the clinical approach is characterized 
by being highly particular, contextual, and partial, or as Koczwara and 
Madigan, (1997) more pragmatically put it, clinical ethics “…is directed at the 
care of a particular patient faced with a particular illness or injury” (p. 80).  
 
In considering the existence of multiple conceptions of bioethics, in particular 
the major narrow and broader versions of bioethics, I detect an interesting 
parallel of sorts with the narrower and broader conceptions of health. I see a 
similarity in the paths of attempting to define both bioethics and health that 
indicates a more general trend in society as a whole towards greater complexity 
(Capra, 1972; Guba, 1991). For example initially there was a narrow definition 
of health as ‘the absence of disease’ which has slowly broadened and multiplied 
as scientists and lay people have become aware of the wider range of factors 
including the environment, genetics, personality, housing, relationships, 
employment, pollution etc. that need to be considered regarding a person’s 
state of health (Beaglehole & Bonita, 1997). Just as with health, bioethics has also 
progressed from a relatively narrow definition to broader and multiple 
versions. In both health and bioethics few can agree on exactly what constitutes 
or defines either. At the present time in both bioethics and health there are 
those that still hold to the earlier narrower and more clearly apprehended 
definitions of each. It seems then, that there is a paradigm shift also involved 
adding to the complexity in bioethics, where the less new and the older versions 
of health and bioethics exist along with the new (Guba, 1990). Thereby the 
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 potential for communication difficulties across different paradigms or 
perspectives and understandings of definition within bioethics is increasing. 
 
In summary from its establishment in 1970 there have been two quite different 
conceptions of what constitutes the field of bioethics. One has a narrow focus 
on the application of traditional ethical principles in medicine and biomedical 
research. The other has a broad focus on the creation of a new interdisciplinary 
ethics, in order to provide wise guidance for the preservation of quality of life 
and human survival in the face of rapid technological change. The narrow 
medically focused version has held a dominant position for a considerable time, 
however its ascendancy is strongly challenged by the nature and rapidity of 
scientific and technological advances. It is the very nature of these scientific and 
technological advances, along with increasing multidisciplinarity, public and 
media participation, that cause the boundaries of bioethics to shift and change 
in ways that make it virtually impossible to develop a conclusive definition. 
These same factors create difficulties with multiple understandings in the use of 
bioethical terminology which combined with the many different perspectives, 
old and newer coexisting at the same time, can make ethical situations even 
more difficult to resolve. The positive side of these seemingly negative factors is 
firstly that in themselves they provide a set of recognisable characteristics with 
which the field of ethics can be broadly but usefully described. Secondly the 
lack of a conclusive definition of bioethics can be seen not as a frustrating 
failure but as a clear indication and appreciation of the complexity and rate of 
growth of a continually evolving field. Growth and development require at 
least some degree of fluidity in boundaries. 
 
Genealogical influences in the history of bioethics 
A number of the complexities and themes in contemporary bioethics result 
from the long reaching direct and indirect influences of its close genealogical 
relation to the disciplines of ethics and philosophy, ethics being the equivalent a 
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 parent, and philosophy a grandparent. For a clearer understanding of this 
situation, the history of bioethics section is divided into two parts. The first with 
a focus on some of the important formative early history, from 500BC to World 
War II, and, the second, with a focus on the more recent history From World 
War II to the present.  
The Early History 500 BC-World War II 
Ethics developed in the Hellenic era initially within the general area of 
philosophical thinking and discussion thriving within the culture of ancient 
Greece at that time, later as it developed, it became a separate and distinct field 
on its own (MacIntyre, 1995). According to Norman (1995), it was the Sophists 
in the fifth century BC who were the first thinkers to raise questions about the 
idea of moral conduct, and about what morality is and why it should exist. As 
Norman, (1995) explains, the Sophists developed the idea that moral codes were 
useful human creations that they saw as “sets of customs and conventions 
which make social life possible and in doing so, committed themselves to a 
form of ethical relativism and to the denial of any universal code of morality or 
any absolute moral truth.” (p.587). Some radical Sophists concluded that if 
traditional moral standards were mere conventions they have no binding force 
therefore why bother to be moral at all (Norman, 1995). It was Plato and 
Aristotle who took up the task of answering that question in a more systematic 
manner.  
 
According to Bostock (1995), Plato’s early dialogues were preoccupied with 
ethics and answering the fundamental ethical question how to live the good life. 
In particular Plato concentrated on finding the correct definitions for the 
traditional virtues of that time, temperance, courage, justice, and piety, for if 
they are good qualities it must be because they make a good life for those that 
possess them, and underlying all the virtues must be the ability to know what 
constitutes the human good (Norman, 1995). Norman further explains that in 
his “Republic” Plato proposes that the good life is found in the harmony of the 
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 soul, a state achieved by the possession and balancing of the virtues, and since 
such a condition is one in which a person is happy and flourishing, the morally 
good life lived in accordance with the virtues is to be the best life for human 
beings.  
 
This was also the time within the Greek culture when the powerful influence of 
the prototype of “theoretical” reasoning in the form of mathematical geometry 
began developing rapidly (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988). According to Jonsen and 
Toulmin (1988), the rigor of Pythagoras’s geometry and the mathematical 
method of formal deduction was so attractive for many Greek thinkers, Plato 
included, that it soon became the ideal of all rational argument at that time. 
Plato moved away from his interest in ethics to continue his work in the wider 
realms of philosophy, and greatly impressed by the rise and spread of geometry 
and formal mathematical deduction he devoted his work “Timaeus” largely to 
exploring mathematical theories (Bostock, 1995). 
 
According to Norman (1995) although Plato’s direct interest in ethics waned, 
Aristotle picked it up and became associated with virtue-based ethics 
developing it further. Although also influenced by formal deductive methods in 
many areas of his work, Aristotle strongly emphasised the practical nature of 
ethical thinking, he called into question “the assumption that moral reasoning 
and moral concepts can be—and should be—analysed in universal and 
invariable terms” (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, p. 281). In direct opposition to the 
precision of the formal mathematical deductive approach Aristotle emphasized 
the difficulty in being certain or exact in determining answers in ethical 
situations. Jonsen & Toulmin (1988), set out in their book The Abuse of Casuistry, 
the three sets of considerations that Aristotle put forward in his 
“Nicomanchean Ethics” to support his view that resolving moral problems does 
not call for appeals to theory but for phronesis, otherwise known as practical 
wisdom. 
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 1. In any field of argument we can look only for such kinds of 
exactitude or necessity as the nature of the case allows: and the practical 
nature of ethics makes it inappropriate to demand mathematical 
exactness or formal necessity. 
2. Given the concrete concerns of moral practice, ethics is never 
systematic in the way abstract theoretical disciplines such as geometry 
and planetary dynamics are. 
3. The moral claims that arise in practical situations depend on the 
detailed circumstances of individual cases, to such an extent that ethics 
rests on no invariable “axioms” or other strictly “universal” 
generalisations. (p. 281) 
 
At this point, if one looks at the juxtaposition of the Sophists and Plato’s early 
pragmatic non absolute thinking alongside the Pythagorean absolute certainty 
of mathematical formal deduction, it appears that the seeds of two very 
different strands of thought have been sown in the fertile intellectual soil of the 
ancient Greek culture. At this early stage in the history of ethical thinking, 
potential conditions have been created to allow movement back and forth 
between the two poles. A broader practical ‘here and now’ concrete approach to 
particular situations, known in Greek as phronesis, and a theoretical, atemporal, 
abstract approach based on the search for universal laws and the formulation of 
deductive principles known in Greek as episteme, (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988). 
Apart from indicating that the abstract theoretical approach to ethics was not, 
even at this early stage, the only approach to ethics, this back and forth 
movement also demonstrates that attempting to reconcile theory and practice is 
by no means only a feature of modern times but has been grappled with for 
centuries.  
 
There are two other groups of Greek thinkers whose original ideas have also 
had a formative influence down the corridor of time and appeared in more 
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 recent ethical theories. Firstly, the Epicureans whose very important 
contribution was to identify the good with pleasure (Norman, 1995). 
Interestingly, the epicurean form of pleasure became unjustly associated with 
the hedonistic pursuit of sensuous pleasures, when in fact the real epicurean 
pleasure was a more austere form of mental tranquility to be achieved by 
rejecting determinism and freeing oneself of superstitious fears of the Gods and 
the after life (De Botton, 2000;Norman, 1995). The connection of the good with 
pleasure is seen again as a significant influence in the work of early utilitarians. 
Secondly, the Stoics developed the idea of the good life as “one lived in 
accordance with nature” or “the natural law”. According to Norman (1995), this 
was to some extent present in the work of Plato and Aristotle but the Stoics 
combined living in accordance with nature with acting in accordance with 
reason, and by this reasoning rendering oneself immune to the disturbances of 
the emotions. There is some evidence here of a link with the abstract, distanced, 
and rational thinking found in the modern formal, deductive, and principle 
based approaches to ethics. The natural law approach is one that also been 
interpreted in many ways and other forms of ethical theories (Norman, 1995). 
 
The demise of the intellectual and sophisticated Greco-Roman era and the rise 
of Christian religion brought about another significant phase in ethics. In the 
thirteenth century morality and religion were combined in medieval Christian 
ethics with St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas being the major influences in 
joining moral principles with divine commands (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988; 
Norman, 1995). According to Norman (1995) Thomas Aquinas used Aristotle’s 
account of natural human functioning, which he interpreted as a purpose that 
humans are endowed with by a divine creator. According to Capra (1982) this 
combination of Aristotle’s system of nature with Christian theology established 
a conceptual framework of the world as “The notion of an organic living and 
spiritual universe” (p.38). The focus was on the body and soul, a dual concept 
involving the here and now of the problems and privations of practical daily 
life juxtaposed with the promise of the souls release after death to the eternal 
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 spiritual beauty and happiness of heaven. Although the fit between the 
Aristotelian ethics and divine commands was not a comfortable one and 
contained many weaknesses, such was the power of religion that this 
conceptual framework remained largely unchallenged up until the sixteenth 
century (Capra, 1982).  
 
In general, religious ethics and theology used a practical case by case approach 
to dealing with ethical problems and transgressions of canon law. One 
particular form known as casuistry, although lost through abuse and disrepute 
by the seventeenth century, has, as with Aristotle’s virtue ethics, undergone a 
contemporary secular revival in contemporary bioethics (Jonsen & Toulmin, 
1988). This will be covered in depth later in this chapter, and in Chapter Six. 
Religion and ethics, despite a tug-of-war between rational certainty and simple 
faith, have had a considerable continuing relationship that is still a valid and 
significant influence for many people today. However, according to Norman 
(1995) in the modern era the mainstream tradition of moral philosophy has been 
essentially a secular one. 
 
It was between the sixteenth and seventeenth century that the fierce grip of 
religious doctrine began to lose strength against the rise of the new scientific 
approach, though not without a fight. The works of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo 
and Descartes especially, presented significant challenges to the authority of the 
church (Capra, 1982). Galileo was actually imprisoned for expressing his radical 
and heretical ideas of the heliocentric organisation of the solar system, and on 
hearing of Galileo’s treatment, Descartes quietly withdrew his work “the 
World”, a treatise on physics and cosmology, as he also supported Galileo’s 
hypothesis (Cottingham, 1995). After several years of discretion Descartes again 
began writing and publishing again producing an extremely influential body of 
work that has left him “usually regarded as the founder of modern philosophy” 
(Capra, 1982, p.41). Descartes book “Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
100 
 Conducting One’s Reason and Searching the Truth in the Sciences ”, although 
regarded as a great philosophical classic, was according to Capra (1982), 
originally intended “not to teach philosophy but to serve as an introduction to 
science” (p.43).  
 
Indeed the influence of Descartes method of thought and perspective of nature 
produced a whole new worldview that has influenced all branches of modern 
science right up to the present day, where it is still seen as useful provided its 
limitations are clearly recognized (Capra, 1982; Cottingham, 1995). Descartes is 
responsible for the idea of absolute certainty of scientific knowledge, a notion 
that echoes all the way back to Pythagoras, and the theory of the mind and 
matter/body separation resulting in the dualities of mind/body, 
reason/emotion, objective/subjective which throughout both science and 
medicine have had such a pervasive influence on our ideas of health, right and 
wrong, and human life in general (Capra, 1982; Cottingham, 1995). Also having 
direct and profound influence according to Capra (1982) was Descartes’ view of 
nature as a perfect machine governed by mathematical laws, in which he shared 
Francis Bacon’s view that the aim of science was the domination and control of 
nature, although Bacon’s approach was empirical and inductive whereas 
Descartes was rational and deductive. The biomedical model developed from 
Descartes’ powerfully influential mechanistic view of the world where, in the 
biomedical view, the human body is seen as a machine that could be 
understood by breaking it down into its constituent parts, which if defective 
could then be mended and reassembled (Capra, 1982). 
 
What this enormously critical period appears to indicate is the intimate 
relations of influence between a paradigm, which I define in this study as a 
general worldview, and philosophy, ethics, science, and medicine. In this 
particular case it is the way that philosophy, ethics, science, and medicine bring 
with them an intensely compounded application of Cartesian thinking through 
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 the joining of Cartesian influenced philosophy and ethics with Cartesian 
influenced science and medicine, all converging when brought together in the 
establishment of the field of bioethics. The ethical legacy of such a convergence 
is, the strongly held assumed superiority of the rational controllable intellect 
over the irrational uncontrollable senses, feelings and emotions, particularly 
when it comes to ethical decisions made in a world seen as comprised of 
individual parts that may be separated without consequence (Capra, 1982). 
 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries according to Norman (1995), a 
form of ethical naturalism reappeared in the works of the British moralists. 
Hobbes, seen more as a political philosopher than a moral philosopher, together 
with Hume, Bentham, and James Mill provided the return of another significant 
secular version of morality. These moral philosophers were looking again to 
nature and Man’s natural inclinations (my italics) for the source of moral beliefs, 
but independent of any religious framework. They attempted to answer the 
following two major questions. Firstly, is morality grounded in self-love or 
benevolence? Secondly, are moral judgements the product of reason or 
sentiment (Norman, 1995)? As Norman (1995) points out, it was the work of 
Hume, Bentham, and James Mill who in answer to these questions laid the 
foundations of the ethical theory of utilitarianism. The utilitarians went so far as 
to create a measurement tool of units of pleasure (hedons) to more accurately 
determine the maximization of pleasure or happiness over displeasure or 
unhappiness. The focus of this central principle in utilitarianism aligns pleasure 
or happiness with “the good” which links back to the original epicurean 
influence of equating what is good with happiness or pleasure as mentioned 
previously. Utilitarianism was further refined and modified by John Stuart Mill 
and has continued to be modified by other utilitarian philosophers who have 
stamped their influence on the development of this ethical theory. 
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 In the nineteenth century according to Jonsen & Toulmin (1988), moral 
philosophy and law writers moved away from the variety and discrimination of 
the practical situation and case method, toward universal systematic theories of 
ethics providing yet a further significant example of the back and forth 
movement between practical and theoretical approaches. In the 1860’s the noted 
philospher Henry Sidgwick, became convinced “that moral philosophers 
should rise above the level of specific practical cases, and engage in a critical 
debate about more general or “fundamental” principles.” (Jonsen & Toulmin, 
1988, p. 280). Following this and in response to the development of 
utilitarianism and ethical naturalism, Immanuel Kant put forward his ethical 
theory of deontology or duty, and formulated his categorical imperative that 
“one must act in such a way that one can will the maxim of ones actions to be a 
universal law” (Norman, 1995, p. 589). Kant proposed in opposition to 
utilitarianism, the idea that morality lay not simply in the consequences but in 
“the motivation to perform ones duty simply for its own sake” and that one 
must “treat all persons never merely as means to an end, but always also as 
ends in themselves” (Norman, 1995, p.589). According to (Norman, 1995), the 
resulting theoretical ethical arguments and inquiries dominated English debate 
till after World War II, and eventually both the USA and Britain followed the 
lead of Sidgwick firmly in the realms of the theoretical approach. 
  
History of Contemporary Bioethics World War II- 1970’s 
Bioethics did not materialise out of a vacuum. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War several major social and scientific events began to create the broad 
underlying changes that eventually lead to the formation of bioethics (Jonsen & 
Toulmin, 1988). Through the media public understanding not only of the sheer 
mass destruction of human lives but also the manner in which they were lost, 
for example the revelations of the Nuremberg trials, and the profound sequelae 
of the bombing of Hiroshima, created a new climate of questioning and 
surfacing of doubts (Gillon, 1998; Johnstone, 1999; Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988; 
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 Tong, 1993). At the same time the scientific discovery of the structure of DNA 
began to open up an entirely new realm of potential and possibilities in biology 
and medicine (Weiss, 1995). As a result of these formative scientific and 
technological advancements together with the social changes many long held 
values were held up to scrutiny in the open discussions, dissent, and media 
coverage of the radical 1960’s.  
 
Most of the early scientific advances were in the realms of biological medicine 
and were implemented in healthcare, which in turn created a challenge to 
established practices in medicine and many of it’s underlying assumptions 
(Gillon, 1998; Pellegrino, 1993; Weiss, 1995). One of the first new technical 
advances was the ability to successfully transplant a human heart. However, 
situations developed that had serious ethical implications and consequences not 
previously encountered that concerned the health professionals, the lives of the 
patients, their families and the communities they came from. Issues arose 
surrounding establishing the criteria for what constituted brain death, and 
when or whether to approach grieving relatives regarding organ donation from 
their deceased family members. Further new scientific technologies followed in 
fairly rapid succession adding more challenges. 
 
According to Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) this flurry of activity extended to 
philosophical ethics directing the attention of philosophers to medicine and 
medical ethics where “it seemed to philosophers that here was a field in which 
the practical merits of their theories might at last be tested” (p. 305). At the same 
time, according to Pellegrino (1993) physicians turned to the philosophers who 
were beginning to write and speak on medical ethical issues as they appeared 
to offer a systematic and relatively objective way to approach their increasingly 
complex ethical problems.  
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 At this point we have the coming together of two centuries old traditions, 
philosophical ethics and medical ethics. They originate from separate sources, 
ancient Greek philosophy for philosophical ethics and ancient Greek medicine 
for medical ethics. The sources of philosophical ethics (moral philosophy) has 
already been covered. The source of medical ethics rises from the same 
wellspring in the Hellenic era but from a different body of work known as the 
Hippocratic corpus (Pellegrino, 1993; Weiss, 1995). According to Pellegrino 
(1993) “the ethics of the corpus are a mosaic of moral precepts written at 
different times and influenced by most of the major schools of ancient Greek 
philosophy” (p. 1159). These ethical precepts covered for example, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, confidentiality, prohibitions against abortion, euthanasia, and 
sexual relationships with patients, as well as requiring the physician to lead a 
pure and virtuous life, and of course it contains the Hippocratic oath 
(Pellegrino, 1993). As Pellegrino further explains,  
 
…the ethics of the physician patient relationship, the fulcrum on which the 
decisions of the physician and the well-being of patient balance, was not 
systematically justified or derived in any formal way ... and even the physicians 
who were philosophers said little about the ethics of the profession in which they 
were trained (Pellegrino, 1993, p.1159) 
  
Therefore although Greek medicine was intimately associated with Greek 
philosophy during their long histories, the philosophical gaze was never turned 
in a direct critical manner on medical ethics, even in its earliest Hippocratic 
beginnings.  
 
Thus as well as inheriting a double dose of Cartesianism the formation of 
bioethics also entailed the joining of philosophical ethics with medical ethics, 
two previously separate independent and proud historical traditions. The 
physician, with the backing of the Hippocratic oath, had maintained the 
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 powerful sole charge paternalistic position within the sacrosanct relationship 
between Physician and patient, and until this point had successfully avoided 
any external attempts at power sharing as Weiss (1995) notes 
 
The Hippocratic oath reflects the traditional notions of paternalism of the 
medical profession, which regard the physician as the primary decision maker for 
the patient and the best person be able to decide what course of action is in the 
patient’s best interest (p. 86). 
  
Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) support Weiss emphasising that, over time “The 
medical profession had slowly achieved a moral pre-eminence that almost ruled 
out debate about medical ethics” (p.304). At the time it was a significant factor 
leading to difficult adjustments in the initial relationship between philosophical 
ethics and medical ethics. Although it is somewhat less obvious today there is 
still evidence of mutual discomfort and the continuing existence of separate 
cultures that meet but rarely blend well if at all particularly in areas such as 
clinical ethics (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988; Levi 1994; Pellegrino, 1993; Reichlin, 
1994; Turner, 1998). 
 
Another source of irritation between the initial partners was that the 
Hippocratic tradition of the medical profession had remained relatively 
constant and stable for centuries, whereas, as has been demonstrated previously 
in this section, philosophy and ethics had been subject to regular upheaval and 
change over time. Despite the immediate pressing need for assistance with new 
complex ethical situations the struggling physicians were concerned about the 
effect of this volatility being introduced within their profession. This concern is 
reflected in the comment by Pellegrino (1993) that,  
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 Medical ethics is too ancient and too essential a reality in the lives of physicians, 
patients, and society to be left entirely to the fortuitous currents of philosophical 
fashion, or the unsupported assertions of clinicians. (p.1162) 
 
Within the newly formed bioethics it soon became apparent that applying the 
variants of act or rule-based deontology or consequentialism from philosophical 
ethics was rather cumbersome (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988). Few apart from 
philosophically trained bioethicists had the background or training to use them 
adequately. Physicians’ medical expertise “…does not automatically equate 
with ethical authority or rectitude” (Pellegrino, 1993, p. 1158). Adjustments and 
changes had to be made and according to Pellegrino (1993) in a relatively short 
time the theory of prima facie principles developed by Ross was most 
effectively adapted to medical ethics by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress in their book “Principles of Biomedical Ethics”, and soon became the 
dominant way of doing ethics. As Pellegrino further points out, two of the 
principles, beneficence and nonmaleficence, were familiar to the physicians and 
were readily accepted, the other two principles autonomy and justice were not 
familiar and “seemed in some sense antithetical to the traditional medical 
ethic”(p.1160). The principle of autonomy directly contradicted the traditional 
authoritarianism and paternalism of the Hippocratic ethic and physicians have 
had the greatest problems with this principle as it was often erroneously 
interpreted is being in opposition to beneficence (Pellegrino, 1993). According 
to Weiss (1995) even for modern physicians there is an inherent tension at the 
core of bioethics between: 
 
…the need to balance the right of the patient to act in his or her own best 
interest without constraint from others (autonomy) and the obligation of the 
healthcare professional to act to promote the ultimate good of the patient, 
prevent harm, or supplant harm (beneficence). (p.86) 
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 Physicians have become more accepting of the principle of autonomy largely 
because it is consistent with the powerful contemporary societal focus on 
individualism, privacy and self-determination, and it is central to informed 
consent (Pellegrino, 1993). Weiss (1995) provides further evidence of this 
acceptance as he points out that in the USA “The President’s Commission for 
the study of ethical problems in medicine and biomedical research (1983) 
declared that where a conflict between a patient’s self-interest and wellbeing 
remains unresolved, respect for autonomy becomes paramount.” (p.86). 
Incidentally it was this same President’s commission in which Jonsen and 
Toulmin (1988) took part, prompting their work devoted to the rehabilitation of 
the casuistic or case approach to ethics. 
 
Of the four principles justice was the most remote from traditional medical 
ethics, and despite its prominence in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle 
justice received no specific attention from a Hippocratic ethic that centred on 
the welfare of individual patients and not of society (Pellegrino, 1993). Once 
again, in recent years, justice has been accepted into medical ethics (and 
bioethics) due to increasing disparities in the distribution of health care and, 
according to Pellegrino (1993) the possibility “that physicians may become 
agents primarily of fiscal or social purposes rather than that of the patient” 
(p.1160). It was John Rawls’ sophisticated contractarian theory of justice and his 
hierarchical ordering of obligations and principles relative to distributive justice 
that placed justice clearly the forefront of bioethics (Pellegrino, 1993; Norman, 
1995). 
Summary 
An understanding of the historical relationship between philosophical ethics 
and medical ethics is fundamental to understanding much of what is happening 
in bioethics today. However, bioethics is far from consisting of that relationship 
alone. Health care is being delivered by an increasing number of different 
health care professionals involving a wide diversity of views, ethical systems, 
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 practice methods, and multiple healthcare settings (Johnstone, 1999; Reich, 
1978). This means that there can be a greater number of different views held in 
situations requiring decision making about a person’s healthcare, not least 
including the views held by the person in question (Levi, 1994; Johnstone, 1999; 
Turner, 1998). The ethical aspects of the issues raised by the new scientific 
technologies have been taken from the esoteric world of philosophical ethics 
into the broader public arena because at a practical level they concerned deeply 
held values of ordinary people. These values concern the issues of birth, life, 
and death that directly involve everyone at some point in their lifespan. The 
sensationalism of some of the issues naturally drew the involvement of various 
forms of the media, so that the ensuing broader discussions of war issues, 
abortion debates, the burgeoning feminist movement, and a focus on human 
rights created a strong challenge to the status quo (Weiss, 1995; Gillon, 1995). A 
flow on effect of this challenge was the growth and expansion of the consumer 
and patient rights movements, a generally better informed public, and greater 
recognition of the self determining nature of people to stand up for their 
perceived rights in healthcare (Weiss, 1995). Without doubt it was also another 
challenge to the inherent paternalism and power base of medicine. In the next 
chapter the focus turns to the current state of contemporary bioethics and a 
critical appraisal of its decision making approaches from the bioethical, feminist 
and nursing perspectives. 
 
109 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONTEMPORARY BIOETHICS: A CRITICAL PORTRAIT FROM THE 
BIOETHICAL, NURSING, AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 
 
We should be on our guard not to overestimate science and scientific methods when it is 
a question of human problems. (Albert Einstein). 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the focus from chapter four on bioethics as the subject, 
but is concerned with outlining and critiquing the current form of 
contemporary bioethics. This includes outlining the most significant continuing 
features, along with the most significant changes that have developed. This is 
followed by a critical appraisal of the field of contemporary bioethics, and 
particularly of the proposed alternatives to principle based approach to ethical 
decision-making, from the bioethical, feminist and nursing perspectives.  
 
Contemporary Bioethics  
The most significant overall continuing feature of contemporary bioethics 
according to Gillon (1998) is its constant growth and expansion. Gillon goes on 
to say that this growth is general, occurring across the full range of areas and 
substantive issues covered in bioethics, including the number and range of 
disciplinary and other contributors, and the proliferation of different 
approaches proposed for addressing the issues. It is a direct response to the 
pressure of persistent new developments in science and technology, and their 
inevitable consequential impacts on the lives and health of individuals and 
communities, and those persons who in turn care for them. Thus the 
boundaries of bioethics continue to expand and remain fluid, as technologies 
bring cutting edge developments virtually piling on top of one another. The 
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 genetic cloning of “Dolly” the sheep, for example, was a significant milestone 
that has now been rapidly surpassed by the genetic engineering of human 
tissues, and potentially whole organs from undifferentiated embryonic stem 
cells (Coghlan, 2000). 
 
The exact list of areas of ethical enquiry covered by bioethics now still remains 
in dispute depending on the varying perspectives held regarding the 
boundaries between bioethics and applied ethics. However, the following far 
from exhaustive list of areas according to Gillon (1998) includes the healthcare 
relationship, patients interests and the interests of others, conceptual analysis, 
life and death, distributive justice, research and experimentation, the 
relationship between science technology and society, and here Gillon includes 
environmental ethics as part of bioethics when, as we have seen previously, 
more recently environmental ethics has been given its own place in the broader 
category of applied ethics (Winkler, 1998). It is possible, I believe, to see that 
there could be macro and micro levels of situations in environmental ethics that 
would make it acceptable for them to belong in either bioethics or the broader 
category of applied ethics. An example of the micro level that would be 
appropriate under bioethics could be an individual with asbestos poisoning 
requiring healthcare treatment. An example of the macro level could be an oil 
tanker spillage at sea. 
 
According to Gillon (1998) all of the areas of bioethics previously listed have 
multiple sub categories with the range now becoming so large and unwieldy 
that as Gillon explains, some have advocated that it should be split into 
subdivisions of: 
 
1. Theoretical bioethics, concerned with the intellectual foundations of 
bioethics.  
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 2. Clinical bioethics, concerned with ethical issues arising from interactions 
between patients and those who care for their health. 
3. Regulatory and policy bioethics, concerned with rules, regulations, and 
laws in the context of bioethics.  
4. Cultural bioethics, which seeks ‘systematically to relate bioethics to the 
historical, ideological, cultural and social context in which it is 
expressed. (D. Callahan, 1995)’. (Gillon, 1998, p. 310) 
 
This further serves to illustrate the potential for fluidity in the boundaries of 
contemporary bioethics. Some find the inability to establish finite boundaries in 
contemporary bioethics a fruitless pursuit for definition ending in frustration, 
however, Gillon (1998) proposes that it should be seen in a more positive light 
as an indication of the dynamic complexity of a rapidly growing field in need of 
some continuing flexibility as it continues to grow. 
 
Bioethics and the Law 
One of the results of this rapid expansion especially in the area of cutting edge 
technology is that bioethics is finding itself forging closer connections with the 
law. The nature and potential impact on human society of some of these 
technologies is of such significance that in response there has been a perceived 
need for decisions regarding these bioethical issues to be translated into 
protective legislation made at a national level (Weiss, 1998). Although these 
ethical and legal processes are usually slow and deliberative, some definitive 
ethical decisions have already been made regarding specific technologies, for 
example the legislation passed in the USA preventing use of genetic 
engineering technology for cloning human beings (Weiss, 1998). 
 
More frequently in contemporary bioethics, bioethicists, ethics committees, and 
other bioethics “experts” are being brought in as consultants in a range of legal 
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 cases concerning contested ethical decisions in healthcare situations that seek 
resolution in local and regional court systems (Kopleman, 1998). For example, 
here in New Zealand the Rau Williams case, which concerned withholding 
kidney dialysis because of the person’s age and stage of dementia. (Ventnor as 
cited in Woods, 1997). Fundamentally this was concerned with the volatile area 
of rationing healthcare resources. Other more recent examples are in the cases 
where families have opted out of orthodox oncology treatment for their child’s 
cancer to pursue a range of alternative treatments. Fundamentally this concerns 
issues of choice, options and rights, is the locus of control ultimately with the 
oncology experts, or with the parents, and at what point are the child’s wishes 
considered. If this point is age dependent who decides and where is the age line 
drawn. 
 
Ethical norms are distinct from legal law, and need to be that way as there are 
instances where what is legal is not necessarily moral and what is considered 
moral is not necessarily legal (Johnstone, 1994). Ethics is vitally important as an 
independent value system that can be used to judge the moral acceptability or 
unacceptability of a valid legal law (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Johnstone, 
1994). However, common sense would also dictate that this does not preclude 
them joining forces and working together in a mutually supportive manner 
where there is both agreement and need. There are differing views among 
bioethicists as to whether and under what conditions this can and should 
happen. Sharpe and Pellegrino (1997) argue that the courts have often “viewed 
ethics testimony as authoritative in determining right and wrong.” (p. 374). 
They go on to explain that in their view this is can be dangerous in that “the 
assumption that there can be normative experts is, at best, dubious in a morally 
polyglot society.”(p.374). Further to this Sharpe and Pelligrino (1997) point out 
that in cases of adversarial litigation questions are raised about “the integrity of 
the ethics experts’ pedagogical role - that is, their descriptive and analytical 
expertise - when they are retained to serve one of the disputants” (P. 374).  
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In general, regarding the issue of bioethicists’ testimony in the courts, Sharpe 
and Pellegrino (1997) hold that the role of the court is to resolve legal, not moral 
disputes, however they also see that, “…matters of morality, when they are 
used to underpin law, should be argued as widely and openly as possible, 
when a law is being framed and not in the narrower arena of a court 
proceeding.” (1997, p. 379). From an alternative view Morreim (1997) points out 
that although it “may be quite right that in a secular pluralist society no 
particular group can establish claim to intrinsic moral superiority, this need not 
imply that courts should rule on major moral issues in a vacuum” (p. 295). He 
concludes that ”there seems to be fairly persuasive reason to believe that moral 
values can not be excluded from legal decisions at least some of the time, and 
that people trained in (bio)ethics might be able to enrich the proceedings.” (p. 
295). 
 
One area where it is critically important to understand the difference between 
the legal and ethical/bioethical aspects of an issue is in the area of concrete 
clinical practice in the healthcare arena. Here at the practical level involving the 
daily lives of vulnerable persons, distinguishing between moral rights and legal 
rights and the different ways they can be and are enforced is essential 
(Johnstone, 1994) The significance of this aspect of practice has been underrated 
as evidenced by the fact that it was only as recently as 1998 that a group of 
teachers from medical schools in the UK produced a core curriculum model for 
teaching medical ethics and law as an integrated subject to medical students 
(Doyle & Gillon, 1998). The nature of the interface between the legal and the 
ethical in the healthcare arena is a part of the complexity of bioethics and one 
that would seem to warrant more attention not just within medicine. Healthcare 
delivery is multidisciplinary, and includes many other providers including 
nursing, and other orthodox and non-orthodox healthcare professionals besides 
medicine (Johnstone, 1994, 1999). 
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 Bioethics as a multidisciplinary discipline 
The increasing collaboration between bioethics and law may be of note given 
their different orientations and somewhat traditional suspicious regard for each 
other (Sharpe & Pellegrino, 1997). However, the collaboration of different 
disciplines within bioethics is not a novelty. Bioethics, began by bringing 
together the previously distinct disciplines of moral philosophy and medical 
ethics, to which the contributions of many more disciplines such as biology, and 
the humanities including nursing, sociology, and others have since been added. 
Thus the multidisciplinary nature of bioethics has become one of its 
characteristic contemporary features (Reichlin, 1994; Weiss, 1998). 
 
Gillon (1998), notes that the multidisciplinary nature of bioethics was supported 
and perpetuated from the beginning of bioethics in the USA in the early 
seventies with the establishment of a range of centres for the multidisciplinary 
study of bioethics established either as parts of universities and as private 
institutes. He notes for example that The Institute of Society Ethics and the Life 
Sciences, which later became the Hastings Centre, and the Kennedy Institute 
are two prominent examples of multidisciplinary academic and teaching 
centres of bioethics. According to Kopelman (1998) in 1998 three such centres, 
the American Association of Bioethics, Society for Bioethics consultation, and 
the Society for Bioethics and Humanities were united into the American Society 
for Bioethics and Humanities. While acknowledging the multidisciplinary 
nature of this organisation, Kopelman (1998), argues that bioethics and 
humanities can in fact be considered one field, in this case because they are 
bound together by their joint commitment to six activities in which all members  
1. Work on a set of defining problems about the human condition, many of 
which are momentous and urgent  
2. Use interdisciplinary approaches to solve them  
3. Employ cases and practical reasoning to understand problems and reach 
answers 
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 4. Apply “Dewsonian” teaching methods and goals to make students better 
problem solvers  
5. Find morally justifiable solutions 
6. Seek interdisciplinary and collaborative scholarship, service or teaching 
(p. 358). 
 
Kopelman (1998) goes on to say that these multidisciplinary centres of bioethics 
are also sources, in the USA, for the development of the ethical advisory and 
consultant role as she explains, “Leaders in our field (bioethics and humanities) 
are put on commissions to advise elected officials in state and federal agencies 
about how to set social policy” (p.354). The advisory role also extends to 
research related policy and the legal domain as previously discussed in this 
chapter. The advisory and consultant role is another relatively new and fast 
growing area in contemporary bioethics in which hospital ethics committees 
and independent ethics consultants are also a significant part.  
 
However the label “expert” and “ leader in the field” need to be treated with 
some caution. It is a possibility that predominantly, only those with academic or 
classical philosophy education backgrounds are going to be deemed “experts”. 
However, possession of these credentials does not automatically mean one is 
more entitled to make or pass judgement on ethical decisions, or solve ethical 
situations, than people with other kinds of qualifications and experience. For 
example Winkler (1998) states “…a more contextualist approach to the process 
of moral reasoning will recognise a central role in moral discourse for a variety 
of skills and intellectual, imaginative, and emotional resources beyond those 
that are typical of the moral philosopher” (p.196). A further point to note is that 
given the breadth of the field of bioethics it would be difficult to become expert 
in all areas, and thus it would make sense if a consultant were deemed 
necessary to select a person with experience in the particular area required. 
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Plurality and the post modern perspective: Bioethics and the growth of uncertainty 
The most significant change between the early bioethics and contemporary 
bioethics is according to Johnstone (1999), “the demise of traditional moral 
certainty” (p.2). It is the major factor providing the contemporary context for 
bioethics as a whole, and has contributed largely to the development of a 
pluralistic worldview, as mentioned by Sharpe and Pellegrino (1997), and 
Morreim (1997) previously. According to Anderson as cited in Johnstone 
(1999),“There is increasing recognition that our moral standards are not 
absolute, but are ever changing social creations” (p.2). In noting the emergence 
and changes in ethical theories over time, as outlined in the history of bioethics 
section, it appears there is some evidence in the historical progression of 
changes of our many moral theories and standards, indicating that they have 
always been ‘ever changing social creations’. This has gone unrecognised for so 
long, possibly because in those earlier times it was still thought that, outside of 
our social embeddedness, in the realms of abstract moral philosophy, there was 
an undefined but continuing exploratory developmental process occurring in 
which the definitive universal moral theory was about to be discovered. Thomas 
Khun has a similar explanation used in regard to scientists trying to identify the 
universal theory for science, without having developed a clear, definitive, 
criteria. He states that: 
 
…few philosophers,(of science) if any, have claimed to possess either a complete 
or an entirely well articulated list of criteria. For some time, therefore, they 
could reasonably expect that further research would eliminate residual 
imperfections and produce an algorithm able to dictate rational unanimous 
choice. (Khun, 1999, p.37) 
  
In all of the centuries of philosophical and ethical endeavour the quest for the 
definitive universal moral theory has never been satisfactorily fulfilled (Tong, 
117 
 1993), and neither has the one definitive scientific theory eventuated as yet. 
What we have are many different theories scientific and moral, some of which 
are in direct conflict with each other. Although a pluralistic morality and a 
postmodernist perspective, are far from unanimously accepted, as a valid 
approach, their presence is increasingly evident as Englehardt (1996) states 
“Moral diversity is real” (p.3), and it is supported by many contributors to 
bioethics, particularly in clinical ethics. See the works of (Johnstone, 1999; 
Komesaroff, 1996; Levi, 1994; Reichlin, 1994; Turner, 1998). With the lack of 
certainty and increased recognition that there is no one reality but multiple 
realities, leading to a plural world and a plurality of ethical perspectives, what 
are we left with? How is one to make effective decisions in ethical situations? 
 
According to MacIntyre (1984), and Jonsen & Toulmin (1988) many fear the 
assumed anarchy and chaos of total relativism with no common ground for any 
systematic approach to address ethical situations. However, the appearance of 
postmodern characteristics in bioethics need not be a signal for panic or a slide 
into extremes of relativism. In today’s contemporary bioethics as Johnstone 
(1999) has so clearly pointed out, one is certainly confronted with, less certainty, 
less rigidity, more ambiguity, and more possibilities. She further points out, 
requires of us that,  
 
1. We ‘need to think better and harder’ about the issues in question (Boyle 1994) 
2. We need to remember that the moral indiscernability, uncertainty, controversy 
and disagreement can and do have many causes, both practical and theoretical, 
(McCullough 1995); and 
3. We need to accept that addressing moral problems in a sound and effective 
manner requires an appeal to a moral schema that recognises a multiplicity of 
possible solutions to a given problem, and that a moral schema which insists on 
the being just one single correct answer to a given moral problem may 
compound rather than remedy that problem (Johnstone, 1999, p.5). 
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These are not unattainable goals, and in working towards them opportunities 
may be created, where we may be more likely to move towards achieving 
“tolerable and peaceable bonds between people” (Englehardt, 1996). It is 
essential that in doing this, it is recognised that the terms tolerable and 
tolerance have limits of acceptability (Held, 1995). A lack of sensitivity and 
awareness of the limits can lead to tolerance becoming indifference, neglect, 
and abuse resulting in real harm to a person (Johnstone, 1999). Examples of this 
are seen in elder, child, and partner abuse (Carse, 1996; Held, 1995; Wilson, 
2000). 
 
The presence of uncertainty indicates the requirement for a commitment, to be 
willing to devote attention, to listen and be open, to participate (these matters 
are not only the concern of bioethicists and physicians). According to 
Tsouyopoulos (1994) “ Post-industrial society has turned our world of 
electronics into a world of information and communication. This also implies 
new strategies of understanding one another… For in a communicative society, 
listening is central and obligatory.” (p.271). She goes on to elaborate that in 
medicine the worlds of the physician and the patient are deeply different, what 
is relevant to the physician engaged in the world of science and technical 
progress may be quite irrelevant to the patient. One way of helping the patient 
in his or her human condition, while still supporting medicine where it is most 
effective, is according to Tsouyopoulos (1994), by demystification of medical 
research and better information for patients. Tsouyopoulos claims that 
”Postmodernity tries to understand the world of both physician and patient by 
respecting the difference between them” (p.271), and that in doing so “post 
modernity has gained the “right” to be always informed about every step of the 
promised progress of scientific medicine. In concluding Tsouyopoulos (1994) 
states that “Postmodern society regains the right to refuse faith in prophecies 
that do not obtain credibility through information” (p.271). 
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The influence of the postmodern perspective is bringing about some radical 
changes in bioethics, and change though inevitable is not well accepted by all. 
However uncertainty and degrees of relativity need not mean the realisation of 
the Nietzschean vision of only being able to discuss multiple truths from totally 
incommensurate perspectives. According to Agazzi as cited in Reichlin, (1994) 
there should be discussion and assessment of the plurality of views and 
approaches, and it should aim to be “ the building of an authentic ethos, 
resulting from a thought out collective agreement on a constellation of values 
seriously and responsibly assumed” (p. 87). According to Tsyouypoulos (1994) 
the postmodern perspective allows for a dialectical relationship between the 
modern and the post modern in which the two positions may comment upon 
and expand or change each other, without the super-session of both into one 
“homogenised” synthesis (p.268). In sum it would appear that with the advent 
of a plural and postmodern world, coming to terms with accepting uncertainty, 
ambiguity and complexity in bioethics is somewhat inevitable. Becoming 
informed and choosing a direction is one approach, much like a skilled archer 
we need to take aim, it does not necessarily mean that we will get the bulls eye 
(the ideal) but we have a much better chance of getting nearer to it than if we do 
not aim and fire at random (adapted from Aristotle as cited in Gadamer, 1986, 
p.163). Another positive approach to dealing with the changes as Johnstone 
(1999) explains, is to put effort into finding the things that do connect us and 
bind us together as human beings so that our multiple realities don’t become 
increasingly isolated fragments. 
 
To explore some of the changes in contemporary bioethics in more detail, it is 
helpful to examine current debates regarding some of the proposed alternative 
ways for approaching ethical decision-making. Therefore the remainder of this 
chapter presents outlines and critiques of these approaches from the bioethical, 
the nursing and the feminist perspectives respectively. 
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Critique of contemporary bioethics from a bioethical perspective 
The major internal focus preoccupying the field of contemporary bioethics is 
the debate surrounding which particular method or combination of methods is 
best suited for bioethical deliberation and decision making in ethical situations. 
(Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988; Levi, 1994; Pellegrino, 1993,1995; Thomasma, 1994; 
Turner, 1998). Within a short time after philosophical ethics was introduced 
into medical ethics, the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non maleficence, 
and justice were formulated and adopted as the bioethical principles 
(Pellegrino, 1993). Almost immediately, some medical practitioners began to 
raise questions about the appropriateness of the fit between the abstract 
impartial principles and the kinds of complex, real life events encountered in 
clinical practice (Jonsen & Toulmin 1988; Pellegrino, 1993; Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1994). This questioning has become more prevalent and wide-
spread developing into a persistent critical debate (Reichlin, 1994). This has 
become clearly evident in the many journal articles and books containing 
contemporary bioethical discourses examined in the course of developing this 
study. 
 
Bioethicists and physician critics of the principle-based approach identify the 
main problems with the use of the ethical principles to be, that they are too 
often in conflict with each other in a particular situation with no definitive 
means of ranking the order of importance (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988). Abstract 
principles are inadequate for attending to the complex particularities such as 
the unique narratives of each participant (Dubose & Hamel, 1995), or for 
including cultural differences (Turner, 1998), and the practicalities of everyday 
clinical practice involving the realities and minutae of people’s lives 
(Komesaroff, 1996; Seedhouse, 1995). This dissatisfaction produced a search for 
a solution that has in turn, resulted in the proposal of several different 
approaches to ethical decision making, either as alternatives or supplements to 
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 the traditional bioethical principles (Pellegrino, 1993). The main approaches 
proposed are, a revival of casuistry and virtue ethics, and the development of 
the newer approaches of hermeneutical ethics, narrative ethics, and the ethics of 
care. Each of these proposed candidates are discussed below. 
 
Casuistry 
One of the first alternatives proposed to remedy the perceived inadequacies of 
the purely principle-based approach was casuistry, a revival of a very old 
method of deliberation and decision making. The original form of casuistry 
existed between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a form of 
reasoning and justification practiced by theologians and canon lawyers (Jonsen 
& Toulmin, 1988). This form of reasoning and justification was developed to 
establish whether an act that an agent wishes to perform does or does not 
conflict with a law. It is noteworthy that this form of casuistry developed at a 
time when law and morality were generally considered as one and the same, 
and they shared a much more intimate relationship than they do in the present. 
Jesuit priests in particular became renowned for developing casuistry into the 
art of resolving problems of moral conscience, with the starting point being the 
individual case which is then weighed against other similar cases (Jonsen & 
Toulmin, 1988). However, eventually the casuists’ skill in making increasingly 
fine distinctions began to be used to justify acts in such a way that they did not 
appear to conflict with a law, when often they were clearly in conflict. Such 
justifications were regarded as pandering to the vice of laxity, and under severe 
criticism and pressure from the church casuistry was discredited and it 
declined, virtually disappearing (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988). 
 
The recent revival of casuistry, credited to Jonsen (1986) and Jonsen and 
Toulmin (1988) in their book The Abuse of casuistry, has emerged as a definite 
alternative to the hegemony of the principle based method of moral analysis 
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 (Arras, 1991). According to Strong the general features of modern casuistry are 
that, 
 
…it is a case based approach in which an argument is developed by comparing 
the case at hand with paradigm cases in which it is reasonably clear what course 
of action should be taken... the comparisons of cases are made in terms of certain 
morally relevant factors, which can vary from case to case. The decision that is 
best will depend on the extent to which these factors are present in the given 
case... casuistry does not generally claim to reach certainty in its conclusions. 
The strength of the conclusions depends on the plausibility of the comparisons 
with paradigms cases (p.396). 
 
In casuistic argumentation, Strong adds, there is room for disagreements 
concerning a number of matters, such as whether a case is more similar to one 
paradigm or another, and whether the morally relevant factors are present in a 
case to sufficient degree to warrant a given conclusion. (p.396). The new 
casuistry is an inductive method that works from the bottom up, emphasising 
practical problem solving by means of nuanced interpretations of individual 
cases (Arras, 1991).  
 
In this view casuistry appears to demonstrate a connection with Aristotle’s 
practical approach to ethics and the importance and necessity of experience in 
developing practice wisdom. Both Jonsen and Toulmin (1988, p.40), and 
Kuczewski (1994, p.99) recognise practical wisdom or prudence as a kind of 
pattern recognition that demands experience with particulars. In the use of this 
terminology it is possible to see here a connection with Benner's (1984) research 
outlined in Chapter Three where she discusses the development of practice 
wisdom through practical experience, and pattern recognition in nurses’ caring 
practices, and in the development of nurses’ ethical comportment (Benner, 
1991). On the other hand casuistry has not been overlooked in nursing, and has 
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 been investigated as an ethical approach for use in the discipline of nursing. See 
the work of Gaul (1995), and Dimmitt and Artnak 1994). 
 
Criticisms from within bioethics against casuistry come from four main points. 
Firstly according to Wildes (1993) casuistry is only possible if there is a 
commonly agreed upon morality. He explains that casuistry came from a time 
in the 15th and 16th century when Roman Catholic moral theology provided a 
common morality that served as the context of casuistry. By contrast, 
contemporary secular society is characterised by a plurality of moral 
viewpoints. Secondly, according to Arras (1991) because casuistry takes 
intuitions about cases as a given, it is not able to examine those intuitions 
critically. He points out therefore, that casuistry cannot challenge established 
social views or the values such as the male dominated medical profession. 
 
Thirdly Arras (1991) states that “for all of the emphasis upon the interpretation 
of particular cases, casuists have not said much, if anything, about how to select 
problems for moral interpretation... practitioners may be bound to conventional 
ways of thinking and of conceiving problems that tend to filter out other 
equally valid experiences and problems.” (p.38-39). According to Warren, as 
cited in a Arras (1991) “As a result, a whole range of important ethical 
problems-including the unequal treatment of women in health care settings, 
sexist occupational roles, personal relationships, and strategies of avoiding 
crisis situations-have been either downplayed or ignored completely.”(p. 39). 
Finally, Arras (1991) who stands out remarkably among bioethicists as being 
notably aware of the feminist and nursing positions, points out the 
consequences of the relative neglect of alternative perspectives held by other 
participants is that,  
 
Quite often, we get the attending’s (or the house officer’s) point of view on what 
constitutes ‘the case’, while missing out on the perspectives of nurses, and social 
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 workers and others. Since most cases are complicated and enriched by such 
alternative medical, psychological and social interpretations, our casuistical 
analyses will remain incomplete without them (p.39). 
 
Although casuistry has drawn much criticism from within bioethics, according 
to Jonsen and Toulmin (1988), Arras (1991) and others, it still remains a valid 
alternative or at the least as a complement to the application of abstract 
impartial principles. 
 
Virtue ethics 
Virtue ethics has ancient origins stretching back even further than that of 
casuistry, to the genealogical roots of Western ethical thinking itself in the 
works of the Stoics, Plato and Aristotle. It suffered decline in Western 
philosophy but not extinction in the post-mediaevil, and post enlightenment 
periods, for a variety of reasons largely due to changes in religious and 
scientific thought right up to the present, where it is experiencing a revival 
(Pellegrino, 1995). Of particular note is the fact that virtue ethics is ubiquitous, it 
crosses cultural boundaries as Pellegrino (1995) points out “every culture has 
the notion of the virtuous person... these paradigm persons are celebrated in the 
second story’s poetry and ritual of non Western and Western cultures” He goes 
on to say that the moral values and characteristics of the virtuous person is 
formalised in varying degrees in the works of Plato and Aristotle,as mentioned, 
and of “Confucius (Cua, 1978) and Lao Tse (Waley, 1956), Yearly, 1990), the 
Hindu concept of Dharma (Jhingran, 1989), and the humanism of African tribal 
cultures (Wiredu, 1992).” (Pellegrino, 1995, p. 255). A point of similarity can be 
seen here with the description of caring provided, at the beginning of Chapter 
Two. 
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 The durability, and it could be assumed the ubiquity, of virtue ethics is 
attributed according to Pellegrino (1995) to the fact that “one cannot completely 
separate the character of a moral agent from his or her acts, the nature of those 
acts, the circumstances under which they outperformed, or the consequences.” 
(p.254). Pellegrino explains that: 
 
“Virtue theories focus on the agent; on his or her intentions, disposition is, and 
motives; and on the kind of person the moral agent becomes, wishes to become, 
or ought, as a result of has or her habitual disposition to Acton certain 
ways”(1995, p. 254). 
 
He further emphasises that that these aspects of virtue are inseparable part of 
the moral life and any moral theory that ignores them fails to encompass the 
fullness and complexity of the challenge and struggle to be a good human being 
(1995, p. 254). In virtue ethics then, “the normative standard is the good person, 
the person upon whom one can rely on habitually to be good and to do good 
under all circumstances” (Pellegrino, 1995). However he points out that this 
leads to a problem of circular logic “that holds the right and the good to be 
what the virtuous person takes them to be while defining the virtuous person as 
the one who is and does what is right and good.” (p.255). This in turn, as 
Johnstone, (1999) explains, leads to the “inability of virtue theories to explain 
adequately its force as a moral action guide (viz. Compared with other 
obligation based theories that can rely on the force of moral rules, principles 
and maxims to justify moral conduct)” (p.105). 
 
As with most ethical approaches virtue theory is not without its difficulties. In 
Pellegrino’s view another difficulty with virtue ethics is that the classical 
insistence on the virtues as excellences seems too much to ask of individuals in 
a legalistically shaped society where “The only duty is not to infringe on the 
liberty of others. Everything else is beyond duty (1995, p.263). However in the 
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 view of Johnstone, (1999) the difficulties seen by Pellegrino may be “more a 
product of traditional modernist philosophical approach used to critically 
examine and raise objections to virtue theory, than a problem of virtue ethics 
itself.” (p.106). She explains that  
 
given the distinctive non-rational quality of the moral virtues, it seems odd to 
suggest that virtuous actions require ‘justification’ (how does one ‘justify’ and 
inclination to be kind toward another, or to be fair? how does one ‘justify’ an act 
of saintliness or heroism?); similarly, it seems odd to expect that virtue theory 
can be reduced to a set of justificatory rules, principles and maxims (noting that, 
what makes the virtues what they are is their spontaneous and unconditional 
expression beyond that otherwise required by rules principles and maxims) 
(Johnstone, 1999, p.106). 
 
Knowlden (1990) a nurse scholar makes the point that “An actor’s report 
provides more than the observer’s description, for the telling action is 
inseparable from thought. Reasons do not produce my actions, but are 
embodied in them” (p.90). Johnstone (1999) further suggests that “to ‘justify’ the 
virtues in a traditional rationalistic and reductionist sense is to do violence to 
them and to all they represent.” (p.106). Finally, in Johnstone’s view seeing the 
expectation of people to be decent and morally excellent human beings as too 
high an expectation is incongruous. She points out that, “Even in its most 
traditional sense morality is precisely about expecting people to strive to 
achieve the ideal of morally excellent conduct. Virtue ethics is no different in 
this regard ” (Johnstone, 1999, P.106). However, she emphasises that the fact 
that even though in reality people may not achieve such an ideal this is no 
reason to abandon ethics generally and it is no reason to abandon virtue ethics 
and particular (1999, p.106). 
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 Virtue ethics rather than an independent theory, is more commonly seen as a 
complement to other ethical approaches (Pellegrino, 1995). It has distinct 
possibilities in other fields of ethical inquiry not least in the field professional 
nursing ethics and in aspects of a feminist perspective on ethics, and will be 
considered in more depth in chapter six. 
 
Narrative ethics 
In bioethics, narrative ethics is a relative newcomer. However according to 
Tovey (1998) there is already a significant body of literature established on a 
range of issues relating to narrative ethics. This includes discussion of “the 
meaning(s) of the term itself; its relationship with phenomenology, and with 
Christian ethics; the relevance of postmodernist analysis; and, of course, its 
relationship with literature” (p.176). Tovey (1998) holds that the elements of 
narrative ethics are first, that personal narrative rather than a pre-identified 
framework are central to the analysis, second, this narrative holds centre stage 
in the decision making/dilemma resolution process. Third, the approach is all 
about the achievement of an understanding of the meanings of the situation for 
those involved, and fourth, there is the recognition that it is only through 
knowledge of the personal, cultural and social context that the most appropriate 
ethical solution can be reached (p.177).  
 
As with casuistry, a narrative approach to ethical deliberation is not 
unanimously or uniformly accepted in bioethics. Murray (1997) points out that 
the relationship of 20th-century moral philosophy to narratives is one of 
ambivalence. He goes on to say philosophers that have an analytic bent are apt 
to have suspicion or contempt for the claim that narratives are important for 
morality. At the same time, many of those same philosophers use narratives in 
their own arguments. Therefore Murray (1997) explains, 
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 “There is an undeniable intellectual tension, as well as a political struggle, 
between those who insist on the importance of narrative in morality, and those 
who want to focus on the defensibility of propositions as the core of moral 
thought” (p.44).  
 
He goes on to say he suspects that this conflict is also a reflection of differences 
in sensibility and personal history. Narratives are not only significant in ethical 
aspects of medical practice. Gillon as cited in Tovey (1998) notes that evidence 
based medicine is increasingly directing research and practice and a 
randomised controlled trial remains dominant in the collation and definition of 
that evidence base. However, Tovey points out that the potential offered by 
qualitative methodologies, such as the use of narratives, in evidence based 
practice is also beginning to receive increasing attention. According to Gillon as 
cited in Tovey (1998) this increased attention is in the pursuit of a deeper 
understanding and a more appropriate practice that would foster the 
integration of the art of medicine and the science of medicine. (p. 177). This 
notion is similar to that discussed in the section on the nursing perspective of 
caring regarding broadening the scope of what kinds of evidence are to 
contribute to evidence-based nursing practice, as pointed out by Fawcett, 
Watson, Neuman, Hinton-Walker, and Fitzpatrick (2001).  
 
However, despite the desire for ‘deeper understanding and a more appropriate 
practice’ in medicine, for Gillon as cited in Tovey, 1998) the acceptance of 
narrative in ethics is only partial. In his view individual stories “are insufficient 
for medical ethics… they need to be used as stimuli and bases for research and 
reflection leading to generalisable conclusions in philosophical medical ethics.” 
(p.178). Gillon goes on to say that “stories are necessarily outside of the research 
process; they provide a preliminary stage in which research ideas are 
formulated, one which is followed by, but never forms a part of, scientific 
procedure.” (Gillon as cited in Tovey, P.178). The persistent preference for the 
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 scientific over other qualitative approaches is indicated in creating other 
difficulties for a narrative approach to ethics. Language is understandably 
critical in narrative ethics as nursing scholars Rogers and Niven (1999) clearly 
explain that in narrative ethics 
 
It is those tales and chronicles, those stories which give meaning to that 
particular person’s life. Inescapably, each narrative is unique. It is this quality of 
uniqueness which is the locus of narrative ethical enquiry. The focal point of 
ethical concern then becomes that narrative which is that person’s particular 
definition of self. (p.95-96)  
 
How each narrative is approached, that is, how it is handled or used, has the 
ability to alter that ‘definition of self’ From a nursing perspective of narrative 
ethics as outlined by Rogers and Niven (1999), the language used in 
philosophy, medicine and even in sociology regarding the use of narratives can 
be seen as objectifying and could do violence to the persons narrative. For 
example, Denzin as cited in Tovey (1998) states in regard to using narratives 
that  
 
It is important to keep in mind that the basic theme of the life history is the 
presentation of experience from the perspective of the focal subject or subjects. 
Their world must be penetrated and understood. Once it is entered, the observer 
lays out the critical objective experiences relevant to that world… (p.178). 
 
Nussbaum as cited in Murray (1997) supports this notion describing the prose 
style typical of modern Anglo-American philosophy as  
 
… correct, scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid, a style that seems to be 
regarded as a kind of all-purpose solvent in which philosophical issues of any 
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 kind at all could be efficiently disentangled, any and all conclusions neatly 
disengaged. It is a style perfectly suited to a conception of moral philosophy as a 
collection of isolable propositions” (p.44). 
 
Others in bioethics seem more aware of the dangers involved in working with 
narratives in ethical decision-making. For example Hunter (1996) explains 
 
While principles remain essential to bioethics and biological science must always 
inform good clinical practice, the tendency to collapse morality into principles 
and medicine into science impoverishes the two practices. In both instances such 
a reduction takes science as a model for what cannot be purely scientific. It is an 
attempt to know generally and abstractly what cannot be known except through 
the particular case-and to be best understood that case must be richly understood 
(p.316.). 
 
Hunter further emphasises that “Clinical judgement and moral discernment are 
equally a narrative skill or capacity” (p.316). She elaborates that for clinical 
judgement and moral discernment, what is necessary is an accessible store of 
well-indexed experience. In this, Hunter (1996) is in complete accord with what 
Benner (1984) has already found in the case of nurses’ ethical caring practice as 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
Whether listening to the patient’s narrative, or employing narrative skills in 
their own practice what is important to understand for healthcare professionals 
is that human beings are meaning-making creatures (Murray,1997). As such, 
“the meanings we look for and seek to construct in our lives are not collections 
of propositions. Meanings are better understood and conveyed as narratives” 
(Murray, 1997 p.55). In this way it can be seen that narratives can also function 
as a complement and supplement to the inadequacies of the principles only 
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 approach criticised by many in bioethics. As Rogers and Niven (1999) put it 
“The focus is not on grand theories, but on the particular life-story which… is 
inevitably characterised by the series of narrations, descriptions, tales, 
chronicles, histories and accounts, which together produce a grand narrative” 
(p.95). 
 
An ethic of care 
An ethic of care, like the other alternatives or complements proposed above, has 
been developed at least in part, in response to the inadequacies of the 
principled based approach (Tong, 1993). However, apart from agreeing with the 
other proposed alternatives on the inappropriateness of applying abstract, 
impartial, decontextualised principles to the real life situations of clinical 
healthcare practices, an ethic of care was developed with a larger agenda. That 
is, an ethic of care challenges the very basis of the applied principle approach to 
ethical and bioethical decision-making that has been developed from, and is 
directly underpinned by, Rawls’s theory of justice (Baier, 1995; Carse, 1998; 
Sharpe, 1992;). Carse, (1991) also includes an ethic of care as challenging “the 
ethical theory taught, the issues addressed, and the skills and sensitivities 
encouraged through bioethical education (p.5). Of particular note is the fact that 
it was the absolute adherence to “morality as justice” in Kohlberg’s theory of 
moral development, grounded in the liberal political theories of Locke, Kant 
and Rawls (Sharpe, 1992), together with the use of all male participants in his 
trials, that prompted Gilligan’s seminal work “In a Different Voice” (Gilligan, 
1982). Sharpe (1992) clearly and effectively sums up the feminist position of the 
care perspective in relation to the applied principle approach. She states that, 
 
Briefly, “morality as justice” regards the moral domain as entirely 
comprehended by the demands of equality, impartiality and universality. The 
image of justice, blindfolded and holding balanced scales, symbolises these 
norms. The care perspective, by contrast, finds moral salience in forms of human 
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 relating and responsiveness that arise between human beings who are seen by 
each other as precisely the particular unique human beings whom they are, 
rather than as abstractly conceived rights bearers. As a result, the care 
perspective allows for partiality as a legitimate moral point of view. In addition 
because the care perspective as attentive to real individuals rather than simply to 
individuals abstractly conceived, it acknowledges a moral significance of real 
inequalities that may in fact distinguish us. (Sharpe, 1992, p 296). 
 
Sharpe (1992) further explains that these two orientations to moral 
understanding have developed into an extensive body of literature known as 
the justice-care debate, the implications of which have extended from moral 
psychology to the fields of moral and political philosophy, jurisprudence, and 
the natural and social sciences (p.295). This aspect of an ethic of care will be 
explored in more detail in Chapter Six 
 
Like narrative ethics, an ethic of care is a newcomer to contemporary bioethics, 
without the inherited genealogical ties to the history of ethical thinking of 
ancient Greece, or the theology and law of the fourteenth century, carried by 
virtue ethics and casuistry respectively. However, interestingly, from a basic 
practical human perspective, care ethics and narrative ethics could be seen to 
predate both. In that, caring for each other and telling stories are as old as 
humanity itself. An ethic of care then, has not risen from within the 
genealogical lineage of bioethics but has been introduced into it from outside. 
 
The proposal of an ethic of care as deserving of a place in bioethical decision-
making, along with its radical larger agenda, has placed a number of challenges 
at the feet of bioethics. These challenges and the proposed ethic of care itself 
has, understandably received a mixed response. Critics from bioethics, nursing 
and feminist theory have all had some input into assessing the strength of the 
challenges and the ability of an ethic of care to deliver on them. According to 
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 Allmark (1995), who is a nurse, “caring ethics is hopelessly vague. It lacks both 
normative and descriptive content” (p.19). In the view of Veatch (1998), a 
bioethicist, “Almost no one would suggest that care is a concept critical to 
metaethics (even if the care orientation is seen by many to be largely about 
foundational issues).” (p.211). He further states, “It is not clear how care maps 
onto the more traditional concepts in ethical theory” (1998, p.211). However, 
Veatch eventually decides that perhaps, while care ethics may not map onto 
traditional ethical theory, it may have a position in adding a new area to the 
map, if it is treating relationships as having normative content. Even if this were 
so Veatch, (1998) warns that there would still be several critical questions 
needing to be addressed in a theory of care (p.221). According to Carse & 
Nelson (1996), the fact that an ethic of care validates skills and virtues 
traditionally associated with women and women’s roles, according to some 
feminists, could simply just reinforce the subordinate status and exploitation of 
women in society. 
 
On the positive side, also in the feminists’ view, many see that an ethic of care 
provides an answer to a “vital need for an ethic that takes the experiences of 
women seriously” (Carse & Nelson, 1996, p.19). Another serious challenge from 
an ethic of care to traditional justice based ethics is regarding the principle of 
autonomy. Many feminists see the emphasis on autonomy, which is 
fundamental to the liberal justice perspective underpinning Rawls’ theory of 
justice, as supporting and perpetuating the myth of the independent 
autonomous individual as outlined in chapter two. This feminist perspective 
sees the emphasis on autonomy as an ideal as not enabling the understanding 
of the reality of dependence and interdependence in human life (Tong, 1993; 
Clement, 1998). However, true to the ability of the feminist perspective to 
actively encourage the wide contribution of many perspectives with respect, 
some feminists “appeal to the notion of autonomy in defending women’s right 
to define themselves according to their own interests and needs (Clement, 1998, 
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 p.21). The doubts surrounding autonomy will also be covered in more detail in 
Chapter Six. 
 
An ethic of care then, put up alongside the other proposed alternatives and/or 
complements to the traditional application of principles as a form of decision-
making in ethics and bioethics, stands out as a more radical challenge. To 
present a broader background to this challenge and allow a more 
comprehensive view of contemporary bioethics, this chapter will conclude with 
an outline of the major critiques of bioethics from the nursing and feminist 
perspectives as follows. 
Nursing critique of bioethics 
For the greater part of its history, nursing, despite its size and unique 
contribution to healthcare, was incorporated in the ethical sense into and under 
medical ethics. According to Johnstone (1994), at this time it was thought by 
many that “Nurses are not required to make independent moral judgements.” 
(p. 4). The ethics associated with nurses and nursing was considered more a 
matter of feminine etiquette and that it was more important that nurses should 
be “good women but not bother with a code of ethics” (Johnstone, 1994, p.1). 
These relationships, as they were thought to exist, and the perspectives nurses, 
have of their practices of care have changed markedly from the mid seventies 
(Benner, 1984; Benner & Wrubel, 1989). Nursing now has, and is continuing to 
develop, its own ethics as distinct from medical ethics whose domain extends 
far beyond merely formulating a code of professional nursing ethics (Benner, 
1991; Duldt, 1995; Fry, 1989, 1990, 1991; Fry, Killen & Robinson, 1996). Within 
the discipline there are in-depth scholarly debates on the entire range of 
subjects covered in bioethics today. These can be found in the well-established 
“Nursing Ethics” journal and virtually all other nursing journals have sections 
devoted to ethical issues, or at the very least publish individual articles on 
nursing ethics and general bioethical issues. Nursing conferences devoted to 
nursing ethics and bioethical topics are regularly held world-wide, and some 
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 might say nursing has the beginning, if not more, of its own ethical research, 
theories and approaches (Astrom, Furaker, & Norberg, 1995; Benner, 1991,1994; 
Bishop & Scudder, 1990; Condon, 1992; Duldt, 1995; Gastmans, 1998, 1999; 
Hinson-Penticuff, 1991; Fry, 1989, 1991, 1996; Johnstone, 1994,1999). 
 
However, at the practical level, as has been so aptly pointed out by Arras (1991) 
above in regard to reviewing clinical cases, or casuistic approaches to ethical 
decision making, nurses’ equally valid perspectives are not consistently sought 
or included. Further to this, Arras (1991) also pointed out that at the practical 
level, nurses do not regularly participate in more general multidisciplinary 
discussions of an ethical nature. There could be several possible reasons for this. 
One is that of language difference. In this respect Johnstone (1999) emphasises 
that 
 
In order to be able to discuss ethics, bioethics and nursing ethics in a meaningful 
way, it is important, first, to share a common and working knowledge and 
understanding of these (and other) fundamental ethical terms. Unless nurses 
use the same moral language and grammar as others, little hope remains of 
either agreement or disagreements being reached on what is considered a 
competing moral view (p. 40).  
 
Taylor (1997) points out that from her experience in practice as a nurse ethicist, 
that some nurses seem to be unaware, or lack the means to articulate the ethical 
nature of their practice (p. 68). In Taylor’s view she recognises the importance 
of nurses working with nurses to identify and address nursing specific 
problems, and the advantages of having nursing ethics committees. However, 
she also points out that in her experience some of nurses’ distress comes from 
tensions within the interdisciplinary team, and this raises “broader issues about 
human well-being that are best addressed by the institution or healthcare 
system at large” (Taylor, 1997, p.69). Taylor further emphasises that restricting 
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 discussion of these concerns to within nursing only ‘may result in their 
becoming trivialised or marginalized to the impoverishment of all.” (p. 69), and 
change will not occur. 
 
A further reason contributing to the perceived lack of nurses’ contribution to 
ethical discussions, in regard to clinical situations, could be due to the theory-
practice split. Nursing as a discipline has scholars in ethics, research on ethics, 
and codes of ethics but much of the work at this level doesn’t seem to be 
transmitted or even more importantly be necessarily connected with the 
situation of nurses ethical awareness and ability at the practice level, as Taylor 
has pointed out above. At the same time, in the study by Woods (1997) he 
clearly demonstrated the presence of a robust nursing ethic in the moral 
practice of experienced nurses, involving an ethic of care along with a selection 
of other approaches. If this disconnection is a factor, this is clearly a nursing 
issue rather than a more general bioethical one, however its resolution would 
appear to the ability of nursing to contribute to bioethics. 
 
In regard to nurses’ contributions to bioethics, apart from the demise of 
traditional moral certainty, the increasingly post-modern context, and the 
different epistemological levels within contemporary bioethics, as previously 
established, another point of dissonance exists. This further complexity arises 
out of whether bioethics and ethics are understood as pertaining largely to 
conflict and dilemma situations, or as an ongoing part of everyday life. That is, 
is ethics more basically epistemological, a way of applying a particular 
knowledge in particular defined situations, or is it more ontological, a more 
continuous way of being in everyday life? The traditional approach, largely 
though not exclusively, adopted in medicine and by many bioethicists is mainly 
epistemological (Reichlin, 1994).  
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 Both the nursing and feminist perspectives on bioethics are critical of this 
predominant focus and tend, though not in an absolute or exclusive way, more 
towards the ontological view of bioethics seeing ethicality more as part of ways 
of choosing to live life or being (Kheel, 1993; Roach, 1987) In an ontological 
perspective, to some extent all facets of life are deemed to have an ethical 
component. For example this would include the full range from the mundane 
so called “niceties” of please and thank you, up to and including the life and 
death issues (Seedhouse, 1997). In this view there is a more continual awareness 
of the ethicality and the impact one’s everyday actions and decisions have on 
others.  
 
Within bioethics there is some tension developing regarding the issue of 
whether ethics is seen as dilemma based or it is seen as an everyday occurrence, 
largely because it too challenges the traditional applied (my emphasis) principle 
approach (Seedhouse, 1995, 1997, 1998) In nursing Benner (1991) was first to 
highlight the importance of everyday skilled ethical comportment in nursing 
caring practices. She sees the reality of nurses’ everyday ethical decisions not as 
separate from dilemma or quandary ethics, but as providing the essential 
foundation for addressing the quandary and procedural ethics or issues. Benner 
noted that “Quandary and procedural ethics depend (my emphasis) on everyday 
skilful comportment and practical moral reasoning that is formed by the 
particular knowledge of the embodied knower” (p. 1). Later in 1996 Komesaroff 
a physician, in a chapter from his edited book “Troubled bodies: Critical 
perspectives on postmodernism, medical ethics and the body”, demonstrates a 
close parallel with Benner’s view. Komesaroff points out a distinction between 
‘conventional bioethics’ (quandary and procedural ethics) and what he terms 
microethics, within medical ethics. He explains that,  
 
“Microethics starts from the premise that clinical practice consists of an 
accumulation of infinitesimal ethical events. Accordingly, its task is to chart the 
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 topography of the medical lifeworld, as it exists in its concreteness, its fluidity, 
and its temporal unpredictability.” (P.73). 
 
However, Komesaroff (1996) makes it clear that microethics is not generally 
considered in debates about medical ethics, even though he considers it may be 
more important for the determination of medical outcomes than most other 
factors, He goes on to make an interesting point saying that an ethical dilemma  
 
“in itself is often merely indicative of a deeper problem namely, the breakdown of 
the communicative process between the participants so that… regardless of the 
formulation, a ‘microethical’ solution that is one at the level of the actual 
interaction between doctor and patient must ultimately always be found, so 
there is no means by which the microethical realisation of discourse can be 
circumvented” (Komesaroff, 1996, P.74). 
 
It can be seen that Komesaroff, from the medical discipline, has eventually 
come to the same understanding as Benner did in her research in the discipline 
of nursing back in 1991, regarding the matter of whether ethics is and everyday 
occurrence or applies in dilemma situations only. Here a nursing and a medical 
perspective agree that there is no either/or dichotomy, that there is instead a 
relationship between them where quandary or dilemma ethics are dependent 
on and not separate from everyday ethical comportment or microethics. This 
perspective of the role of everyday ethical caring practices is a vitally important 
part of ethical caring practices in nursing (Benner, 1984; Benner & Wrubel, 1989; 
Parker, 1991; Watson, 1990a, 1990b). 
 
This is not to say that from a nursing perspective principles should be done 
away with completely, as Cooper (1991) has pointed out, the tension between 
principle based ethics and other forms of ethical approach such as an ethic of 
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 care can be a creative one rather than a mutually exclusive one. Patricia Benner 
in her book “from novice to expert” explained that principles are a stalwart for 
the novice nurse before she /he has the experience to develop and select from a 
more eclectic, individual experience based ethical approach. Various 
possibilities for alternatives to the principlist approach have been explored 
within the discipline of nursing (Gibson, 1993; Johnstone, 1994, 1999), including 
several of the alternatives supported by the medical fraternity within bioethics 
(Artnak, 1995, Dimmitt & Artnak, 1994; Gaul, 1995). However, due to the 
fundamental position of caring in nursing it has been an ethic of care that has 
received the major focus (Benner, 1984, 1991,1994; Benner & Wrubel,1989; 
Carper, 1979; Fry, 1989; Watson & Ray, 1988). Even so, as with the feminist 
perspective, some nurses support an ethic of care and some are against it, while 
others prefer an ethic of care being in conjunction with other approaches in 
nursing as for example Woods 1997) has found in his research. 
 
Nurses and the nursing discipline have a lot to contribute to the bioethical 
debates and discussions. This is both from the depth of their experience and 
extensive emersion in the intimate relations necessitated in the practices of care 
with their patients, and from their explorations of ethical issues and alternatives 
in ethical decision-making. However, although nursing ethics is a distinct body 
of work, in the study of the literature for this thesis, nursing ethics scholarship 
rarely makes frequent appearances in the established bioethical journals used in 
this study, except as the occasional individual article, or even more rarely as 
one particular edited issue of a bioethical journal. For example, in 1991 Sara Fry 
was editor of one issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy volume 
sixteen, titled “Nursing Ethics: Current State of the Art”. The pattern appears to 
be in general that nurses publish their bioethical/ethical articles in their own 
journals and the medical fraternity and bioethicists publish in their established 
medical/bioethical journals.  
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 The feminist bioethicists, although growing in numbers and now resident in 
some of the bioethical schools and institutions, particularly in the USA for 
example, Alisa Carse, and Margaret Little at the Kennedy Institute at 
Georgetown University, are not regularly, or as commonly published in the 
bioethical journals. They are also less frequently represented in the bioethical 
databases such as bioethics line relative to medical professionals and 
bioethicists and male moral philosophers. For example only two issues in 
eleven years, between 1990 and 2001 are concerned with a nursing perspective 
of ethics and an ethic of care. The one mentioned previously (Fry, 1991) and 
more recently one edited by Margaret Little and Robert Veatch in 1998, with the 
dubious title “The Chaos of Care and Care Theory”, volume twentythree, 
number two.  
 
The other main bioethics journal available in New Zealand, The journal 
“Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics” had no complete issues concerning 
nursing ethics or an ethic of care at all in the same period. Patricia Benner had 
one article published in this journal, volume eighteen in 1997. In a strictly 
informal assessment of the references taken from bioethical journals used in this 
study, out of a total of 70 bioethical journal articles, 31 mentioned caring and/or 
nursing. Of those eight were authored by recognised nurses, fifteen by 
recognised feminists or feminist bioethicists, and nine by physicians or 
bioethicists. This is just to give an idea, and carries no statistical weight. 
Moreover, as far as using the representation of an ethic of care and or nursing in 
bioethical journals as a criticism of bioethics, the full range of contributing 
factors are not known. However, speculatively, it is likely that it is, at least in 
part, nursing issue as well as a bioethical one. 
 
Feminist critique of bioethics 
Quite apart from the challenges that an ethic of care makes to the predominant 
approach of applying abstract principles to bioethical situations in healthcare, 
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 and challenging the emphasis on justice and autonomy, feminists have even 
broader criticisms of traditional ethics and philosophy. In particular, feminist 
moral theorists point out that there is a gender bias in philosophy itself, and it 
has a consequent effect on ethics in general and bioethics in particular. Further 
to this, despite its claims, traditional moral philosophy has not succeeded in 
supplying as promised a sound reliable universal moral theory, and last, that a 
difference exists between male and female moral thinking  
 
According to Kersey (1989) “The history of philosophy, particularly ancient 
philosophy, has been a history of men. From its recorded beginnings…Western 
philosophy… was created by, for, and about men” (p.1). The gender bias is 
found in both popular and standard texts such as dictionaries, philosophical 
reference works, encyclopaedias, and histories of philosophy (Johnstone, 1994) 
These texts make little, and in most cases, no reference at all, to the 
philosophical contributions of women; in fact, the accomplishments of many 
hundreds of women philosophers have been omitted (Kersey, 1989; Johnstone, 
1994).  
 
According to Kersey (1989) and Johnstone (1994) there has been a substantial 
contribution by women to philosophy and ethical thinking, retrieved from 
history as far back as the 6th century B.C. Pythagorean mothers, who developed 
moral theories based on harmony, friendship, compassion, courage, care, and 
justice, through to Dorotea Bocchi, who succeeded her father as professor of 
medicine and moral philosophy at the University of Bologna (Alec as cited in 
Johnstone, 1994), Elizabeth of Bohemia, and Mary Wollstonecraft, to current 20th 
century female philosophers, and moral philosophers. Kersey (1989) points out 
that many of the works of women philosophers were destroyed and lost, some 
as in the case of Olivia de Nantes Barreta Sabuco (1562-1625) who wrote a 
philosophical book “Nueva filosofa” had her work destroyed by the Spanish 
Inquisition. She later republished her book but “Characteristically history has 
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 attributed the work to her father”, although it still bears her name (Kersey, 
1989, p.10). 
 
The reason for the bias appears to be the historical powerful influence of 
philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Rousseau, and Kant. Their influence 
has been overwhelming both inside and outside moral philosophy as in society 
in general, women are still regarded as being rationally inferior to men, 
emotionally fickle, and unstable for positions of authority (Johnstone, 1994). As 
Johnstone elaborates, this is evidenced by, the under representation of women 
in government, business management, professorial chairs, and religious 
leadership. Such a long-standing historical lack of inclusion of the experience of 
virtually half of the world’s population in determining how best to live and 
organise our affairs clearly shows an inadequacy in traditional ethics. 
 
The absence of the one grand universal theory in ethical theory is quite clearly 
evident. The number of competing, and complementary approaches to ethical 
deliberation already presented illustrates this well. However the perceived 
difference in male and female thinking is more problematic. Some have read 
Gilligan’s work as providing proof of a definite gender based difference with 
females adopting the care approach and males adopting the justice approach. 
As explained in chapter three, Gilligan did not make this absolute judgement, 
pointing out in her early work that it was by theme she heard the different voice, 
and that some men adopted the care approach and some women the justice 
approach (Gilligan, 1982). Sharpe (1992) puts this aspect of care ethics in 
perspective as she states that even though Carol Gilligan’s research discerns 
different themes between the moral concerns of men and women, 
 
…it is important to point out that these findings do not affirm that there should 
be distinctive women’s and men’s moralities. Rather than reiterating or 
reinforcing the archaic notion of separate gender-defined moral realms, 
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 Gilligan’s work shows that an accurate understanding of moral competence 
must encompass those skills and forms of human relating that have heretofore 
been neglected or dismissed by contemporary moral theories (Sharpe, 1992, 
p.297). 
 
Gilligan herself confirms this in her later research where she found that both 
men and women can come to use both care and justice approaches, and that 
even though more women were likely to use the care approach predominantly, 
and men the justice approach predominantly, the main point is “a different 
voice has been heard and a new direction charted” (Gilligan, 1995, p.126). 
However, the question of whether morality is in fact gendered, in an essential 
manner, and if it is seen as gendered in such a way then how, or rather what, 
determines its gender, remains an ongoing debate in the field of bioethics in 
general. 
Summary 
This chapter has continued the focus of chapter four on bioethics as the subject 
in order to continue and enrich the laying out of a view of the bioethical 
landscape in which caring may have a place. However, in this chapter the 
orientation is towards the present rather than the historical past, and a current 
picture of the main features of contemporary bioethics and a critique from a 
bioethical perspective of the predominant principle based approach to ethical 
decision-making. Part of this critique involved the proposal and outline of some 
different approaches as alternatives or complements to the application of 
abstract principles, particularly in clinical situations. This included an ethic of 
care as one of the contenders. Finally, the nursing and feminist perspectives 
have contributed an outline of their major criticisms of contemporary bioethics. 
Several of the points raised by their criticisms in this chapter, supported by 
notions of caring and an ethic of care from chapters two and three, will be the 
subject of the following chapter six. This signals a shift to the next phase of the 
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 study that is, exploring some pathways to a possible place for caring as an ethic 
of care in bioethics. 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 
POSSIBILITIES FOR A PLACE FOR CARING IN BIOETHICS: ADDING 
SOME NEW LENSES 
 
There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio… 
(Shakespeare, “Hamlet”) 
Introduction 
In this chapter the work of Chapters Two and Three focused on the importance 
of caring and its ethical aspects to human health, development, quality of life 
and survival, together with the work of chapters four and five on presenting a 
lay out of the nature and landscape of bioethics as a topographical map of the 
field, are brought together. The juxtaposition of the phenomenon of caring and 
an ethic of care, and the field of bioethics, including the critiques of caring and 
bioethics from all three disciplinary perspectives in the previous chapters, draw 
the attention to three apparently critical focal points regarding the possibility of 
a place for caring and an ethic of care in bioethics. These are the care-justice 
dichotomy, the interpretation of the concept of autonomy, and aspects of the 
relationship of caring and virtue ethics. An explanation of these critical focal 
points, and some of the possibilities for their resolution are presented as the 
subject of this chapter. 
 
Undoing the care-justice dichotomy 
The development of an ethic of care and its consequent challenge to a 
traditional justice based ethics and bioethics has, as Sharpe (1992) pointed out in 
chapter five, given rise to a large body of literature on the subject. In this study 
so far, the case in support of caring and an ethic of care that has been 
collectively presented in chapters two, three, and five, regarding the 
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 fundamental nature and importance of caring, and relation in human life, 
(Berry, 1985; Buber, 1970; Heidegger, 1962; Montagu, 1975), together with the 
development of an ethic of care focused on response to needs, the 
interrelatedness of human beings, and the importance of relationships between 
persons (Bowden, 1997; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Tronto, 1993), appears 
to indicate a serious challenge to the traditional justice based principlist ethics 
and bioethics. In return traditional bioethics has either summarily dismissed the 
possibility of an ethic of care as being taken seriously or has used a number of 
different strategies to deflect or remove the basis of the challenge (Carse, 1991, 
1993, 1998; Gatens, 1998; Held, 1995; Little, 1996,1998;). 
 
The pivotal situation 
What is significant about the much reviewed, argued and debated relationship 
between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice, and their relative merits and 
demerits, is that they have tended to be framed so that they are seen from an 
oppositional or dichotomous perspective. This perspective though not 
necessarily technically incorrect in some views, takes only the bones of the 
situation and sets up traditional justice based bioethics, very tightly framed as 
focused on the rights of independent, rational, autonomous individuals that are 
determined from an abstract impartial point of view (Held, 1995). While on the 
other hand, an ethic of care is tightly framed as focused on the response to 
needs of persons who are seen as interdependent, and as existing in 
contextually bound, historical and particular relationships (Gilligan, 1982).  
 
This dichotomous framing is not helpful in progressing past an either/or 
position for an ethic of care and an ethic of justice. It is too spare and simplistic 
a position to provide seeds of possibility for its management or more hopefully 
its resolution. According to Clement (1996) this resolution is important because 
the ethic of care and the ethic of justice 
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 are especially worthy of our attention because they are not merely two among 
many different approaches to ethics. They are more fundamental than other 
possible ethics because they thematise two basic dimensions of human 
relationships, dimensions that might be called vertical and horizontal. The ethic 
of justice focuses on questions of equality and inequality, while the ethic of care 
focuses on questions of attachment and detachment, and both sets of questions 
can arise in any context (p.1) 
 
Further to this, Clement points out Carol Gilligan has written, 
 
…both inequality and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern. Since 
everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two moral 
visions -- one of justice and one of care -- recur in human experience. The moral 
injunctions, not to act unfairly towards others, and not to turn away from 
someone in need, capture these different concerns” (Gilligan as cited in Clement, 
1996, p.1). 
 
Therefore, the importance of finding elements of connection and compatibility 
within the ethic of care and the ethic of justice can be seen, particularly if an 
ethic of care is to find a place of acceptance in bioethical decision-making.  
 
Discussion 
As the nature of an ethic of care has already been covered in chapters two, three 
and to a lesser extent in chapter five, it is pertinent here to briefly outline the 
theory of justice as developed by Rawls (1971). Following this some of the main 
approaches, and positions of objection that have most frequently precipitated 
out of “the care-justice debates” will be examined. 
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 In 1971 John Rawls published his book “A Theory of Justice” in which the 
foundational idea is that of justice as fairness. Justice as fairness is based on “the 
hope that social institutions do not confer morally arbitrary lifelong advantages 
on some persons at the expense of others. This condemns as unjust not only 
racial, sexual, and religious discrimination, but also many forms of social and 
economic inequality.” (Nagel, 1995, p.745). This perspective of justice, according 
to Nagel (1995), is a strongly egalitarian form of liberalism based on a form of 
social contract theory that is not an actual social contract, but a hypothetical one 
(p.745). He further explains that in this theory, we are to imagine ourselves in 
an “original position of equality” otherwise known as the “veil of ignorance”, in 
which we do not know most of the socially significant facts about ourselves, for 
example race, sex, religion, economic class, social standing, natural abilities, 
even our conception of the good life.  
 
Nagel (1995) continues that from this imaginary point of view “we are to decide 
what principles we could agree to, on the basis of the desire to further out own 
aims and interests, what ever they may be.”(1995, p.745), and he elaborates that 
for Rawls  
 
not knowing our position in society or our conception of the good, we are driven 
by this fiction to an equal concern for the fate of everyone, and Rawls maintains 
that we would give priority in choice of principles to avoiding the worst possible 
life prospects, with emphasis first on the preservation of personal and political 
liberty and second on the amelioration of socio-economic inequality (Nagel, 
1995, p.745). 
 
The principles Rawls defends are,  
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 (1) Each individual is to have a right to the greatest equal liberty compatible 
with a like liberty for all  
(2) (a) Social and economic inequalities are to be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b) 
such inequalities are justified only if they benefit the worst off (Nagel, 1995, p 
745).  
 
In Rawls’ theory the first principle has priority over the second, and both 
principles are to govern not detailed political choices, but the basic political, 
economic, and social structures that determine people’s chances in life. 
According to Rawls as cited in (Nagel, 1995) “Equal liberty rules out 
persecution, discrimination, and political oppression. Equal opportunity 
ensures that those with equal ability and motivation have equal chances of 
success, what ever class they are born into” (p.745). In general Rawls claims that 
“the right is prior to and independent of the good, and cannot be defined is that 
which will promote or maximise the good” (p.745). In later essays Rawls 
developed the theory of justice and its relation to general moral theory further 
by employing what he calls the method of “reflective equilibrium”. In this he 
means that, in a situation where there are several moral views, coherence is 
achieved through mutual adjustment between particular moral judgments, 
general principles, and theoretical constructions that model the ideas of 
morality (p.746).  
 
From a feminist perspective, according to Clement (1996), a major approach to 
the care-justice debate is the one that celebrates an ethic of care as a feminine 
ethic, and seeks the recognition of women’s activities and experiences that have 
traditionally “been ignored or devalued by male-defined moral theory” (p.2). In 
this view, Gilligan and Tannen, in separate studies, as cited in Sharpe (1992) 
point out that, “empirical research has shown that the justice orientation is over 
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 represented in males and that the care orientation is over represented in 
females” (p.296). Sharpe (1992) continues that  
 
For this reason, the issue of gender is germane to the difference in moral 
perspective….insofar as the justice perspective, which is the dominant voice in 
contemporary moral theory, excludes the perspective of care, it fails to give 
moral credit to or even to address many of the concerns that have historically 
been associated with woman's experience (p.296). 
 
Clement (1996) further supports this view and explains that  
 
Even if many women do not use the ethic of care, this ethic undeniably captures 
a widely held view of what women are and ought to be. The ethic of care is 
socially coded as a feminine ethic, while the ethic of justice is socially coded as 
the masculine ethic. We need not make any false generalisations about women to 
recognise that woman’s traditional activities and experiences are especially 
relevant to a study of the ethic of care (p.3) 
 
Clement goes on to explain that advocates of the “feminine” approach, “do not 
necessarily believe that all or only women use this ethic, their interest in the 
ethic arises because (they believe) that women especially use it” (1996, p.2). The 
main feature of the feminine approach as Clement points out, is that the ethic of 
care is moved from the periphery to a more central position in moral theory. It 
is thought that in doing this to reveal that the dominant ethic of justice with its 
emphasis on autonomy is often dangerous and illusory (Clement, 1996, p2). 
However, Clement (1996) notes that a criticism of claiming the ethic of care as a 
women’s ethic put forward from the feminist position is, that it puts the 
advocates of the feminine approach very close to taking up a form of 
essentialism. The feminist position is against the generalised assuming of an 
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 essentialist view and is very strongly supportive of allowing for unique and 
individual choice, and the expression of those choices. (Jaggar, 1995; Silvers, 
1997). 
 
A second and less directly oppositional approach to the justice-care debate, 
according to Clement (1996) is the assimilation of the ethic of care into a justice 
perspective. She explains that many traditional moral philosophers who adopt 
this approach see gender and ethics as separate and distinct. As Clement 
elaborates, those that adopt this approach hold that the deplorable things 
historical philosophers have had to say about women can and should be 
distinguished from what they have to say about morality (p.3). Clement (1996) 
claims that by confining attention in this way it construes the care/justice 
debates as “being simply contemporary versions of the Kant/Hume debates 
over the roles of reason and sentiment in morality.” (p. 4). According to 
Clement (1996) the traditional bioethicists position is, that even if most moral 
philosophers have had little to say about care issues, their moral theories 
generally allow for the ethic of care. What is required is to simply re-examine 
the ethic of justice to see whether and how it can accommodate an ethic of care’s 
concerns. In short according to the assimilation approach the ethic of care need 
not be rejected, but neither is it an important development in moral theory in it 
own right (Clement, 1996). 
 
Clement’s (1996) own response to this “assimilation” approach is to point out 
that the ethic of care studied from a feminist perspective has brought out critical 
attention to the gender coding of our moral concepts, and it has clarified and 
challenged the sexual division of moral labour. Clement herself believes that the 
ethic of care and the ethic of justice are in many ways compatible. However, she 
is emphatic that simply “assimilating care into the ethic of justice cannot 
(emphasis original) be done in a way that gives care equal status to justice. It 
can only be done by interpreting care through the perspective of justice, thereby 
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 devaluing and marginalizing it” (p.5). As pointed out by Little (1996) in chapter 
three, that which is coded feminine, as the ethic of care is, would be regarded as 
less important than that which is coded masculine as the present ethic of justice 
is. 
 
Carse (1998) agrees with Clement but takes up the argument against 
accommodationist strategies for dealing with an ethic of care in more detail. In 
doing so she provides a very sound case for the inclusion of an ethic of care as 
an important development in moral theory in its own right. The heart of this 
case extends from the most pervasive dichotomy in the care-justice debates, that 
of the abstract and impartial tenets of the justice ethic verses the concrete and 
particular tenets of an ethic of care. The first accomodationist strategy according 
to Carse (1998) is viewing the constraint of impartiality as no more than the 
norm of fairness (p.155). In this construal Carse states that, 
 
A commitment to impartiality does not in and of itself rule out the possibility of 
acknowledging special obligations and duties rooted in our particular roles and 
relationships, nor need it rule out as morally irrelevant particular features of our 
identities, interests, attachments, or special needs (Carse, 1998, p.156). 
 
She goes on to say that correlatively, giving close attention to particulars is not 
at odds with a conception of moral injunctions as universal injunctions. 
According to Herman and Sher as cited in Carse (1998) “impartial principles 
can contain a high degree of specificity and nuance without losing their 
universal normative force” (p. 56). Carse’s rejoinder is that this accomodationist 
strategy is still essentially based on a model of principled judgement, which is a 
model that conflicts with the model of understanding and agency of the care 
orientation. Carse (1998) explains that in an ethic of care moral judgement is not 
characterised by a conscientious adherence to principle, “Moral judgement, 
even paradigmatic forms of moral judgement, can be generated by direct 
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 response to another, without any guidance or mediation of categorical 
considerations” (p.157). However, Carse is careful to point out that this does not 
mean that every moral response (in an ethic of care) is a seat-of-the-pants 
response”(p158). She further explains that 
 
It is instead an acknowledgement that there are sources of moral wisdom and 
insight that lie outside the reaches of categorical principle. It can matter less that 
we find general reasons for action than that we have well-formed dispositions to 
notice and attend to the conditions of others (Carse, 1998, p.158) 
 
Following on from this in a greater depth Blum as cited in Carse (1998), points 
out 
 
A compassionate or sympathetic attitude, a habit of paying attention to others, a 
sensitivity to others’ needs -- these are components of a person’s moral make up 
that she brings to a situation and yet that cannot be cashed out (in terms of 
conscientious adherence to) universal principles of action. A person can learn to 
be more compassionate; this does not mean that she comes to hold new action-
specifying principles. What is learned in previous situations is not only which 
principles to consult an action but, as Murdoch (1970) emphasises, what to 
notice, how to care, what to be sensitive to, how to get beyond one’s own biases 
and narrowness of vision (p.158). 
 
In order for impartialist principles to accommodate such complex processes, the 
accommodationist approach would have to be formulated in “sufficiently 
intricate terms to capture morally relevant exigencies of the case at hand, yet in 
a way that generalises appropriately to all morally relevant similar cases” 
(Carse, 1998, p.160). As Blum cited in Carse (1998) explains, in such a view, 
”The principle in question is likely to be so cumbersome that few would be 
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 likely even to try to make explicit use of it” (P.160). In this view then, Carse 
(1998) points out that therefore  
 
an account of moral judgement as impartial and principle-derived cannot, in an 
ethic of care, provide a full picture of how we come properly to judge what we 
ought to do, no matter how intricate and nuanced-how encumbered-our picture 
of moral principles is allowed to be (p.161). 
 
What is remarkable about an ethic of care is that not only does it “see different 
features of cases as morally relevant, it also counsels attention to 
differences”(emphasis original) (Carse, 1998, p.166). Where as, the process of 
abstraction exerts “normative pressure in the direction of attending to 
commonalities rather than difference”(Carse, 1998, p.166). In challenging the 
impartialist perspective Carse cautions against “embracing too rigid a view 
about the nature of impartiality or too limited a conception of the role principles 
can play in moral deliberation and response”(1998, p.166), while maintaining 
awareness that focusing on impartiality has had “the effect of ascribing a 
derivative, secondary status to forms of epistemic skill-involving nuance and 
particularity-that are, from the perspective of care, often of first importance” 
(Carse, 1998, p.166).  
 
In summing up, Carse’s examination of an accomodationist strategy that would 
see an ethic of care fitting into existing impartialist ethical theory, has 
demonstrated two important points if there is to be some reconciliation. In her 
detailed and meticulous examination Carse (1998) has shown that there is a 
reasonable amount of flexibility in the focus of impartiality in the ethic of 
justice. This eases it away from a totally oppositional position, which gives hope 
to possibilities for connection. Meanwhile at the same time, Carse (1998) has 
clearly demonstrated that an ethic of care really is a new approach to ethical 
deliberation, and not a re-representation of something already in existence. She 
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 has also demonstrated that in its very complexity an ethic of care contributes a 
valid and valuable approach not currently provided for in contemporary 
bioethics.  
 
Possibilities 
In both non-feminist and feminist writing the ground work is now being 
established for progression from a dichotomous view of the justice and care 
ethics to the recognition and exploration of the possibilities of some form of 
integration of the two. For example in the view of Baier (1995),  
 
there is little disagreement that justice is a social value of very great importance, 
and injustice an evil. Nor would those who have worked on theories of justice 
want to deny that other things matter besides justice. Rawls, for example, 
incorporates the value of freedom into his account of justice, so that denial of 
basic freedoms counts as injustice. Rawls also leaves room for a wider theory of 
the right, of which the theory of justice is just a part. Still, he does claim that 
justice is the ‘first virtue’ of social institutions” (p. 47-48) 
 
She goes on to explain that in her view “the differences are as much in 
emphasis as in substance, or we could say that they are differences in tone of 
voice…For “care” is a less authoritarian humanitarian supplement, a felt 
concern for the good of others and for community with them” (p. 48). 
 
Clement, (1996) also argues that real possibilities exist for an ethic of care in 
ethics and bioethics as she makes the point that “ just as it is a mistake to ignore 
care’s social context, it is also a mistake to reduce the ethic of care to the 
distorted ways it is often practiced. We can look for the moral and political 
possibilities implicit in the ethic of care while actively addressing its dangers.” 
(p. 4). According to Clement (1996), it is looking at the ethic of care and the ethic 
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 of justice only in their idealised forms where they are presented in a 
dichotomous relationship that perpetuates the idea that these two ethics are 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Clements’ own approach to undoing the 
care/justice debate is to acknowledge that both ethics exist in a variety of forms, 
and that by distinguishing between better and worse versions of an ethic of care 
rather than simply accepting or rejecting it outright, and matching it with more 
compatible versions of the ethic of justice she believes it possible to develop a 
feminist ethic of care. Even an ethic of care that can usefully and adequately 
cross the public-private boundary as demonstrated by Di Quinzio and Young in 
their edited book Feminist Ethics and Social policy published in 1997.  
 
There appears to be a growth in an awareness that we need more than Justice 
but that care alone as an alternative cannot carry the full moral load (Baier, 
1995). Finding a compatible functional way to use both ethics that preserves the 
best of both approaches is a worthwhile goal that has enormous implications 
for the discipline of bioethics (Carse, 1998; Clement, 1996). It also appears to be 
particularly important for a bioethics in a state of transition, searching for better 
ways to address the increasing demands of rapidly growing population health 
needs, even more rapidly changing technological advances. This is not least 
important in ensuring that the so-called private realm receives appropriate 
versions of justice and care that acknowledging and deal with domestic 
violence and exploitative caring relationships. Ruddick (1995) supports this 
idea, pointing out that confining justice to the public realm allows people’s 
vulnerability to violence and other harms (p.218) At the same time the public 
realm can benefit from the adoption of appropriate versions of the ethic of care 
(Ruddick, 1995, p.218). For example, this could occur in some areas such as 
workplace relations, or negotiation and conflict resolution. 
 
The main point here is that there are possibilities. It is important that points of 
tension and conflict are not framed in a dichotomous way that suffocates 
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 creativity and progress towards resolution. As Miller (1976) explains, the 
fundamental nature of reality is the fact that, in its most basic sense conflict is 
both inevitable and the source of all growth. When points of tension and 
conflict are confronted respectfully and openly they can provide pathways to 
connection and growth (Miller, 1976, p. 125-128). The next critical or focal point 
regarding conceptions of autonomy is in part related to the care-justice debates 
as it a disputed aspect of both the care and the justice perspectives. 
 
Autonomy and care 
In Western traditional philosophy autonomy holds a central position, however 
it is a position that is not necessarily central beyond that tradition (Davis, 1990). 
According to Clement (1996) “most literally, autonomy means self 
determination. An autonomous person is one who is in control of his or her life 
rather than being controlled by outside forces” (p.22). The concept of autonomy 
is deeply entwined in our personal understanding of whom we are as human 
beings. Taylor as cited in Nedelsky (1989) states “The image of humans as self 
determining creatures…remains one of the most powerful dimensions of liberal 
thought” (p.8). Nedelsky (1989), herself elaborates that for those of us raised in 
liberal societies the notion of freedom “ takes its meaning and value from the 
presupposition of our self-determining self-making nature” (, p.8). Although 
more or less taken for granted by many, autonomy is a deeply complex concept 
in the different ways it is perceived, constituted and defined. 
 
The complexity and different perceptions of autonomy give rise to a number of 
tensions in its meaning, significance and practical application in politics, law, 
nursing, feminism and bioethics. In regard to the aims of this study to explore 
possibilities for a place for caring as an ethic of care in bioethics, significant 
tensions arise concerning different conceptions of autonomy, and the 
compatibility of autonomy and care in the feminist and nursing perspectives. 
As some of the constellation of issues and tensions specifically concern the 
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 soundness and acceptability of an ethic of care, the concept of autonomy will 
now be explored in some detail. 
 
The pivotal issue 
Autonomy was originally born of Kantian ethical theory and it is incorporated 
as a fundamental part of Rawls’ egalitarian justice theory. This theory as 
outlined in the previous section on the care-justice debates underpins much 
bioethical deliberation and decision-making. Autonomy is also a foundational 
principle in traditional bioethics, and continues to have a strong presence, 
although changes are in process (see chapter five). This liberal and justice 
oriented conception of autonomy then, has a history steeped in Cartesian ideals 
of abstraction, reduction, and patriarchal ideology which feminist theory and 
ethics find difficult to accommodate and in many cases would prefer to reject 
outright.  
 
The basis for this rejection from a broad feminist perspective according to 
Nedelsky (1989) is that this conception of autonomy “ takes atomistic 
individuals as the basic units of political and legal theory and thus fails to 
recognise the inherently social nature of human beings” (p.8). However, 
Nedelsky is careful to point out that “no one among the feminists or 
communitarians is prepared to abandon freedom as a value, nor, therefore can 
any of us completely abandon the notion of the human capacity for making 
one’s own life and self” (p.8). Nedelsky (1989) goes on to explain that “Indeed, 
feminists are centrally concerned with freeing women to shape our own lives, 
to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the definition given to us by 
others” (p.8). This tension is the first part of the pivotal situation. 
 
Clement (1996) agrees with Nedelsky (1989), that feminists are divided on the 
value of autonomy (p.21). However, Clement (1996) explains that there is 
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 another significant tension related to the feminist perspective of autonomy, 
which causes a feminist division on the valuing of an ethic of care (p.21). This 
tension stems from the issues already discussed in chapters two and three 
regarding the feminist perspective of an ethic of care not only growing out of 
women’s oppression, but also perpetuating it. While others (the feminine 
approach) argue that women’s experiences and activities are sources of 
strength, and that challenging women’s oppression requires celebrating these 
differences, one of which is an ethic of care. Clement further explains that, 
 
There are important connections between these two debates. Many feminists 
who reject the ethic of care do so because they believe it undermines some notion 
of autonomy. For instance, whereas an autonomous individual defines herself, it 
is argued that an adherent of the ethic of care allows herself to be defined by 
others-by those for whom she cares. Similarly, those who criticise the notion of 
autonomy often do so because they believe it is inconsistent with an ethic of 
care…based on the recognition that human beings are socially constituted 
(p.21). 
 
In sum, according to Clement (1996) from this view it seems that the liberal 
conception of autonomy as one that arises out of certain individualistic 
assumptions of the ideal type of the ethic of justice, is incompatible with an 
ethic of care. From Nedelsky’s (1989) perspective “the problem… is how to 
combine the claim of the constitutiveness of social relations with the value of 
self determination”(p.9). She eloquently concludes that while 
 
liberalism has been the source of our language of freedom and self determination. 
The values we cherish have come to us embedded in a theory that denies the 
reality we know: the centrality of relationships in constituting the self 
(Nedelsky, 1989, p.9). 
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 For an ethic of care to have some possibility of a place in bioethical decision-
making, from a bioethical perspective, the apparent incompatibilities between 
the liberal understanding of autonomy and an ethic of care need to be 
addressed. However that is not sufficient in-itself, the tensions and divisions 
within the feminist perspective on an ethic of care and autonomy also need to 
be dealt with in an acceptable manner in order to strengthen an ethic of care’s 
case for a position in bioethics.  
 
Discussion 
Clement (1996) argues that the main problem in preventing the connection and 
reconciliation between care and autonomy lie in looking at autonomy only as it 
is portrayed in the ideal type of an ethic of justice, and pitting it against the 
ideal type of an ethic of care. She points out that both ethics’ ideal types have 
important flaws and that a case for care and autonomy as compatible can be 
made. An attempt to reconcile care and autonomy is important According to 
Clement (1996) in that, 
 
Autonomy (properly defined) serves as a criterion for an adequate ethic of care. 
That is unless a version of the ethic of care allows for the autonomy of the 
caregiver and the care recipient, the ethic of care will be deficient on moral and 
on feminist grounds (p.21-22).  
 
Further to this Clement elaborates that 
 
If it can be shown that there need not be a conflict between care and autonomy, 
the debate can shift from whether care or autonomy is more important to how we 
might bring about the social conditions to allow us to overcome their present 
conflict (p.22). 
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 Part of the present conflict broadly construed is that the intensely 
individualistic “self made man” conception of autonomy does not take into 
account that “we come into being in a social context that is literally constitutive 
of us” (Nedelsky, 1989,p.8). Clement (1996) provides an account of liberal 
autonomy that assists in understanding this conflict and some way that it can 
and has been challenged. 
 
According to Clement (1996), most discussions of autonomy regard it as a 
psychological attribute related to free will where persons are seen as self-
determining. She explains that there are two general categories of impediments 
to psychological autonomy in the usual liberal view. The first is that autonomy 
requires that one be free of coercion in one’s decision-making, the second is that 
it is necessary to think reflectively or critically about one’s choices (Clement, 
1996). She further explains that in this way autonomy is understood as having a 
negative component to not be coerced, and a positive component to critically 
evaluate one’s choices. In this psychological conception of autonomy “if the 
sources of an agent’s choice meet the above two conditions then the agent is 
self-determining” (Clement, 1996, p.23). 
 
This concept has been challenged as Clement (1996) explains, because “meeting 
these two criteria is still not sufficient to be autonomous” (p 23). This overlooks 
the social embeddedness of our critical reflections. She points out that,  
 
the primary reason for requiring critical reflection, or higher order desires, is 
that our ordinary desires, our first-order desires, are often socially determined 
(emphasis added).When we reflect on these desires we may realise that they are 
not really our (emphasis original) desires. Thus autonomy requires that we take 
a critical perspective on our socialisation” (Clement, 1996, p.23). 
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 Clement further explains that the realisation that critical reflection is itself a 
social product has led philosophers to search for ways in which an individual 
can elude his or her socialisation and thus be autonomous in the ideal 
conception. She emphasises that although no one can escape his or her 
socialisation, it is obvious that some people are more autonomous, that is, in 
control of their lives, than others, and that we can recognise that critical 
reflection allows people to be more autonomous than they would be otherwise. 
 
The results of this thinking according to Clement (1996) present two approaches 
to the question about social constitutiveness and autonomy: 
 
On the one hand, we can define autonomy and then consider whether anyone 
achieves it. On the other hand, we can observe the differences between people we 
consider autonomous and people we consider non autonomous, and then make 
generalisations about what constitutes autonomy. The first approach results in a 
purer conception of autonomy than the second: The autonomous individual can 
call everything into question. However it does so by ruling out the possibility of 
autonomy; it stalls when it is faced with the fact that we are socially constituted. 
The second approach results in a more limited, descriptive conviction of 
autonomy, one that accepts the social constitution of the individual. Unlike the 
first approach, however, this approach is practically helpful in focusing on what 
allows individuals to control their lives to extend that they do. (p.24) 
 
If we are concerned with the conditions that allow individuals to be as in 
control of their lives as they can be, Clement (1996) continues, it becomes 
obvious that those conditions are not only psychological but social as well and 
therefore we need to expand upon standard accounts of autonomy (p.24). 
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 The first feature needing to be recognised in an expanded account of autonomy 
is that autonomy itself cannot be achieved individually, that is alone. “In fact, 
we learn to become autonomous, and we learn this competency not through 
isolation from others, but through relationships with others. An individual’s 
autonomy is nurtured through the care of others”(Clement, 1996). Clement 
notes in regard to the liberal conception of autonomy, that isolation may 
promote the negative component, that one not be coerced, but it undermines 
the positive component to critically reflect on our decision-making. She explains 
that it is the support and guidance of our family, friends and teachers that foster 
the skills of self-examination allowing us to be autonomous, in other words, 
relationships with others teach us to be ourselves. Code cited in Clement (1996) 
puts it personal uniqueness, creativity, expressiveness and self-awareness... 
grow out of interdependence and continually to impact would affirmation and 
continuation to (p 24). Clement (1996) is careful to point out that some 
relationships foster these skills better than others and some relationships 
actually undermine these skills. “But relationships, and specifically caring 
relationships, are a necessary precondition for autonomy” (p24). 
 
Further to this, in taking note of the social conditions that allow individuals to 
be as in control of their lives as possible another point requires recognition. As 
Clement (1996) explains “One need not be coerced, in that one is literally forced 
to carry out someone else's decisions, in order to lack control over one’s life” 
(p24). Clement provides an example of the decision of a battered woman’s to 
remain with her batterer, which she explains may be the best option available to 
her, however the fact that she makes this decision does not make it an 
autonomous decision. Therefore, literal force is not necessary. In Clements’ 
view cases such as this highlight the need to expand the concept of autonomy to 
include social conditions that influence the relative capacity of persons to set 
their own courses. She sees that literal coercion should be the limiting case in 
our understanding of autonomy, and relative power and disempowerment 
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 should become the broader issue. Since there are degrees of empowerment, 
there are also degrees of autonomy. 
 
Following from this then, the second condition for liberal autonomy, critical 
thinking, also takes on a broader meaning in the light of social factors that affect 
our ability to control our own lives (Clement, 1996). What needs to recognised 
at this point, are the culturally bound norms and sanctions that are part of the 
social factors that have such influence on how people live their lives. In 
summing up Clement states that, 
 
The ability to think about our own decisions critically is largely dependent upon 
being in a society in which the society’s norms, which subtly socialise us are 
critically analysed and discussed. This means that voices that challenge the 
status quo must be allowed or even encouraged to exist and to be heard in a 
social discourse on important social values. This discourse must be available to 
the average person, and society must be set up in a way that citizens are able to 
effect political change based on this discourse. There are degrees of critical 
capacity, and thus degrees of autonomy, but it is clear that our critical capacities 
are maximised in social conditions that permit and encourage us to critically 
assess and influence the social ideals that in turn shape our lives (Clement, 
1996, p 25). 
 
Here Clement provides a lengthy but important explanation, and summation of 
this part of her re-conceptualisation of autonomy, which in turn directs the 
attention to the possibilities that this exercise may hold for an ethic of care. 
 
Possibilities 
In terms of addressing the ambivalent feminist perspective Clement (1996) and 
Nedelsky (1989) have indicated that there are possibilities for compatibility 
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 between the liberal justice version of autonomy and the ethic of care. The 
tension between those who support an ideal ethic of care and see autonomy as 
an ideal with dangerous illusions of a profound individualism that has no place 
in an ethic of care, and those feminists, and non-feminists for that matter, who 
claim that the ideal ethic of care is deficient because it compromises women’s 
autonomy, can be at least eased. To illustrate how this could occur Clement 
explains 
 
Broadening our account of autonomy to include social factors eliminates the 
excessive individualism that conflicts with the ethic of care. It also allows us to 
focus on the core of the feminist criticism of the ethic of care, namely that it 
serves to disempower women… but the notion of autonomy I defend would 
certainly not conflict with being a caregiver, instead it would seek to empower 
caregivers by demanding that they have the power to carry out their 
responsibilities adequately. (Clement, 1996, p.26) 
 
There are further possibilities in that a version of liberal justice autonomy, in its 
support of respect for individuals, could be taken on board in a partial manner. 
Some feminists point out “care is distorted when the carer identifies so 
completely with the recipient that she looses her critical perspective” (Clement, 
1996). A caregiver needs a healthy sense of self and sense of autonomy in order 
to see the care receiver as a person in their own right with both similarities and 
differences to themselves to be able to attend appropriately to the receivers real 
needs and requirements. Therefore some degree of autonomy is necessary so 
that caring is not detrimental to either the giver or the reciever 
 
What Clement (1996) and to a lesser extent Nedelsky (1989) have demonstrated 
is that it is possible to close the division in the feminist perspectives on an ethic 
of care, and less fully developed but still a possibility, to quiet at least some of 
the criticisms of bioethicsts and other non feminists opposed to an ethic of care. 
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 Clement has indicated it is the individualism of autonomy from the ideal type 
of an ethic of justice that is compatible with care, while the social emphasis of 
the ideal type of the ethic of care is incompatible with autonomy. Clement’s 
(1996) response is that reconciling care and autonomy requires moving beyond 
the ideal types and examining different versions of both for compatibility to 
find the right balance between the connections and the separations between 
individuals. A further possibility for the developments in reconciling autonomy 
and care could be the development of new language to express the new 
thinking and ideas. According to Frazer and Lacey as cited in Clement (1996) 
they have developed the term “relational self to express a balance between care 
and autonomy. 
 
It is important to signal here that autonomy is a concept also of deep 
significance in the discipline of nursing and to nursing practice, and in direct 
connection with the feminist perspective to nurses as mainly women (Condon, 
1992). The significance of autonomy has, as with the feminist perspective, 
produced considerable literature, debate, discussion, and different perspectives. 
Autonomy is significant to nursing in three broad categories. First is in the 
relationship between the nurse and his/her patient, (Benner, 1984), second is in 
the nexus of relationships and hierarchies of authority in which the practicing 
nurse is embedded in the workplace, (Bishop & Scudder, 1990; Bowden, 1997; 
Yarling & McElmurry, 1986), third is in the establishment and acceptance of 
nursing as a professional discipline in its own right. This is too large to 
comprehensively cover in the constraints of this thesis, therefore for the 
purposes of this particular discussion, which is oriented toward the place and 
acceptability of an ethic of care in bioethics, and for reasons of time and space, 
the focus will be relatively brief and general. 
 
Nurses and nursing are also ambivalent about the whole-hearted acceptance of 
an ethic of care, and in nurses’ discussions their reasons are similar to those 
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 raised by the feminist critique. Nurses see that adopting an ethic of care could 
be a trap hindering their growth as an independent discipline, following the 
same basic reasoning of the connection between patriarchal oppression, women 
and caring and caring work (Condon, 1992, Watson, 1990). Many would rather 
see the emphasis put onto either natural science or nursing as a human science, 
feeling that would confer greater legitimacy and acceptability as a discipline 
(Polifroni & Welch, 1999) 
 
Some nurses point to the difficulty of nurses’ ability to act morally from a 
position where they are not able to control their practice in institutions to a 
satisfactory extent. That is, in this case they lack sufficient autonomy (Yarling & 
McElmurry, 1986) and don’t necessarily see an ethic of care helping the lack of 
autonomy. This is not to say that, they are not acutely aware that caring and an 
ethic of care are fundamentally important to their relationship with their 
patients and the quality and ethicality of care they can give.  
 
Further to this most nurses are aware that an ethic of care indubitably 
underpins nursing practice, even if they sometimes have difficulty expressing 
it, as pointed out in Chapter Five, and studies have demonstrated this (Benner, 
1991; Woods, 1997). Therefore when looking at the possibilities of refashioning 
the concept of autonomy as outlined by Clement (1996) and Nedelsky (1989) 
above, it appears that much of what they have to say would be just as relevant 
to nurses and nursing. Particularly the broadening of the concept to recognise 
the social and cultural influences and constraints on people’s decision-making 
both generally and morally. It is also important to point out that nurses have 
not been idle on this subject themselves and have also developed, and are 
continuing to develop, ideas and thinking concerning autonomy (Benner, 1984, 
1991, 1997; Carper, 1979; Davis, 1990; Gastmans, 1998,1999, Johnstone, 1999; 
Ray, 1994; Scott, 1996, 1998 which may in return hold possibilities for the 
feminists to consider. 
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 Summary 
This chapter has diverged from the perspectives and predicaments presented in 
the previous 5 chapters, and brought the focus down onto two apparently 
critical focal points regarding the possibility of a place for caring and an ethic of 
care in bioethics. These were the debates concerning the care-justice dichotomy, 
and the different perceptions of the concept of autonomy. The pivotal point for 
each was explained and then particular issues concerning each were discussed 
and finally some of the possibilities for their resolution were presented. The 
final phase of looking back at the study as whole now follows in chapter seven. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION 
Introduction 
 
The focus of this final chapter is reflective rather than generative as the previous 
chapters have been. Its purpose is to present a summary of the conclusions or 
main points arising from this study. It also presents the limitations and an 
evaluation, followed by the significance and implications of the study, and 
finally recommendations for future work in this area In this final phase of the 
study it seems appropriate to re connect briefly with where it began. This study 
was initiated by a desire to understand more clearly what was behind the 
apparent dismissal, or at least resistance to the acceptance of an ethic of care as 
a valid approach in bioethics. It seemed to me as a nurse, so obvious and so 
important in terms of caring for human beings, real people with real lives in the 
processes of their experiences of health and illness, that an ethic of care was 
both valuable and necessary. It appeared even more important that caring, 
developed as an ethic of care, should be included in bioethical decision-making. 
This is now the place to look back and reflect on the nature of the journey, and 
what has eventuated in the process of that particular journey. 
 
STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
Main conclusion 
 
There is a sound and robust case to be made for a valid and necessary place 
for caring, as an ethic of care in decision-making in the discipline of 
bioethics. 
 
The case is revealed in its greatest strength in the accumulation of contributions 
from all of the disciplines involved in this study. These contributions come 
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 predominantly from the disciplines of nursing, feminist theory, and medical 
ethics, that have been the main focus of this study. However, important 
contributions also came from the other disciplines of biology, anthropology, 
psychology and philosophy that have been included to a somewhat lesser 
extent in the study. Each of the three main disciplines contributed a distinct 
substantial part of the case, with nursing and feminist theory playing a rather 
more predominant role than bioethics, in this particular conclusion. Together 
with the added support of the other disciplines, a very strong multidisciplinary 
case in support of a place for caring in bioethical decision-making was created. 
 
Summary of the disciplinary contributions to the case and the particular role 
each played. 
 
The nursing contribution 
The discipline of nursing provided a perspective of caring from a professional 
practise discipline in which caring is ontologically basic and fundamentally 
valued both generally and ethically in its constitutive practices of care. From an 
examination of practice narratives from nurses’ experiences within a range of 
nurse-patient relationships, examples from the work of Benner (1984) provided 
a meticulously detailed and intimate account of the exquisite skills, intellectual, 
emotional, spiritual, and practical that were revealed in her studies of expert 
nursing practice. These accounts, if read, provide clear evidence that in this 
situation, caring is a complex, intricate skill, a consummate blend of the art and 
science of nursing, woven into ethical practices of care directed towards the 
purpose of being with and assisting human beings in their experiences of 
health, illness and dying.  
 
The ethical nature of caring in nursing practice is demonstrated by examining 
Gadamer’s view of practice as “human action directed by communal ways of 
being, aimed at promoting human good” (Gadamer as cited in Bishop & 
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 Scudder, 1990, p73). In the work of Benner (1991) she demonstrated how nurses 
develop expert ethical comportment from reflection on an accumulation of past 
practical experience. This includes experiences of doing worse and doing better, 
from observations and emersion in practice, and contact with excellent role 
models and mentors. According to Benner (1991) the dominant ethic found in 
stories of everyday practice is one of care and responsibility. It can be seen then, 
that nurses caring practices involve deliberations and preferences guided by a 
perspective of care, because from their practical knowledge (practice wisdom) 
they have learned to actively value, trust and prefer (and so choose) caring. This 
is because for them, in their nursing practice it has demonstrated a primal 
relationship to “the good”. Benner (1991) encompasses this in her definition of 
nurses’ ethical caring practices as skilled actions “that have a notion of the good 
embedded in them because they are lodged concerns lived out in a community 
with a narrative tradition” (p.2).  
 
The involvement of nurses in a community with a narrative tradition is an 
essential part of how nurses’ support and sustain each other and their ethical 
practices of care. This together with the more general enculturation process of 
the nursing education process from undergraduate onwards, and the very 
important experiences of participating in the growth, development and healing 
of their patients, all serve to support sustain and re-enforce nurses commitment 
to caring ideas and ideals. This is important because nurses’ ethical caring 
practices are often carried out in situations of uncertainty, difficulty and 
emotional tension. With the patient and their needs as the centre of their focus 
nurses frequently find themselves in situations of conflict with their employer, 
with other healthcare professionals (most often physicians), their patient and 
sometimes their own perspectives and needs.  
 
This situation has been pointed out by Yarling and Mc Elmurray (1986), and is a 
point of tension and conflict between the nurses and feminist perspectives of 
caring. This is because one of the negative aspects of caring from a nursing 
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 perspective in the view of the feminist perspective is that they see the position 
of nurses and their caring practices subjugated under the medical profession 
which to the feminists implies that nurses caring practices may be products of 
patriarchal exploitation and oppression of women’s caring practices. Even if 
this is so, to whatever extent, abandoning caring and an ethic of care is not the 
answer. Rather the point is to find ways to avoid mitigate or remove the 
problems and traps.  
 
Another very important aspect of nurses’ ethical caring practices is that because 
of the nature of the nurse patient relationship it can be seen that even the small 
ordinary day to day decisions are ethical. This perspective implies that nurses’ 
ethical caring practices are a way of being, or as an ontology and not something 
produced in an ethical dilemma or problem solving situation. Benner (1991) 
was the first to highlight the importance of skilled everyday ethical 
comportment in nursing caring practices. She sees nurses’ everyday decisions 
not as separate from dilemma or quandary ethics but as providing the essential 
foundation for addressing the quandary and procedural ethics or issues. Benner 
also sees that “… quandary and procedural ethics depend on everyday skilful 
comportment and practical moral reasoning that is formed by the particular 
knowledge of the embodied knower”. (p 1).  
 
Despite the detailed account of nurses’ caring practices and the mechanisms in 
nursing with which it is supported and sustained there are real difficulties that 
impinge on nurses’ ethical caring practices which mean that despite nurses’ best 
abilities the combination of external employment and social influences 
sometimes impinge significantly on their ability to be moral. It is here that a 
fruitful connection and dialogue with aspects of feminist theory could help. 
Some nurses have already and for some time been working in this area (see the 
works of Chinn and Watson, for example). 
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 The feminist contribution 
The contribution from feminist theory comes from a very different perspective. 
It is a plurality of views that are unified by “ an attempt to uncover the ways in 
which conceptions of gender distort peoples view of the world, and to articulate 
the ways in which these distortions …are hurtful to all” (Little, 1996 p. 2). The 
feminist perspective acknowledges the tension between individual and 
community needs, and seek to include all voices. In general they contribute a 
perspective that is more broadly social and political and not confined by 
professional or social mandates. Even though, or perhaps because of, the 
assumptions at issue are often subtle or so familiar as to be invisible the 
“distorted and harmful conceptions of gender have come to affect the very 
ways in which we frame our vision of the world, affecting what we notice, what 
we value, and how conceptualise what does come to attention “(Little, 1996 p. 
2).  
 
Focusing specifically on caring and caring practices Little (1996) explains how 
the association of women with caring and what is seen as the natural and more 
basic processes of life devalues women, caring and nature in a perpetual circle 
of devaluation by association. Tronto (1993) identifies that caring is able to 
occupy a paradoxical position of being vitally important to human life, while at 
the same time it is devalued and compartmentalised. She explains that caring as 
a four-stage process is divided into two parts, where caring about - recognising 
need, and taking care of - recognising that action can be taken are related to 
broader public issues and roles, and seen as duties of the more powerful. The 
second part care giving - the direct hands on meeting of needs, and care 
receiving - the acceptance and response to the care delivered are related to more 
private issues and private roles, and are seen as duties of the less powerful. 
Tronto also points out that race and class, as well as gender determine who 
does caring and care work. These values and social structures are supported by 
social myths regarding people as autonomous, equal and independent. In the 
174 
 feminist perspective people are never autonomous in the absolute sense, are not 
all equal, and exist in webs of interdependent and at times dependent relations.  
 
These myths seem to be connected to a perception of care as posing a threat and 
fears of being overwhelmed that result in attempts to deny and denigrate 
caring. Miller (1976) sees these attempts to deny what are vast areas of life 
actually builds an exceedingly restricted conception of the total human 
potential. She points out that feelings of vulnerability and weakness are a 
natural part of human life. They are a necessary part of experience and growth, 
no one is exempt and they are not simply traits of dependent women. However. 
Miller further explains that, because women generally have a closer connection 
with this central human condition, and by having to defend less and deny less 
they are in a position to understand weakness and vulnerability. This 
understanding can be a positive strength. Finally Miller explains that caring as a 
fundamental part of participating in the growth of others, which has been in her 
view unfairly distributed to women, has the benefits of providing the pleasures 
of close connection with physical and mental growth, something that all 
humans can enjoy and benefit from. She is careful to point out that many of 
these situations are changing, but that process is not consistent in speed or 
distribution, and that what has not changed is that women have had to do this 
major work without the supports a culture would give to a task it valued. 
 
That there are negative aspects to caring is fully acknowledged in the feminist 
perspective. According to Bowden (1997) seeing caring only in a positive light 
glosses over the dark side of it where caring practices have frustrating 
demeaning and isolating dimensions to their routines. Bowden notes that some 
feminist theorists see women’s caring as a coerced practice on which their 
survival depends, and which may undermine their integrity and ethical agency 
perpetuating the reign of the dominant by encouraging self-sacrifice. Bowden 
explains that where the association of caring with women has been seen as 
natural, that is as an essential, inherent part of being a woman, correlatively, the 
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 absence of caring attributes are used to castigate and denigrate women. She 
further emphasises that the essentialist association of women and caring results 
in the constriction of the enormous diversity of women’s caring practices into 
abstracted and prejudiced models of femininity and care. 
 
Finally Bowden along with Baier (1995), Carse (1991), Groenhout (1998a), Held 
(1995), Little (1996), and Miller (1976) agree that the compartmentalisation of 
the stereotypical women and caring relationships to the private realm of 
domestic, personal, and intimate relations reinforces the traditional splitting of 
public and private realms, and between men’s and women’s caring possibilities. 
While it is important to face up to the negative aspects of caring, it should not 
be dishonoured or abandoned. The value placed on caring by so many is not 
misguided. Rather, means to avoid traps and to remove distorting barriers need 
to be found, and similarly, means to support good caring practices need to be 
developed. 
 
Exploring the ethical possibilities of caring is a potential source for good caring 
practices. As Noddings (1984) points out, the natural inclinations to do good 
present in human beings needs to be built on. It was the works of Gilligan 
(1982) and Noddings that initiated the development of an ethic of care, arising 
out of their dissatisfaction with traditional justice based principled theories of 
ethics and bioethics. Although some readers of Gilligan’s work have taken the 
difference in the moral voices as gendered in an absolute sense, Gilligan did 
point it was by theme only that she detected the different voice. Further to this 
Friedman (1993) points out that despite any gender difference, the different 
voice hypothesis would survive because it reveals the traditional single-minded 
focus on abstract principles based on justice and rights as the only approach. 
 
Johnstone (1994, 1999) explains that the main disagreements of feminist thought 
regarding traditional ethics and bioethics is that, the traditional approach is too 
abstract to be practically useful. It focuses too intensely on rules and principles 
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 rather than promoting quality relationships between people. Finally it has 
tended to privilege the interests of white, middle class, able bodied, 
heterosexual males. From the work of Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984), and 
with some development within feminist ethics an ethic of care was created. It 
can be described as an ethic that recognises that the main moral concern is with 
needs, and a caring commitment to respond to those needs. An ethic of care 
recognises the inseparability of persons and their environments making choices 
contextually bound, and dependent on the particularities of the situation. It 
values and supports connections and relations between people, and values the 
natural interdependent relatedness of all human beings (Cleary, 1999). 
 
A further important contribution to the case for a place for an ethic of care in 
bioethical decision-making came from feminist ethics. In Chapter Six two of the 
main objections and arguments put out in the bioethical discourses against a 
place for an ethic of care in bioethics have been picked up and addressed 
comprehensively and meticulously. First predicament is the dichotomous view 
perpetuated of an ethic of justice very tightly framed as focused on the rights of 
independent, rational, autonomous that are determined from an abstract 
impartial point of view (Held, 1995). While on the other hand, an ethic of care is 
tightly framed as focused on the response to the needs of persons who are seen 
as interdependent, and as existing in contextually bound, historical and 
particular relationships (Gilligan, 1982).  
 
The predicament here is that the dichotomous framing is not helpful in 
progressing past and either/or position for an ethic of care and an ethic of 
justice. According to Clement (1996) resolution of this dichotomy is important 
because the ethic of care and the ethic of justice are “ more fundamental that 
other possible ethics because they thematise two basic dimensions of human 
relationships …the ethic of justice focuses on questions of equality and 
inequality while the ethic of care focuses on questions of attachment and 
detachment, and both sets of questions can arise in any context” (p. 1). Further 
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 to this as Gilligan has written “both inequality and attachment constitute 
grounds for moral concern since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and 
to abandonment “ (Gilligan as cited in Clement, 1996 p.1).  
 
A second less directly oppositional approach to the justice care debate, 
according to Clement (1996) is the assimilation of the ethic of care into a justice 
perspective. This is an approach adopted by many traditional moral 
philosophers. Their position is that an ethic of justice can accommodate an ethic 
of care’s concerns. In response to this assimilation approach Clement points out 
that an ethic of care studied from a feminist perspective has brought out critical 
attention to the gender coding of our moral concepts, and it has clarified and 
challenged sexual division of moral labour. She is emphatic that assimilating 
care into the ethic of justice cannot be done in a way that gives care equal status 
to justice. 
 
Carse (1998) also defends a place for an ethic of care in bioethics in its own 
right. She presents an argument against the claim by bioethicists that a 
commitment to impartiality in principlist thinking does not, in and of its self-
rule out the possibility of acknowledging special obligations, duties and 
relationships. However Carse, points out that, it is putting care into a principled 
frame which conflicts with the understanding of agency in an ethic of care 
where “ moral judgement, can be generated by direct response to another, 
without any guidance or mediation of categorical considerations” (p.157). Carse 
is careful to point out that this does not mean that every moral response (in an 
ethic of care) is “a seat-of-the-pants response”(p158). 
 
What is remarkable about an ethic of care is that it sees different features of 
cases as morally relevant, and it also pays attention to differences. Where as, the 
process of principle based abstraction exerts “normative pressure in the 
direction of attending to commonalities rather than difference”(Carse, 1998, 
p.166). Despite her strong argument in challenging the impartialist perspective, 
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 Carse cautions against ignoring completely the nature of impartiality or 
adopting too limited a conception of the role principles can play in moral 
deliberation and response (1998, p.166),  
 
In her detailed and meticulous examination Carse (1998) has shown that there is 
a reasonable amount of flexibility in the focus of impartiality in the ethic of 
justice. This eases it away from a totally oppositional position, which gives hope 
to possibilities for connection. Meanwhile at the same time, Carse (1998) has 
clearly demonstrated that an ethic of care really is a new approach to ethical 
deliberation, and not a re-representation of something already in existence. She 
has also demonstrated that in its very complexity an ethic of care contributes a 
valid and valuable approach not currently provided for in contemporary 
bioethics. In both non-feminist and feminist writing the ground work is now 
being established according to Clement (1996) for progression from a 
dichotomous view of the justice and care ethics to the recognition and 
exploration of the possibilities of some form of integration of the two. 
 
The relationship between autonomy and care is the second predicament to be 
addressed meticulously from the feminist perspective. Autonomy is a powerful 
concept in Western society but its reign does not necessarily extend beyond the 
boundaries of that tradition. The concept of autonomy is deeply entwined in 
our personal understanding of freedom and who we are as human beings. 
However the liberal justice conception of autonomy focused on atomistic 
individuals as the basic units of political and legal theory fails to recognise the 
inherently social nature of human beings (Nedelsky 1989). As such feminist 
theory and ethics find it difficult to accept and would prefer to reject the liberal 
justice conception of autonomy. However Nedelsky is careful to point out that 
“no one among the feminists or communitarians is prepared to abandon 
freedom as a value, nor, therefore can any of us completely abandon the notion 
of the human capacity for making ones own life and self” (p.8). Nedelsky (1989) 
goes on to explain that “Indeed, feminists are centrally concerned with freeing 
179 
 women to shape our own lives, to define who we (each) (emphasis original) are, 
rather than accepting the definition given to us by others” (p.8). This tension is 
the first part of the pivotal situation. 
 
The second part is that feminists themselves are divided on the value of 
autonomy, and at the same time they are also divided on the value of an ethic of 
care. Restating for clarity Clement’s (1996) explanation from page 160 
 
There are important connections between these two debates. Many feminists 
who reject the ethic of care do so because they believe it undermines some notion 
of autonomy. For instance, whereas an autonomous individual defines herself, it 
is argued that an adherent of the ethic of care allows herself to be defined by 
others-by those for whom she cares. Similarly, those who criticise the notion of 
autonomy often do so because they believe it is inconsistent with an ethic of 
care…based on the recognition that human beings are socially constituted 
(p.21). 
 
In this view the liberal conception of autonomy emphasising individuality, is 
incompatible with an ethic of care. According to Nedelsky (1989) the problem is 
how to combine the claim of the social constitutiveness of social relations with 
the value of self-determination. She eloquently concludes 
 
liberalism has been the source of our language of freedom and self determination. 
The values we cherish have come to us embedded in a theory that denies the 
reality we know: the centrality of relationships in constituting the self 
(Nedelsky, 1989, p.9). 
 
For an ethic of care to have some possibility of a place in bioethical decision-
making, from a bioethical perspective, the apparent incompatibilities between 
the liberal understanding of autonomy and an ethic of care need to be 
addressed. However that is not sufficient in-itself, the tensions and divisions 
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 within the feminist perspective on an ethic of care and autonomy also need to 
be dealt with in an acceptable manner in order to strengthen an ethic of care’s 
case for a position in bioethics.  
 
In Clement’s (1996) view it is the portrayal of the ethic of justice and the ethic of 
care as ideal types that hinders reconciliation of care and autonomy, which she 
further points out are both flawed in important ways. However again, a 
reconciliation of the two is important according to Clement because  
 
Autonomy (properly defined) serves as a criterion for an adequate ethic of care. 
That is unless a version of the ethic of care allows for the autonomy of the 
caregiver and the care recipient, the ethic of care will be deficient on moral and 
on feminist grounds (p.21-22).  
 
She explains that there are two general categories of impediments to 
psychological autonomy in the usual liberal view. It is understood as having a 
negative component to not be coerced, and a positive component to critically 
evaluate one’s choices. Clement (1996) points out that critical reflection is itself a 
social product, and that this realisation has made many philosophers seek for 
ways that an individual can elude his or her socialisation and thus be 
autonomous in the ideal conception. However, she emphasises that although no 
one can escape his or her socialisation, it is obvious that some people are more 
autonomous, that is, in control of their lives, than others, and that we can 
recognise that critical reflection allows people to be more autonomous than they 
would be otherwise (p.23-24). 
 
The results of this thinking according to Clement (1996) present two approaches 
to the question about social constitutiveness and autonomy 
 
On the one hand, we can define autonomy and then consider whether anyone 
achieves it. On the other hand, we can observe the differences between people we 
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 consider autonomous and people we consider non autonomous, and then make 
generalisations about what constitutes autonomy (p. 24). 
 
If it is the conditions that allow individuals to be as in control of their lives as 
they can be that is important, then social conditions obviously have a role, and 
we need to expand our standard accounts of autonomy. Two major features 
need to be recognised, first we learn to become autonomous not through 
individual isolation but through relationships with others. An individual’s 
autonomy is nurtured through the care of others (Clement, 1996). Further to this 
she is careful to point out that some relationships foster these skills better than 
others and some relationships actually undermine these skills. “But 
relationships, and specifically caring relationships, are a necessary precondition 
for autonomy” (Clement, 1996, p24). The second feature is that one need not be 
coerced in that one is literally forced to do someone else’s bidding, social and 
relational circumstances can have this effect without the literal force. What 
needs to be recognised at this point, are the culturally bound norms and 
sanctions that are part of the social factors that have such influence on how 
people live their lives. 
 
There are definite possibilities for reconciliation of care and autonomy if we 
include the understanding of these features in an expanded account of 
autonomy as Clement explains doing this 
 
eliminates the excessive individualism that conflicts with the ethic of care. It also 
allows us to focus on the core of the feminist criticism of the ethic of care, namely 
that it serves to disempower women… but the notion of autonomy I defend 
would certainly not conflict with being a caregiver, instead it would seek to 
empower caregivers by demanding that they have the power to carry out their 
responsibilities adequately. (Clement, 1996, p.26) 
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 Further to this Blum, Homiak, Houseman and Scheman as cited in Clement 
(1996) emphasise  
 
Concern, care, and support may be defective unless they are founded on a strong 
sense of autonomy or independence and a healthy concern for oneself, so that in 
some sense a genuine and non-defective care actually requires autonomy (p.27). 
 
What Clement (1996) and to a lesser extent Nedelsky (1989) have demonstrated 
and contributed to the case for a place for an ethic of care in bioethics is that, it 
is possible to close the division in the feminist perspectives on an ethic of care, 
and less fully developed but still a possibility, to quiet at least some of the 
criticisms of bioethicsts and other non feminists opposed to an ethic of care. 
Reconciling care and autonomy according to Clement requires moving beyond 
the ideal types of autonomy and care, and examining different versions of both 
for compatibility to find the right balance between the connections and the 
separations between individuals.  
 
The bioethical contribution 
It might seem odd to talk about a contribution from bioethics in support of an 
ethic of care having a legitimate place in the discipline, however it does make 
one. And it comes from two different aspects of bioethics. First, not all 
bioethicists or physicians are against an ethic of care. From chapter four, 
Pellegrino, (1993) outlines the parallel development of moral philosophy on the 
one hand and medical ethics particularly in relation to the ancient but durable 
Hippocratic Oath. The Hippocratic Oath contains within it, the seeds of care 
and virtue inherent in the practice of medicine, and physicians in the present 
with the focus on market oriented health solutions are discussing the effects this 
has on their own ethics. In this, it is not so much that even concerned Physicans 
like Pellegrino (1993) and Thomasma (1994) actively embrace an ethic of care as 
espoused from the feminist or nursing perspectives, but in their questioning 
and doubts evidenced in the bioethical discourses there lie possible seeds for 
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 connection if interdisciplinary dialogue can be fostered more regularly and 
respectfully with nursing and feminism. 
 
The second contribution is also less than direct and stems from the critique of 
contemporary bioethics, by bioethicists presented in chapter five. In their 
critique of the use of the principle based approach only, they share points of 
common ground with both nursing and feminist theory and ethics in what they 
find most objectionable about using principles in clinical practice with real 
people and real lives. Although there are points of connection, they do not take 
the step of actively embracing an ethic of care as proposed either. Their own 
proposed alternatives skirt close to it using terminology and language that 
almost suggests they mean caring but never quite cross the line. However, once 
again in their questioning and critique there lie the seeds of connection. The 
question is who will make the first move and how will they go about it. 
 
In summary of the summary, It can be seen that there is a clear and unequivocal 
case for caring as an ethic of care to have a valid and respected place in 
decision-making in bioethics. However in the course of the study two broad but 
important factors that can and do impinge on these possibilities have surfaced. 
The following is a brief discussion of each that due to time constraints I have 
not been able to polish to the required standard.  
 
The constraint of caring dialogues in bioethics 
Within the discipline of bioethics, bioethicists and medical physicans, who by 
far make up the most frequent, and greatest number of contributions to the 
disciplinary discourse, dissent as to what constitutes the most effective 
approach to ethical situations. As seen in chapter five they put forward 
casuistry, narrative ethics, and virtue ethics. Some even put forward the idea 
that it needn’t be brought down to one choice that all those named could have a 
place in a plurality of approaches. Aspects of caring were addressed by some 
bioethicists and physicians, for example in Lawrence Blum’s defence of moral 
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 aspects of emotions and feelings being necessary in order to be ethical, and 
MacIntyre (1984) explored virtue and Pellegrino (1993) emphasised virtue and 
caring as important aspects of medical practice. However since the formation of 
bioethics as a discipline and despite the well documented dissent and disfavour 
of the principle based approach particularly in the clinical encounter and the 
alternatives sought for and variously developed, caring as an ethical approach 
in itself, was never put forward by bioethicists or physcians. An ethic of care as 
a viable approach to ethical situations arose out of the development of feminist 
ethics as noted in chapter three. 
 
As feminists turned their gaze on to ethics and healthcare ethics in particular 
they saw that according to Browning Cole and Coultrap-McQuin (1992) that 
although women and their values are of profound importance they were 
ignored in bioethics. Social institutions and practices in general encouraged 
discrimination against women and the suppression of their moral views; and 
finally, that these two assumptions have led to demands for a new ethical 
outlook as well as for social change. The feminist perspective though concerned 
with women’s issues and experiences also recognises the involvement of race 
and class as well as gender as issues to be addressed. It has also been made 
clear in feminist studies, that the restrictions of bias and discrimination placed 
on women in our society in effect lead to corresponding restrictions on men 
also. Thus changes to the bias and restrictions of gender would be seen to 
benefit all members of society. 
 
Women make up the greatest numbers in caring work domestically and in 
healthcare, and also significant in terms of the relationship between bioethics 
and health, is the fact that women comprise at least half of the population that 
requires healthcare. At the philosophical and theoretical levels, the actual 
nature and significance of the role of gender continues to be a matter of active 
debate in contemporary moral thinking. On a more practical level, and to state 
the obvious while avoiding getting into the sameness/difference debate at this 
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 point, the human race is made up of roughly equal proportions of the female 
and male genders. These female and male persons have at least some health 
and healthcare issues that specifically relate to their gender both biologically 
and socially at some point in their life span. The manner in which these health 
and healthcare issues are handled has important implications for bioethics. 
Thus in considering the place of caring in bioethics gender is undoubtedly an 
important issue. The gendered association of caring with women and private 
and personal, is a barrier to seeing and understanding the real value of caring to 
human beings, men women and children, their ethics, society, quality of life, 
and survival. 
 
Nurses, as they developed their own ethics as distinct from those of medicine, 
under which they had been suppressed and subsumed for most of the 
disciplines history, also voiced discontent with principle based ethics as the 
approach to use in their ethical decision making. Nurses also because of the 
fundamental place of caring in their practice supported caring as important and 
ethical in nature. However the ethic of care as developed in feminist ethics was 
not uniformly considered appropriate to be adopted into nursing ethics. 
 
Initially in the strong drive to separate themselves from medicine and stand on 
their own as a professional discipline, emphasis was put on professionalism 
and the scientific approach in education practice and research order to attain 
credibility and acceptance of their independence. Being aware that their caring 
skills were seen as unscientific, and undervalued as simply part of women’s 
expected work (whether in nursing or in the home), many nurses felt that to 
embrace an ethic of care would not be helpful to the cause of establishing their 
legitimate professional independence. Thus the vision of nursing as an ethical 
caring practice was not so much lost as submerged in the drive for 
independence and acceptance for a time, and only in some areas.  
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 More recently on seeing the impact of technology and economic and political 
policy, in the Western world, on themselves and on the people they care for the 
need for human caring to redress the dehumanisation has become of prime 
importance (Watson, 1990). There is a strong move to make visible explain and 
support the valuing of the complex caring skills developed by nurses in order 
to foster healing and health in their patients. Nurses like feminists have 
explored what traditional bioethics has to offer and explored the more recent 
proposed alternatives and have come out in the present stage of development 
of their discipline and in support of caring to embracing an ethic of care (which 
some say as always been a characteristic of nursing practice). Nursing has its 
own ethical journals and in those and other nursing journals lively debate 
seems to coming towards the acceptance of an ethic of care along with 
accepting a range of other approaches from within bioethics such as virtue 
ethics and principle based ethics which are recognised as useful in education 
and in the development of nurses from the novice stage up to the experienced 
level. Thus nursing seems to developing the notion of a sort of eclectic ethical 
tool kit if you will. 
 
However, conversely, within the discipline of bioethics, an ethic of care has 
been treated with deep suspicion if it was acknowledged at all, and discussions 
have been confined to occasional articles in bioethical/medical ethics journals, 
and two whole issues of the journal “Medicine and Philosophy” one in 1990, 
and one in 1998. And as if they indeed do not “see” caring, the bioethical 
disciplinary discourses continue to search and debate what is the best approach 
amongst both the old and new alternatives but not including caring or an ethic 
of care. 
Perspective and socialisation 
The position of caring in society is deeply and widely entrenched and is not 
going to change quickly or easily. (Tronto, 1993) It is so embedded and kept 
invisible (Benner & Wrubel, 1989; Bowden, 1997; Watson, 1990) which makes it 
difficult for people to recognise consciously that it requires more attention 
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 which is the first step to change. It is like in an addiction problem where first 
step is recognising there is a problem, feminists and nurses have done this but 
most bioethicists and physicians, have not. In the larger context outside the 
healthcare arena the main social, scientific, economic and political systems are 
still very gendered, Cartesian and positivist. These influences have a powerful 
and enduring effect on perspective, and the ability to see differently. If people 
are not presented with many different views as they are developing and 
growing it often takes some major occurrence to be able to jolt open the 
perspective to seeing differently, or the need to do so. 
 
When Wittgenstein referred to the fact that “we tend to be blind to the things 
most important to us” It makes one wonder how much of that is to do with 
what we have been socialised and trained not to see. And purely speculatively 
how much the fear of vulnerability and weakness attached to caring and 
needing care and the psychological adjustments made to cope with those fears, 
particularly resting here on Chodorow’s (1978) view of the different gender 
developmental processes of girls and boys, effects that blindness and inability 
to ”see” caring. It seems to me that the way we socialise children the way they 
acquire gender identity may have a role in the process of developing basic ways 
of seeing that may become narrowed and entrenched perspectives. 
 
The statement that we cannot come to know and understand what we do not 
see actually may hold some hope boys and girls can and do experience caring 
do know what caring is can see it and feel it from their earliest experiences in 
life up to when the developmental separation point is reached. If one were to 
take an epidemiological approach to the perpetual socialisation cycle, this early 
stage would seem most promising to break the cycle and intervene. Studies 
have shown that gender attributes are acquired very early in life thus here is the 
place to find ways to study and analyse just what we pass on to our children 
that contributes to those differences and which are acceptable and life 
enhancing for all and which are not. As for example the male fears surrounding 
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 dependence and interdependence and the need to deny the common human 
need for caring resulting from the too strong separation from the female figure 
in order to become the socially constructed idea of what it is to be a man 
(Chodorow, 1978) and similarly in case of the female where up until the recent 
past they came to see themselves only defined within relation, resulting in some 
cases in the socially constructed dependent woman (Miller, 1976). This neatly 
fits with the socially constructed ideal of the nuclear family-strong independent 
male head of the house, together with a dependent caring female to provide for 
needs of man and children. 
 
This is undeniably changing, but then even if or when the need for change is 
seen, steps towards that change are often slow and need to be supported and 
nurtured. This requires resources and time that in turn requires economic and 
political backing which is still male dominated and pervasively threaded 
through and through with Cartesian and scientific dualist abstract and 
impartial thinking. This is not to say that there aren’t men who do see and 
wholly support the need for change and aren’t diligently working within 
governments and economic systems towards those changes. However they 
remain in the minority and to the extent that they are perceived to align with a 
female caring perspective they too are often marginalized and their efforts also 
rendered less effective in the change process. 
 
Thus the place of caring and any ethic developed from it, despite having a very 
thorough and well supported research based case put forward by feminist 
theorists and nursing scholars and theorists, for its inclusion as a full and 
equally worthy approach to dealing with ethical situations arising in bioethics 
(or ethics in general), remains constrained and marginalized in a corner of the 
discipline of bioethics. This is despite the fact that through the evidence 
presented in the chapters of this thesis that those who support the inclusion of 
an ethic of care has effectively demonstrated their awareness of the negative 
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 aspects of caring and have answered each criticism levelled at it eloquently and 
effectively. 
 
The limitations and an evaluation of the study 
At the beginning of this study I was on a quest to understand more clearly than 
I did at that time, what place caring may have in bioethics. My initial impetus 
came from a paradoxical experience of personally and professionally valuing 
caring and an ethic of care, while attending a multidisciplinary bioethics 
conference, where few others there knew of, let alone valued, an ethic of care in 
bioethical decision-making. The experience was even more acute in that “the 
costs of caring”, was the focus of the conference. Using the difference between 
what I knew about caring and bioethics at the time, and what I wanted and 
needed to understand, I made the critical decision at this basic level of an initial 
exploration of a topic, to stay with a very broad approach in this study. This 
was in order to cover and allow maximum exposure to a wide range of 
information. From this position came the decision to not adopt a specific 
research methodology, in terms of selecting phenomenology for example, but to 
stay virtually at the level of the literature review stage of a research project, and 
literally immerse myself in the literature concerning caring and an ethic of care 
in bioethics. This was done with the questions in mind, what is going on here? I 
understand caring and an ethic of care to be a valuable, vital and most 
importantly an ethical part of nursing and healthcare, therefore, in a situation 
where the implications of the financial aspects of caring, were being discussed 
from a bioethical perspective, why was caring or an ethic of care virtually 
absent, or only mentioned in a dismissive manner? What place should or can 
caring really have in bioethics? The next step was deciding to include literature 
focused on caring and an ethic of care from the disciplines of bioethics, nursing 
and feminist theory and the study actively began. 
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 The choice to stay broad and immersed in the literature is an accepted valid 
approach when beginning to explore a topic (Rountree & Lang, 1996). I took 
this choice because the areas of nursing ethics, an ethic of care, and ethics in 
general are important and of particular interest for me. I intend to use this 
broad study as a beginning point for future work in this area However, in 
taking the broad view, it proved quite difficult, though not impossible, to 
handle, organise and keep track of the literature especially coming from three 
different disciplinary perspectives. I spent a long time “out there” with the 
literature, and at times lost my direction and perspective completely, “coming 
back” and making coherent sense of it all was a very long difficult process only 
able to be achieved in episodes. This experience is part of many research 
processes and not unique to my study, but if I had chosen a clearly defined 
methodological approach the process may have been more structured, concise 
and (only perhaps) less arduous. I have no wish to claim the sufferer’s crown! 
 
Initially in the data-gathering phase of the study I concentrated on online 
databases and peer reviewed journal articles listed in them. I used bioethics but 
the responses for articles involving caring and/or an ethic of care, were not 
large and did not satisfy my personal criteria for richness and depth in all of the 
disciplines. The next step was physically going to the libraries accessible to me 
and tracking down the actual articles. This solved the problem of sparse 
numbers from the databases and provided a richer source of information, in 
that within the same issue and amongst other issues that I browsed I found 
many more relevant articles. I also came across books. Unfortunately this 
undermined a clear approach to the literature in terms of crisply defined 
parameters to refer to. However, on the other hand serendipitous “finds” led to 
satisfying depth, richness and connections being made that otherwise would 
not have occurred. On reflection and in balance I feel that my choice of 
approach, and process of study development achieved my initial aim of 
exploring the possibilities for a place for caring (as an ethic of care) in bioethics, 
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 and did also provide a sound case for it to have a valid and valuable place 
alongside other accepted approaches to decision-making in bioethics. 
 
The significance of the study 
The significance of the study is that, in taking the chapters and the disciplinary 
contributions and critiques together as a whole, a robust case has been created 
for the ethical importance of caring and an ethic of care. It is a case that soundly 
and meticulously supports a valid and respected place for caring as an ethic of 
care in bioethical decision-making. The case rests predominantly on strong 
evidence provided from both the disciplines of nursing and feminist theory. 
Each had a distinctive part to contribute, along with a combined contribution 
from the areas of commonality and compatibility between them. The key is that 
the whole case is only revealed through the combined interdisciplinary picture, 
which leads one to question what further interdisciplinary study and 
communication could achieve. 
 
The implications of the study 
Relevance to nursing 
Caring is fundamental to the discipline of nursing, so much so that it is 
assumed that caring is a way of being or an ontology for nurses. Thus anything 
that effects the valuing and perception of caring is relevant to nursing. The fact 
that caring is also seen as an ethical entity adds to the importance of the 
commitment and attention nurses pay to caring. If caring is not seen, a large 
part of nursing, indeed the heart of it, is missing. Nursing is also invisible if the 
ethical aspects of caring are not accepted and valued because then a nursing 
ethic based on, or including an ethic of care will have no or less power and 
credibility. It will not help nursing’s ethical voice to be heard 
 
Having a nursing ethic and our own journals is necessary and important but the 
ethical world that nurses inhabit is multidisciplinary and also contains different 
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 spheres and levels of action and responsibility we need to be able to participate 
in ethical discussions in all these areas, this will entail being multi-perspectival, 
and having an awareness of what in any situation is gender based what is 
different paradigms or individual differences, what is management or 
organisational system problems and what is clinical. This in turn has 
implications for nursing education While waiting for the larger social changes 
to occur nurses need to look for points of connection with others involved in 
patients experiences in healthcare system. This means getting experience in 
inter-professional and interdisciplinary dialogue. The key is how others do or 
do not perceive caring and that in turn depends on so many things social 
cultural and biological that is an enormous task to attempt to influence the 
process of how people come to know about and form an understanding of 
caring . Gender obviously plays a part but it is not all that has an influence, and 
indeed given that caring is a human need, common to all, although gender is 
without doubt significant and must be addressed, it may also overly divert 
attention from searching for solutions based on commonalities and points of 
connection rather than points of difference. 
 
Reflection  
This has been an enormous learning experience. The aims I started out with 
changed and at times got lost in the sheer volume of information I encountered 
and tried to take in and organise into a coherent view. I overreached my self in 
what was appropriate and possible in a two-paper thesis. And I also over 
reached my own abilities as a novice in taking on this type of study which I 
thought initially was in the manner of a major literature review, but in 
hindsight was a raw and ungainly novice attempt along the lines of philosophic 
enquiry. I have a personal predisposition to broad thinking and making 
connections and attempting to see the whole picture from many different 
angles. 
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 According to Carper (1979) philosophic considerations of nursing and of the 
impact of social forces on the activities of nursing differ from the empirical 
investigation that acts as an end product of investigation to add to what is 
known. The objective of philosophic enquiry is not to extend the range of what 
is known but rather to form a way of critically examining or thinking about 
what is taken to be of valuable or significance, in this case, to the nurse engaged 
in the enterprise of nursing. (P. 2). In my very humble view, at the end of this 
study this seems to be close to what I have been doing Carper (is 1979) states 
that in thinking philosophically, I am concerned with carefully suggesting or 
constructing a guide to the practical activities of nursing by becoming critically 
aware of what is involved in the complex business of nursing. (P. 2). 
 
By no means am I at this stage, but this study with its required emersion in the 
literature of bioethics feminist theory and ethics and nursing theory and ethics 
has given me the beginnings of the broader picture regarding the position of 
care and an ethic of care in relation to all three disciplines. It has also given me 
an idea of the size of the project of establishing it firmly in ethical decision-
making. I remain true to my original assumption that ethical decision-making is 
not truly ethical without including the perspective of an ethic of care at the end 
of the study, if not even more reinforced and reenergized by the picture of the 
possibilities of the place of caring in bioethics that has developed in my mind 
over the course of this study.  
 
The future 
Several important directions that can be pursued as a matter of course and as 
next steps or further studies and research projects, and this is far from 
exhaustive, are 
• Continuing to support the values skills and knowledge of caring and 
ethical caring practices in my own work and life 
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 • Working in the area of finding what processes are used to teach ethics at 
undergraduate level developing them to enable nurses’ voice and ability 
to participate in ethical discussion from the stand-point of their own 
ethic and ethics 
• Where able to foster interdisciplinary dialogue when ever possible 
 
The project is of course huge and of course it is not my intention to assume any 
kind of definitive direction or answers. But what I will be doing is continuing to 
think, read, talk and research in a purposeful manner to contribute to 
acknowledging the valuing depth of skill and ethical capacities of caring in 
ethical decision making. 
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